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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Coming to Terms 
 
—I fear those big words, Stephen said, which make us so unhappy.1 
 
 
This dissertation plots a literary history of modern Britain that begins with Dorian 
Gray obsessively inspecting his portrait’s changes and ends in Virginia Woolf’s visit to 
the cinema where she found audiences to be “savages watching the pictures.”  It focuses 
on how literature written in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, focusing 
most closely on the period from 1880 to 1930, regards images as possessing a shaping 
force over how identities are understood and performed.  My central claim is that 
modernists in Britain felt mediated images were altering, rather than merely representing, 
British identity.  As Britain’s economy expanded to an unprecedented imperial reach and 
global influence, new visual technologies also made it possible to render images culled 
from across the British world—from its furthest colonies to darkest London—to the small 
island nation, deeply and irrevocably complicating British identity.  In response, Oscar 
Wilde, Henry James, Joseph Conrad, E. M. Forster, T. S. Eliot, and Virginia Woolf 
sought to better understand how identity was recognized, particularly visually.  By 
exploring how painting, photography, colonial exhibitions, and cinema sought to manage 
visual representations of identity, these modernists found that recognition began by 
acknowledging the familiar but also went further to acknowledge what was strange and 
new as well.  
This project is, then, about modernism, modernity, visual cultures, identity, and 
recognition: big words I want to unpack in this introduction.2  After giving each of these 
                                                 
1 James Joyce, Ulysses, Corrected Text, ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Vintage, 1986), 26. 
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terms its due, I will return to the argument I have begun to set forth here to add more 
depth, explain how what I have to say speaks to the discipline, and to offer a map for how 
the rest of my dissertation makes its case. 
 
Modernism and Modernity 
For whatever else it may have been, then, British modernism was a literary and 
cultural response to a period that was coming to know itself as crossed with forces that 
were competing, contradictory, incongruous, and often profoundly complex.  These grand, 
impersonal forces—capitalism, imperialism, national culture, and technology among 
them—were understood as holding undue and unregulated sway over everyday life.  The 
“crisis” of representing modern life felt by so many in Europe in the decades leading up 
to and following the turn of the twentieth century was a crisis born of this very problem.3   
In such an atmosphere, how does one begin to tell a story? 
I regard the aesthetic currents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
that we retrospectively call “modernism” as giving voice to a few key recognitions about 
the deep complexities of modern life.  In part, this is recognition in Aristotle’s sense of 
anagnorisis, a moment of epiphanies about the self and its situation in the world.  But 
modernism’s was also a particular kind of recognition, for one of the insights that reading 
modernist literature is likely to offer is that scenes of recognition are also scenes of 
misrecognition, of misunderstanding or misinterpretation.  This is because modernist 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Though I refer to the work of other scholars here, my purpose in this introduction is not to provide a 
comprehensive literature review of these topics; that would take us too far afield and take up too much 
space.  Instead, I want only to clarify my terms and adumbrate my argument. 
3 Though it has become a cliché to say that modernism was born of a “crisis of representation,” Pericles 
Lewis reinvigorates that claim by consolidating a wealth of such statements from modernists in The 
Cambridge Introduction to Modernism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
Introduction. 
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texts strongly and self-consciously suggest that any given event or cultural product 
(including a text) is overdetermined, meaning it emerges from more than one source.  
Moreover, modernist texts encourage readers to see that any event or cultural product has 
two (or more) effects, some of which we understand immediately and others that we do 
not spy for some time, if indeed we ever do.  That is the view of modernism I take in this 
project, and given debates about the definitions of modernism and modernity—debates 
that seem only to wax and wane without ever entirely disappearing—not all will find it 
satisfactory.  I will return to the topic of modernist recognition in a moment, but let me 
say here that it a is a way of coming to terms with that both allows new insights while, at 
the same time, highlighting the limits of those insights.   
For all the resistance to definition that modernism and modernity have created, 
there are two points of critical consensus surrounding modernism at the moment.  The 
first is that modernism demands deep historicizing, ways of reading that can square its 
forms and experimental techniques with events that were taking place at the same time.  
The second is that there is little else that can be agreed upon when it comes to this 
durable but vexingly inadequate label.  If it is still true that modernism is a vague term 
that signifies, as Michael Levenson wrote of modernism nearly thirty years ago, things 
have not become much clearer since.4  Perhaps its period should be expanded; perhaps its 
geography, too.5  Perhaps we should speak of modernisms instead.6  Perhaps we would 
                                                 
4 Michael Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), vii. 
5 Susan Stanford Friedman has written on this dual expansion in two counterbalancing articles: 
“Periodizing Modernism: Postcolonial Modernities and the Space/Time Borders of Modernist Studies,” 
Modernism/Modernity 13.3 (2006): 425-43; and “Planetarity: Musing Modernist Studies,” 
Modernism/Modernity 17.3 (2010): 471-99.  See also the contributions to Geomodernisms: Race, 
Modernism, Modernity, ed. Laura Doyle and Laura Wienkel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).  
For a broad but valuable survey of modernist studies since the 1990s, see Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. 
Walkowitz, “The New Modernist Studies,” PMLA 123.3 (2008): 737-48.  In addition to finding that notions 
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do better without the term altogether.7  If modernist studies is in the midst of redefining 
its key term, this project that has been going on for some time now, and with no end is in 
sight.  It seems the nature of studying modernism is to ask what the term means.8  These 
questions, it should be clear, are questions not only about modernism as such but about 
the time and place from which it emerges.  Even the most basic statements about 
modernism tend to return to questions about its context.9 
For this reason, scholars of modernism have lately been more content to make 
pronouncements on modernity rather than modernism.  Modernity may be a vague 
signifier as well, but here, at least, are a few more points of consensus.  The modern era 
begins in seventeenth-century Europe as with the onset of capitalism and Enlightenment 
rationalism; matures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and begins tending 
toward postmodernity—that is, social life defined by mass media and late capitalism—at 
or around the turn of the twentieth.  Without doubt, the crisis of representation to which 
modernists felt compelled to respond is the product of the social flux generated by 
capitalist expansion and its effects, as many have observed.  “All that is solid melts into 
                                                                                                                                                 
of modernism have been expanding in terms of time and geography, Mao and Walkowitz also discuss the 
effects of media (visual and otherwise) as a emerging as a crucial context for studying modernist literature. 
6 See The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, ed. Peter Brooker et al (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), and Peter Nicholls, Modernisms: A Literary Guide (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press). 
7 Though few are making this case, its attraction is palpable.  For example, in the Introduction to Fateful 
Beauty: Aesthetic Environments, Juvenile Development, and Literature 1860-1960 (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), Douglas Mao (a past president of the Modernist Studies Association) 
explains his decision to make “relatively sparing use of [the term] ‘modernism’ in [his] study” (12) though 
his book focuses on Wilde, Joyce, Auden, and other modern writers because of modernism’s vestigial 
associations with high culture are misleading, and because arguing a term as contested as “modernism” 
runs the risk of sidelining projects like his which at any rate are not seeking to make claims that definition.   
8 This tendency goes back to study modernism by asking fundamental questions about it appears as early as 
Harry Levin’s seminal essay, “What was Modernism?” (in Refractions: Essays in Comparative Literature 
[New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966], 271-95).  
9 To take a familiar instance, Astradur Eysteinsson insisted, “the self-conscious break with tradition must, I 
think, be seen as the hallmark of modernism, the one feature capable of lending the concept a critical 
coherence most of us can agree on, however we may choose to approach and interpret it” (The Concept of 
Modernism [London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990], 52). 
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air,” as Marx said, and, as Marshall Berman has shown some time ago, the widespread 
goal of securing affluence brought in tow a widespread sense of effluence.10  
Further, our understanding of the experiences of acquisition and circulation of 
capital and precious materials in nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been deeply 
enriched by postcolonial theory and criticism.  Scholars like Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, and 
Mary Louise Pratt have made clear that movement itself is a feature of modernity by 
exploring the period’s unprecedentedly wide-ranging travel, migrations, and commercial 
traffic.11  Postcolonial approaches to modernist studies has deepened and enriched the 
ways in which we can appreciate British identity as reflecting and seeking to resist 
movement.  For Ian Baucom, the very notion of “Britishness” was an attempt to secure a 
stable, traditional sense of Englishness by housing it in recognizable locales throughout 
England and its colonies (in the Gothic architecture Ruskin revered, the country house, 
and cricket fields, for example).  Yet wherever sites of Englishness stood, it seemed, 
colonial subjects, immigrants, and finally citizens of the Commonwealth paid tribute to 
the customary notions of what Englishness meant before the expansion of empire beyond 
the British Isles that these sites memorialized while also inhabiting and redefining those 
sites, and thereby Britishness, for themselves.  The central features for such redefinitions, 
then, are at once the locations themselves and how subjects move within and through 
these spaces.  “For in creating an empire whose commercial, political, demographic, and 
cultural economies depended on a continuous traffic between the English here and the 
                                                 
10 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Penguin, 
1988). 
11 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in Identity, Community, Culture, 
Difference, ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 222-37; and Mary Louise 
Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Writing and Transculturation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992). 
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imperial there, England rendered its spaces of belonging susceptible to a virtually infinite, 
and global, series of renegotiations.”  In these spaces, the “topographies of 
Englishness . . . are always sprawling, mutating, solidifying, and collapsing once 
again.”12  Locations and architecture meld solid identities only to watch them melt away 
once more. 
 If modern identities can be nested in a sense of place, they also reflect a sense of 
pace.  “The car [too] was modernist mobile architecture,” as Enda Duffy explains, and, 
like the architecture whose altered meanings Baucom carefully assesses, cars had more 
than one cultural meaning: they were a pleasure for travel and also a sight to see.  To see 
a fast car, or evidence of a car crash, makes for “a media spectacle” whose “power 
derives from their success at awakening our own memories of real experiences.”13  The 
ability to travel more widely and more efficiently inspired new notions of seeing as well 
as new things to see.  The many ways technologies of transportation altered modern 
life—connecting previously remote corners of the globe and creating new points of travel 
and migration and the exchange of communication and capital—were sensed individually 
as changes in visual experience.  For historians of the cinema, the technology that most 
readily anticipated filmic images was the railroad, which offered the experience of 
watching a scene pass by that appeared at once continuous and broken into frames.14  
Think, too, of the impressionism with which Conrad experiments in texts that take place 
abroad or at sea, a technique which relies on visual evidence while also remaining deeply 
                                                 
12 Ian Baucom, Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 38, 221. 
13 Enda Duffy, The Speed Handbook: Velocity, Pleasure, Modernism (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 6, 3. 
14 See Lynne Kirby, Parallel Tracks: The Railroad and Silent Cinema (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1997); and Nicholas Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. chap. 1. 
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suspect of sight itself.15  Throughout the modern era are suggestions that sight and images, 
even still images, connote a sense of movement that for many felt like the zeitgeist of the 
period.16  Such fluidity was reflected in efficient transportation, and in the alacrity with 
which one might accrue, or lose, wealth. 
 What all of this suggests—and this is the point I want to make before moving to 
the next section—is that one of the features of modern life to which modernism 
persistently points us is that the complexities of modern life bear close ties to the seen 
and unseen.  One of the peculiar facets of turn-of-the-century modernity was that, as daily 
life for many in the west became imbued with visual technologies and attention to ways 
of seeing, modern life seemed also to be defined by the global circuits of commercial and 
imperial traffic that invisibly connected European metropoles to distant lands.  If an 
invisible hand governed capitalism since its earliest stages, as Adam Smith had it, 
imperial capitalism multiplied and extended its veiled forces.  In a well-known 
representation of Edwardian London, John Maynard Keynes captures in a salubrious 
domestic scene the effects of the economic boom that began in the late nineteenth century.  
“The inhabitant of London [of “the middle and upper classes”] could order by telephone, 
sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity 
                                                 
15 The “artist [who] plunges into himself” that Conrad celebrates in his manifesto of literary impressionism, 
the Preface to The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ (1898; in Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness: Authoritative 
Texts, Background and Contexts, Criticism, ed. Paul B. Armstrong, 4th ed. [New York and London: Norton, 
2006], 279), seems a close relative of anyone who, like Tuan Jim, cannot speak the truth of his own 
narrative because “he had indeed jumped into an everlasting deep hole” (Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim, 1900 
[New York: Penguin, 1986], 125).  These metaphors centralize the praise for or discouragement regarding 
what one sees that appears throughout both texts.  For more on the visual dimension of Conrad’s 
impressionism, see Jesse Matz, Literary Modernism and Modernist Aesthetics (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 138-54. 
16 Leo Charney has found that early cinema helped characterize the modernist era as a period of “drift.”  
Yet even before the appearance of cinema, argues Lynda Nead, paintings, caricatures, and other still images 
seemed invested with a sense of mobility.  See Charney, Empty Moments: Cinema, Modernity, and Drift 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998); and Nead, The Haunted Gallery: Painting, 
Photography, Film c.1900 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
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as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep.”17  
Keynes’s imbrication of the immediate with the remote calls attention to the deep ties 
binding global commodities with local metropolitan consumer identity.  Keynes’s 
description also calls attention to the permeable boundaries separating these locations—
indeed, to the necessity of passing through these boundaries in order to construct the 
largely unseen delivery system that will respond to the phone call placed by Keynes’s 
middle- or upper-class Londoner.  Although few would say there is much in modernism 
that trusts what Conrad calls “the visible universe,”18 there is more than enough evidence 
to suggest that it is just as mistaken to read “the logic modernism” as claiming “that 
images per se are bad” as it is outdated to regard modernism(s) as possessing a singular 
“logic.”19  If we read modernism instead to gain a fuller understanding of how modern 
vision was at once revealing as well as obfuscating, we can come to a better 
understanding about how the crosscurrents of social life at the turn of the century 
impressed themselves on British subjects.  
 
                                                 
17 John Maynard Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Howe, 1920), 10-12.  Though Keynes looks back in 1919 with more than a little nostalgia, his assessment 
of a widely international economy whose products were accessible and in demand has nonetheless been 
roundly corroborated by contemporary economic historians as the closest the world came to a global 
economy before the 1980s.  For comparisons of early- and late-twentieth-century global economies, see, for 
example, Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
18 Conrad, Preface, 279. 
19 This phrase appears in Nancy Armstrong, Fiction in the Age of Photography: The Legacy of British 
Realism (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 275, but can be taken as an 
emblematic of a broader tradition of reading modernism as hostile toward sight.  I have more to say about 
this claim, and about Fiction in the Age of Photography, in Chapter 4. 
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Visual Culture and Modern Britain’s Visual Cultures 
As an object of study, “visual culture” refers to studying the range of visuality 
outside of art history proper.20  Svetlana Alpers is often credited with helping to 
popularize the term, and, as she explains in her response to the “Visual Culture 
Questionnaire” that appeared in the art theory and criticism journal October in 1996, she 
wanted a term that made it possible to discuss painting as well as “cultural resources 
related to the practice of painting,” a shift in approach meant to allow one “to focus on 
notions about vision (the mechanism of the eye), on image-making devices (the 
microscope, the camera obscura), and on visual skills (map-making, but also 
experimenting).”21  Since that time, studies contributing to knowledge on visual culture 
have continued exploring sight in various contexts in terms of power (“the gaze” or other 
dominant “ocular regimes” vs. subversive or minor acts of seeing) and alongside ways of 
making and disseminating images.22 Alpers and other theorists of visual culture, such as 
Michael Baxandall, Norman Bryson, Jonathan Crary, Michael Ann Holly, Martin Jay, W. 
J. T. Mitchell, and Keith Moxey, intend to depart from the traditional path of studying the 
history of art in order to open the tools of visual interpretation to a wider spectrum of 
cultural practices and artifacts.  The meaningful difference between the disciplines of art 
history and visual culture studies is that the latters seeks to historicize sight itself and to 
                                                 
20 There is an unfortunate ambiguity in the term “visual culture”: it is sometimes the name given to an 
object of study, and sometimes the name given to the study of that object.  I have tried to ensure that in 
these pages “visual culture(s)” refers only to what is being studied so as to deal with questions of method 
separately. 
21 “Visual Culture Questionnaire,” October 77 (Summer 1996), 26. 
22 One could cite any number of studies here, but I will cite just two that have been particularly influential 
in literary studies.  On “ocular regimes” and the rhetoric of sight as knowledge, see Martin Jay, Downcast 
Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993).  On the evolution of sight in nineteenth-century Europe and the 
development of visual technologies, see Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and 
Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). 
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widen the kinds of images and institutions, high and low alike, that can be considered 
acceptable for examination.  Many of the scholars I have just named would agree that 
studying high art and aesthetic traditions has its place, and that art history ought not to be 
abandoned.  The point of studying visual culture is, then, to augment rather than to 
replace art history.   
The study of visual culture provides theoretical models for parsing literary 
modernism’s deep engagements with a range of visual artifacts, from visual arts 
(particularly painting) to mass culture entertainments (colonial exhibitions) to visual 
media that blurred the high/low culture line (photography and cinema).  At the same time, 
literary modernism’s approach to and appropriation of visual cultures sometimes demand 
that we reconsider visual culture theories, many of which were formulated by attending to 
late-twentieth- or early-twentieth-first-century conditions.  I should be clear that my focus 
throughout is on literature and the insights the study of language has to offer.  That is, I 
am not an expert in visual forms nor pretend to be.  But recent studies of visual culture 
offer the opportunity for enriching our understanding of the cultural contexts in which 
modern writers lived and worked, and can help unknot riddles in texts particularly 
attentive to spectacles, images, and acts of looking.  In her response to the October 
questionnaire, Michael Ann Holly offers a point of departure I find useful here.  “What 
does visual culture study?  Not objects, but subjects—subjects caught in the congeries of 
cultural meanings.”23  Similarly, my focus will be on modern subjects and how they 
understand sight to play a role in constructing identities. 
 Because cultural meanings are produced in different contexts, I have found it 
useful to follow Maggie Humm in speaking not of a “visual culture” that works more or 
                                                 
23 “Visual Culture Questionnaire,” 40-1.   
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less uniformly across Britain but rather of “visual cultures” in the plural.24  I treat 
throughout to painting, photography, colonial exhibitions, and cinema as discreet visual 
cultures because each form carried its own aesthetic aims and expectations, loose set of 
conditions for viewing, and connotations for what kinds of audiences it was produced and 
marketed.  The boundaries separating these visual cultures were far from rigorously 
enforced, to be sure, but they were palpable nonetheless.  Visitors to colonial exhibitions 
might well at other times have been viewers of paintings at London’s most exclusive 
galleries and museums, of course, and certainly the authors I consider here crossed the 
boundaries of the high and the low in their visual pursuits.  E. M. Forster, for one, went to 
the Japan-British Exhibition held at Shepherd’s Bush in 1910 to see the Japanese 
paintings on display there.  He found the paintings, but not displayed according to his 
expectations.  “I have been to Shepherd’s Bush, but was disappointed,” he explained to a 
correspondent; “the painting huddled away among the commercial work, & not 
catalogued.  Then to the B[ritish] M[useum], which, with coy dignity, has brought out its 
Chino-Japanese pictures, and simply knocked Shepherd’s Bush into a cocked hat.”25  It is 
telling that Forster complains, not of the mixture of classes he would have encountered at 
the exhibition, but of the differences in how paintings are not consistently displayed—
and thus not viewed in the same way—from one visual culture to another.26   
 Visual culture studies, in short, attempts to create a discipline for studying 
everyday life by wedding social theory and art history making it well suited for the study 
                                                 
24 Maggie Humm, Modernist Women and Visual Cultures: Virginia Woolf, Vanessa Bell, Photography, and 
Cinema (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003).  Pluralizing visual cultures allows Humm to 
trace the distinct impact photography, cinema, and film journalism had on modernist writers, as well as to 
describe how Woolf and Vanessa Bell contributed to these separate modes. 
25 Selected Letters of E. M. Forster, ed. Mary Lago and P. N. Furbank, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 
1983-5), 1:109; Forster’s italics; the brackets elaborating “British Museum” belong to Lago and Furbank. 
26 E. M. Forster, “The Birth of an Empire,” in Abinger Harvest (New York: Harcourt, 1964), 47. 
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of literary modernism.  Ephemeral by definition, our sense of what the everyday must 
have been like for modern Britons remains in extant posters, pictures, and films, in the 
guidebooks that survived their exhibitions, and, most powerfully, I would insist, in 
imaginative literature.  Bringing visual culture studies to bear on modernist narratives is 
partly a way to supplement critical and historicist theories of literature.  But the study of 
visual culture is itself an unfinished and (to borrow Bahktin’s word) an unfinalizable 
project.  The chief difficulty for those who study the history of perception and vision, 
Jonathan Crary explains, is that 
perception and vision . . . have no autonomous history.  What changes are 
the plural forces and rules composing the field in which perception occurs.  
And what determines vision at any given historical moment is not some 
deep structure, economic base, or world view, but rather the functioning of 
a collective assemblage of disparate parts on a single social surface.27 
 
Though there are a number of methods for reconstructing what Crary calls the “social 
surface” of daily life—such as assembling the cultural artifacts I have just mentioned—
imaginative literature preserves that surface and its changes.  Such writing captures the 
wide, seemingly limitless expanse of vision that poses problems to Crary and other 
historians of visual culture, chronicling the changes in everyday sight brought by new 
media and new visual content alike.  Perhaps literature’s oldest lesson is that the act of 
writing (whether in chronicling or imagining) is also an act of response and theorizing, 
and the literature of modernism offers no shortage of responses to and theories of modern 
seeing.  
 
                                                 
27 Crary, Techniques, 6. 
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Identity and Recognition 
When I write of identity in this dissertation, I have in mind a social sense of self 
that emerges from contact with others, and in particular the construction of those subjects 
as we have just seen Michael Ann Holly explain it, as “caught in the congeries of cultural 
meanings.”  The cultural meanings that become most significant here are those which 
emerge where Britishness and consumer culture are in play.  As will become clear, I have 
been informed by critics who theorize identity in these or similar ways, and while I add to 
and complicate their accounts of British identity, I want to steer clear of accounts that are 
totalizing.  This will no doubt disappoint those who want a more theoretically rigorous 
sense of identity that emerges from putting, say, the Lacanian self in dialogue with 
Foucauldian power.  Or I might at least have engaged expressly with Louis Althusser, the 
theorist most closely associated with recognition and for whom identity emerges at the 
moment of being recognized (or hailed, or interpellated, in Athusserian terms) by 
another.28  I find this claim a useful starting point—as well as Althusser’s broader call for 
studying capital’s reach into all corners of social life—but little more than that.  To begin, 
one cannot speak of Althusserian recognition without finding identity always already 
ensnared within ideology, and to enter that debate now seems unnecessary as theoretical 
models of capitalist identity shift focus from the restricting power of production to the 
agency involved in consumption.29  Second, as I will be discussing in a moment, 
recognition cuts both ways: it is an act that involves one who recognizes as well as 
                                                 
28 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben 
Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-86.  W. J. T. Mitchell, whose theories of visuality 
emerge by using ideas from marxism, psychoanalysis, and iconology to critique one another, offers a useful 
challenge to Althusser’s theory of recognition by placing it against recognition as the iconologist Erwin 
Panofsky understood it.  See Mitchell, Picture Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 25-34.  
29 The theorist most closely associated with searching for new ways to inhabit a world in which capital and 
capitalist ideologies are nearly ubiquitous and anticipate the subject is Fredric Jameson. 
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another who is recognized.  For Althusser, the recognizer is always an uncomplicated 
agent of the state.30  If Althusser is at pains to claim that recognition has a politics, my 
reply would be that its politics are inextricable from the affective dimensions of 
recognition on which Althusser says little, but which modern authors and poets have 
considered deeply.  Ultimately, though, I do not take up Althusser expressly simply 
because do not find empirical definitions of identity very compelling.  Studying identity 
as a mode of self-understanding, consciously or not, that emerges and is performed, 
imagined, and which intensifies or recedes for particular people or groups at a particular 
time and place is far more practical to my mind.  Just as identity is contingent, so, too, are 
the cultural mechanisms that produce it, like recognition, products of history.  The people, 
time, and place that I study here are clear; how recognition was historically constructed 
for modernist-era Britons now needs elaboration. 
Modern writers in a variety of contexts were concerned with recognition—what it 
is, how it works, and what it does—and, in surprising contrast to many of the differences 
of the period that scholarship’s pluralized modernisms reflects, many modernists in 
Europe and America came to understand recognition in similar ways.  For these 
modernists, recognition names an initial response that is both intellectual and affective, 
and which usually involves seeing.  As Ralph Ellison’s invisible man knows, this makes 
recognition responsible to identities: “But to whom can I be responsible, and why should 
I be, when you refuse to see me?  . . .  Responsibility rests upon recognition, and 
                                                 
30 Though I do not take up Althusser expressly in Chapter 5, I read a similarly enclosed social life in 
Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907) as calling upon its readers, not to capitulate to its ideological enclosures, 
but to imagine other productive modes of resistance.  If Althusser could be read in the same way, then the 
more expansive notion of recognition I take up in this section of the introduction would be a starting point 
for critiquing interpellation as Althusser conceives it. 
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recognition is a form of agreement.”31  The agreement here rests with how viewers can 
confer the status of subject on others simply by looking at them (or refusing to), pointing 
not only to a deep-seated desire to be acknowledged but also to the power of a glance to 
confer that acknowledgement.32   
Wallace Stevens provides another iteration of this responsive and responsible 
mode:  
[W]e recognize, even if we cannot realize, the feelings of the robust poet 
clearly and fluently, noting the images in his mind and by means of his 
robustness, clearness and fluency communicating much more than the 
images themselves.  Yet we do not quite yield.  We cannot.  We do not 
feel free.33   
 
Stevens’s sense of recognition as possibly, though not necessarily, overlapping with 
realization speaks to the difference between modernist recognition and Aristotlean 
anagnorisis.  What does come through for Stevens are “images . . . communicating much 
more than the images themselves,” and though he writes with a particular text, Plato’s 
Phaedrus, in mind, it is hard not also to hear in these lines what could sound like a 
reader’s initial response to, say, “The Emperor of Ice-Cream” or “The Idea of Order at 
Key West.”  And an initial response it is: recognition is for Stevens prelude to something 
that demands more (“Yet we do not yield.  We cannot.”).  Indeed, Stevens goes on to 
illustrate his explanation of recognition as a beginning by making that explanation his 
point of departure for writing about how the imagination is inseparable from “real” life.  
Closely wed to perception and the imagination, then, recognition serves a different 
                                                 
31 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York: Vintage, 1981), 14. 
32 Kwame Anthony Appiah discusses both the affective and political dimensions of such acknowledgement 
in “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 149-64. 
33 Wallace Stevens, “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words,” in The Necessary Angel: Essays on 
Reality and the Imagination (New York: Vintage, 1965), 5. 
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purpose to moderns than it had in eras past.  As an intellectual process, recognition is 
more than acknowledging the familiar.  It is one of our operations for generating the 
possibility of becoming, of inventing new states from older ones.  In his philosophical 
mode, Eliot used recognition to delineate the process of turning what is imagined into the 
real.34  
In her recent and illuminating book, Uses of Literature, Rita Felski discusses 
recognition in this very way.  Whether in encounters with high culture aesthetics or in the 
course of daily life, recognition “brings into play the familiar and the strange, the old and 
the new, the self and the non-self.”35  Felski aims for a critical apparatus that accounts for 
how recognition can point to something one already knows while also leading one to new 
insights with what had already seemed familiar.  “Recognition is not repetition,” she 
explains; “it denotes not just the previously known, but the becoming known” (UL 25).  
As she makes clear, to think in this way is to square affective responses to aesthetic 
products like texts or pictures with theories about them so that recognizing does not 
                                                 
34 Because meanings have to be acknowledged in order to exist at all, Eliot explains, any number of 
habitual activities (“judgments” are what Eliot has in mind), do not exist unless we recognize that we are 
doing them.  Thus it is “everywhere the case,” writes Eliot in Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy 
of F. H. Bradley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), “that until the ideal is recognized as real, it 
is not even ideal.  And I use the word ‘recognize’ with this in view: the idea as idea (as meaning) is neither 
existent nor non-existent, and could we consistently keep to this internal view it would not be real.  It will 
be said, I know, that the externality of the idea is implied in its internality.  But this implication exists only 
for a point of view which contains both points of view” (37). 
35 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 49 (hereafter cited in text as UL).  
Terence Cave also centers his study Recognitions: A Study in Poetics (New York, Oxford, Toronto: 
Clarendon Press, 1988) on recognition’s ambivalence, whether it is “the mark of intelligibility or the 
unintelligible.”  He differs widely from Felski, however, in his conclusions.  His survey of recognition 
scenes in the western canon concludes with readings of James and Conrad that suggest recognition “has 
progressively become less distinct, less capable of definitive articulation; it has been wrapped in layers of 
delicate and unstable perception” (496).  I find Felski’s approach, which she calls the “phenomenology of 
recognition,” a more productive way of reading because it regards both perception and recognition as 
informing one another in particular historical situations: “What I find valuable about phenomenology is its 
attentiveness to the first person perspective, to the ways in which phenomena disclose themselves to the 
self.  Phenomenology insists that the world is always the world as it appears to us, as it is filtered through 
our consciousness, perception, and judgment” (UL 17). 
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simply reiterate.  Rather, like Stevens’s encounter with Phaedrus, Felski hopes to come 
to know happens when we “recognize [ourselves] in a book” (UL 23). 
What I am charting in this literary history of modernism’s recognitions are the 
early strands of our postmodern era in which Felski comes to these conclusions about 
recognition.  This history also has much in common with the early stages of late 
twentieth-century globalization as anthropologist Arjun Appadurai explains it.  For 
Appadurai, a number of communities across the globe have experiences governed by the 
confluence of imagination, media, and migration.  My interests are similar to Appadurai’s 
in that I am concerned with how mediated images from abroad “seem to impel 
(sometimes compel) the work of the imagination.  Together, they create specific 
irregularities because both viewers and images are in simultaneous circulation.  Neither 
images nor viewers fit into circuits or audiences that are easily bound within local, 
national, or regional spaces.”36  Because the first sizeable waves of immigration did not 
arrive in England until after the scope of my project (a moment usually dated to the 
arrival of the Empire Windrush to London from Kingston in 1948), there is less to do 
with the migration of peoples to England in the pages that follow than with the transport 
of money, artifacts, and images to London from the world over.37  For centuries it had 
been the case that the wealth acquired abroad was spent at home and, indeed, used to 
purchase furniture, sculptures, paintings, and materials like ivory and silks from 
elsewhere to decorate the English home and domesticate the foreign.  But it is also the 
                                                 
36 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), 4. 
37 Despite the fact that four of the authors I focus on here—Wilde, James, Conrad, and Eliot—immigrated 
to London, I have not taken up immigration here in part because these writers were, for the most part, eager 
to assimilate, and partly because immigration is hardly the social issue in prewar England that it becomes 
after 1948.   
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case that, from the Victorian period onward, it became increasingly difficult to 
understand where and to whom these objects and materials belonged as photographs of 
them in their indigenous locations circulated in their adopted metropolitan homes.  As a 
result, various strategies for managing recognition appeared in the nineteenth century.  
Beginning with the Great Exhibition of 1851, Britain sought to domesticate foreign items 
simply by arranging them for display, a practice that had gained a perverse edge as 
peoples, too, were put on display at colonial exhibitions beginning in the 1890s.  In time, 
mediated images themselves seemed to suggest distance and unfamiliarity.  For Woolf 
and Eliot, the new technology of cinema seemed already stippled with a sense of 
discovery from without, as if watching films were uncannily like seeing the birth western 
civilization itself.  All of these things testify to the urgency modernists and their 
contemporaries felt for being able to recognize identities captured in images and 
composed from more than one source, at once in England and territories overseas.  To 
quote Stevens once more, “If it was only the dark voice of the sea / That rose . . . But it 
was more than that.”38 
 
Recognizing Modern Identity 
We now arrive at the question of argument.  As I have been saying, I will be 
pursuing recognition as it was constructed in the modernist era, and a key component to 
this pursuit will be bringing together readings of modernism within its visual cultures.  
But why do this?  Why single out recognition as a social practice at this time?  What 
claims to British or consumer identities and to literary representations of such identities 
                                                 
38 Wallace Stevens, “The Idea of Order at Key West,” in Collected Poetry and Prose (New York: Library 
of America, 1997), 105. 
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does recognition have?  What lessons do we stand to learn by reading modernism in this 
way?   
One answer to these questions would be that the period I have referred to as “the 
modernist era”—by which I mean roughly 1880-1930—goes by other names as well.  For 
Walter Benjamin, this was the age of mechanical reproduction: the period in which 
lithography, photography, and cinema were widely distributed for the first time and the 
impact of all those images on subjectivity and politics was only beginning to be 
understood.39  For the historian Eric Hobsbawm, the same period brought Britain’s age of 
capital to a close and began its age of empire: the era of the Berlin Conference, the 
Anglo-Boer War, and the expansion of a British economy based on imperial resources 
and commodities.40  A number of very strong studies have made the case for modernism 
as the emergent aesthetics of the age of mechanical reproduction;41 many more have 
found it productive to read British modernism as emerging from the dense fabric of 
colonial and postcolonial relations.  Of late, the new modernist studies has attended to the 
convergence of these co-defining historical forces by reading the spectacular propaganda 
of empire, the power of the disembodied gaze of imperial authority, or the visual 
                                                 
39 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Version,” 
1935, trans. Harry Zohn and Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings of Walter Benjamin, ed. Marcus 
Bullock et al.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996-2003), 3:101-33.  This English translation, 
heavily revised and working from a different typescript, is now preferred to Zohn’s  previous translation, 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”  I retain this phrase because of its familiarity.  
In her article “Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s Gamble with Cinema” (October 109 [2004]: 3-45), Miriam 
Hansen explains the reasons for preferring this new translation and the typescript from which it works. 
40 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Scribner, 1975) and The Age of Empire, 
1875-1914 (New York: Vintage, 1989).  
41 Though they speak largely to an American context, the best examples here are Michael North, Camera 
Works: Photography and the Twentieth-Century Word (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005) and Karen Jacobs, The Eye’s Mind: Literary Modernism and Visual Culture (London and Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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phenomenologies of Anglophone Caribbean writers living in London.42  Yet none of 
these proposes a way of understanding how British modernism emerges as an intellectual 
and affective response to the age of empire and technological reproducibility, nor to how 
the images may have purported to represent the identities of Britons but were imagined 
by their viewers to possess other meanings, to call for other responses.  Questions about 
why modernist narratives and poems often present images as challenges to recognition, 
identity, or both go unanswered.  Attending to recognition allows us to better understand 
how Britons came to make sense of themselves, one another, and their colonial “others” 
in the course of daily life in during an age in which capital, empire, and reproducible 
images vie for the position of regnant theme.  Moreover, considering how national 
culture, capital, and visual cultures in Britain interpenetrated one another can expose 
deeper insights into the question of why modernism emerged when it did, of why 
previous aesthetic conventions seemed so untimely to the poets and novelists whose 
careers began in the fin-de-siècle and the years leading up to World War I. 
I argue that a great deal of modernist literature regarded images as extending 
identities, as shaping forces that do not simply represent what identities are but which 
have the capacity to reaffirm or alter, consolidate or fragment them as well.  Paintings, 
photographs, and films are, of course, representational forms; one could argue that even 
expressionist pictures represent desires or modes of consciousness.  Modern writers 
themselves regarded these as representational forms.  But the distinction that must be 
made is that modernists also knew that representational forms did more than the work of 
                                                 
42 These approaches can be found in a number of scholarly works that I engage with later in this 
dissertation.  A few are worth mentioning at the outset as particularly cogent and already influential: Mark 
Wollaeger, Modernism, Media, and Propaganda: British Narrative from 1900-1945 (Oxford and 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Mary Lou Emery, Modernism, the Visual, and Caribbean 
Literature (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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representation.  Images in particular have the peculiar qualities.  As W. J. T. Mitchell 
suggests in the very title of What Do Pictures Want?, viewers have a willingness to 
attribute emotions, desires, and other interior states to images.43  During the modernist era, 
a host of images define identities in various ways: portraits are meant to reflect a self-
image; photographs reproduce individuals as well as “types;” and commodity spectacles 
give shape to desires, while images of the cultural “other” offer glimpses into that with 
which Victorian and post-Victorian viewers wished to disidentify.  Further, the properties 
of images were understood to have some effect on the identities of those portrayed.  The 
portability and proliferation of mediated images alone meant such images could have 
been, and indeed, were seen by new audiences every day.  The ease and frequency with 
which an image might pass from one visual culture to another—to say nothing of their 
immersion into everyday life—also changed the conditions of viewership and visual 
interpretation before new standards could replace them.  In this way, reading modernist 
literature that explores the visual cultures of its time reveals a great deal beyond seeing or 
images as such.  It tells us about how they imagined the worlds of which they were part.  
I suspect that many of those living in Britain in the period in question knew as well as 
anyone that communal identities are constructions of the imagination.44  Indeed, 
persistent concerns about what unseen forces are holding influence over the way British 
communities were being imagined animates much of the literature of modernism. 
 In the chapters that follow, I trace the historical construction of recognition from 
the beginning of the nineteenth century to on or about 1930.  Because a loose chronology 
is implied here, let me be clear that chronology is important to my argument only as a 
                                                 
43 W. J. T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
44 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Rise of Nationalism, rev. 
ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2006). 
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loose structure.  This is not a history of concrete developments that moves in a fixed 
teleology, but a literary history that chronicles authors’ responses to acts of looking.  
These are uneven developments.  Though it will be clear that visually recognizing 
someone or something comes to acquire the denotation I outlined above in the modernist 
period, not everyone in the same time and place regards sight—let alone distinct visual 
cultures—in the same way.  Literary histories, in their most cogent forms, account for the 
different rates of processing, backward steps, recursions, and repetitions as well as 
profound insights and great leaps forward—the phases involved in all learning, including 
at a broad, cultural level. 
Chapter 2 offers a brief overview of how the cultural conditions surrounding sight 
were changing in the decades leading up to modernism.  I provide some historical 
background into the emergence of photography in Britain but attend most closely to how 
seeing was understood in nineteenth century literature by William Wordsworth and 
Thomas Hardy, and in the polemical writing of Thomas Carlyle.  Photography, according 
to these authors, had two important effects on processes of recognition.  The first was in 
making images portable, and therefore no longer determined by their contexts, so that for 
the first time natural order—the Romantic sublime itself—was effaced by an artifice that 
appeared to allow nature to write itself (as photography’s etymological root promised).  
The foundation for a picture’s meaning shifted from the image’s context to that which 
lies within the frames of the mechanically reproduced image itself, a shift that had 
implications for conceptions of identity on a number of levels.  Photography altered the 
way national identity was recognized when members of the Royal Geographical Society 
began arguing, as early as 1841, that the new medium was critically important to the 
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project of mapping the British world.  Britishness shifted from being an identity 
indigenous to Great Britain to an identity that had some degree of purchase all over the 
world.  As images of British territories from all over the world began flowing back to 
Britain itself, concerns for how to recognize British identity paralleled a general anxiety 
that, after photography, viewers could no longer make sense of the vast archive of images 
that represented the world at large.  
 Chapter 3 argues that Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891) marks a 
moment at which recognizing the image of identity becomes inextricably bound to 
misrecognizing some key feature of it.  Wilde’s novel takes the familiar medium of 
portraiture and repeatedly demonstrates that Dorian Gray’s portrait calls to be both 
recognized and reinterpreted with each viewing: each time Dorian Gray and Basil 
Hallward encounter the painting, they see the face of Dorian Gray and yet must come to 
terms with why it is not the face they expected.  Among Dorian Gray’s decadent 
behaviors that cause his portrait to alter are his acquisition of goods from all over the 
world, an obsessive and excessive stockpiling of rare, beautiful, and decorative things 
meant to make his home resemble the kind of beautiful picture his portrait cannot be.  
Reading essays and reviews in which Wilde characterized paintings as decorative art, and 
taking into account his claim that his novel was about decorative art, I argue that The 
Picture of Dorian Gray presents the accumulation and careful display of decorative 
materials and styles associated with cultures outside of Britain as part of the visual 
imagery that was meant to appear “English.” 
Focusing on the relation of identity and capital, Chapter 4 makes the case that 
Henry James regarded photography as a preeminently modern tool for recognition.  I read 
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James’s Preface to The Golden Bowl (1909) as reflecting on a career spent writing fiction 
that seeks to explore modern identity from within and without by negotiating the blurry 
boundary between character and what James sometimes called “type,” or what he calls in 
the Preface writing of “the particular attaching case plus some near individual view of 
it.”45  Photography supplies James with the metaphors and diction for explaining the acts 
of rereading and revision as acts of recognizing both the familiar and the heretofore 
unacknowledged in his own work.  Moreover, in his artist fiction, James regarded 
photography as lending a form to type.  As I make clear in a reading of “The Real Thing” 
(1892), James regarded the flatness of types and photographs as a feature that could 
either be recognized as limiting or as a point of departure for more complex identities. 
Chapter 5 explores writings by two of modernism’s best-known ironists, Joseph 
Conrad and E. M. Forster.  Writing during London’s era of colonial exhibitions, I argue 
Conrad and Forster discovered that attending to the gaze these visual contact zones 
solicit—a detached scientific gaze that does not empathize with whom or what it looks 
upon—called not for further detachment but for new forms of productive reengagement, 
such as curiosity.  In The Secret Agent (1907), Conrad ironizes late-Victorian and 
Edwardian London’s disdain for the “primitive” as necessary for recognizing “civilized” 
identity.  The conspicuous absence of genuine curiosity in The Secret Agent burdens the 
novel’s irony as the only tool available for responding to a late imperial culture Conrad 
characterizes as governed by fetishizing scientific observation.  By contrast, curiosity 
emerges in Forster’s review, “The Birth of Empire” (1924), not as irony’s naïve opposite 
but as that which may learn from the distance irony produces.  For Forster, curiosity 
                                                 
45 Henry James, Preface to The Golden Bowl, vol. 23 of The New York Edition of Henry James (New 
York: Scribner’s, 1909), v-vi. 
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serves as a necessary and fresh vantage point for recognition which tests tentative styles 
of reattachment to the metropole that seek deeper knowledge of British India and late 
imperial London than colonial exhibitions can display.  I argue that reading such texts 
today calls not for reaffirmations for ironic distance but for pursuing an alternative 
knowledge of curiosity’s role in response itself by considering it within the paradigm of 
modernist irony. 
 Chapter 6 moves from the exhibition space to the cinema house, and reads 
comments on cinema by Virginia Woolf and T. S. Eliot as capturing an approach to 
intimacy both explored further in their literature.  This chapter explores how the 
apparently opposed postures of impersonality and intimacy came to be modernism’s 
compensations for the sense of fragmentation and disunity after the emergence of film.  I 
seek to undo a commonplace in film theory that understands cinema as inviting audiences 
to identify with what they see onscreen and yet feel themselves to be incomplete, not 
fully integrated with what they are watching, a process psychoanalytically-informed film 
criticism calls “suture.”  I argue instead that the relationship between modernist 
audiences and film could be better understood by attending to writings by Woolf and 
Eliot on or informed by film which use the movement inherent in film as a way to 
describe the shifting relationship between film and audiences.  Reading Woolf’s essay on 
“The Cinema” (1926) against Walter Benjamin’s Work of Art essay (1935), I find that 
early film inspired its audiences to associate the camera eye with an anthropological gaze 
directed at their own cultures, a gaze that speaks to the desire for distant observation and 
yet feels close identification.  I find that the impulses of impersonality and intimacy tend 
to surface in Woolf’s early novel, The Voyage Out (1915), and Eliot’s early poetry and 
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poetics whenever filmic techniques, such as montage and quick cutting, are strongly 
asserted.  A brief conclusion revisits and consolidates the claims I make in the preceding 
chapters. 
If we approach recognition as a historically determined and key component to 
understanding how audiences negotiate the imaginative worlds created in stories and 
pictures with the world they imagine themselves to live in, then recognition requires the 
intense scrutiny of taking affective response as well as theoretical positions into account.  
This may be good advice for any approach to criticism, but it is indispensible for thinking 
through how aesthetics helps instruct audiences in what is known and unknown, what is 
conceivable and inconceivable.  “Precisely because of [recognition’s] fundamental 
doubleness,” Felski writes, “its oscillation between knowledge and acknowledgement, the 
epistemological and the ethical, the subjective and the social, the phenomenology of 
recognition calls for more attention in literary and cultural studies” (UL 49). This project 
hopes to contribute to that end. 
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Chapter 2 
Heroic Visions and Sixpence Photographers: Visuality and Recognition in 
Nineteenth-Century London 
 
Recognition in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
Let us begin in London in the early nineteenth century, a time safely before 
modernism but which was already bearing its earliest signs.  As England’s urban 
populations rapidly increased over the course of the nineteenth century (from one million 
in 1801 to three times as many by 1861), visual media, too, were on the rise with 
“Victorian ‘show business’ centered firmly in London.”46  Throughout the century, 
metropolitan visual cultures in England suggested to their viewers ways of seeing that 
challenged earlier assumptions about the images they mediated.  In so doing, even the 
most apparently trivial technology or novelty could urge viewers to question what kinds 
of visual interpretation certain content called for.  In a sense, this was no new 
development.  As Richard Altick explains in his magisterial The Shows of London, 
London has a long and rich history of visual cultures that reaches at least as far back as 
the medieval church’s display of religious relics in the fourteenth century.  Over the 
course of several centuries, a host of spectacles—wonder cabinets, museums, exhibitions, 
panoramas, street shows, picture-advertisements, photographic display, and 
phantasmagoria among them—provided a means of instruction to a largely illiterate 
urban population in matters of science and travel.  This education came in the form of 
entertainment, “an indispensible way of momentary escape from the dullness, the mental 
vacuity, the constriction of horizons, the suppression of the imagination which were too 
                                                 
46 Joss Marsh, “Spectacle,” A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture, ed. Herbert F. Tucker 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 277. 
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often the price of life in the enveloping city.”47  Even as London’s instructive visual 
entertainments placed a premium on audiences’ affective responses, their pedagogy was 
often in the realm of alterity and identity, at once negotiating the bounds of Englishness 
(and later, Britishness) while coterminously instructing viewers how to trace the contours 
of their own personal identities in relation to a national collective. 
In “Metropolitan Perception and the Emergence of Modernism,” Raymond 
Williams warns against regarding the metropolis as the center of the production of a 
single, dominant cultural identity.  Cities are complex and contested places, homes to a 
number of minority identities as well as dominant cultural expressions, and the conflicts 
between these are most readily apparent, Williams explains, when we attend to 
perception.  In the long history of its metropolitan visual cultures, London has inspired a 
number of responses that are suggestive of how personal narrative might be extrapolated 
from the shock of the new.  Williams enjoins his readers to trace currents of modernism 
that run far deeper than 1890 and which permeate much further than a dominant cultural 
narrative.48 
One relatively early wellspring for modernism and the fragmented metropolitan 
perception that concerns Williams, and one that is important to the concept of recognition, 
appears in Book Seventh of the 1805 Prelude, William Wordsworth’s poetic account of 
his arrival in London.49  Wordsworth’s response to the city’s new and often disruptive 
popular visual attractions and the social life that surrounds them is, as Williams points 
                                                 
47 Richard D. Altick, The Shows of London (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1978), 1-2. 
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out, instructive for understanding how modernism’s responses to its own postindustrial, 
metropolitan landscape.  Disoriented by “Advertisements of giant size” (7:210), street 
fairs (“a hell / For eyes and ears” [7:659-60]), panoramas (“the spectacles / Within doors” 
which “ape / The absolute presence of reality [7:245-6, 248-9]), and, “[a]bove all,” the 
isolation of this urban Gesellschaft where “[e]ven next-door neighbors” who see one 
another regularly live as “[s]trangers, not knowing each other’s names” (7:117-20).   
But if, as Williams suggests, Book Seventh of The Prelude is a testament to the 
how themes we typically associate with writing a century after Wordsworth are no less 
present for Romanticism (anomie, fragmentation, and concerns with mass culture among 
them), this poem also asserts itself as a triumph over London’s discomfiting visual 
environment—a triumph difficult to imagine as conceivable in the era of Prufrock’s 
observations.  Watching strangers go by, Wordsworth discovers the key to understanding 
his surroundings. 
Here, there, and everywhere, a weary throng, 
The comers and the goers face to face— 
Face after face—the string of dazzling wares, 
Shop after shop, with symbols, blazoned names, 
And all the tradesman’s honours overhead: 
Here, fronts of houses, like a title-page 
With letters huge inscribed from top to toe; 
Stationed above the door like guardian saints, 
There, allegoric shapes, female or male, 
Or physiognomies of real men, 
Land-warriors, kings, or admirals of the sea, 
Boyle, Shakespear, Newton, or the attractive head 
Of some quack-doctor, famous in his day.  (7:172-83) 
Wordsworth makes a virtue of being able to recognize the features of the city with which 
he repeatedly comes in contact (“[f]ace after face,” “[s]hop after shop”) by showing that 
the metropole can be read as a text.  By recording impressions of the city’s “motley 
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imagery” (7:150), he produces a mental legend for London’s architecture, streets, and 
people that makes parts of the city legible “like a title-page” that offers the most 
important contextual clues for making sense of all that one sees.  Storefronts become 
allegories for what they contain, as readable as the “physiognomies of real men” where 
visible surfaces provide clues of what lies beneath.  Like challenging texts, the opacity of 
this space dissolves as its most repeated images offer clues for its interpretation.  In this 
supremely disorienting space, an overarching narrative has become available to the poet. 
What’s more, by the end of Book Seventh, Wordsworth’s autobiographical 
account generalizes the particularities of his experience so that his readers may take up 
the tools left behind by the Prelude and interpret London in much the same, skillful way.  
The city that seemed at first to overwhelm with its variety of sights and swells of people 
now appears part of a grander design.  The masses who had been “melted and reduced / 
To one identity by differences / That have no law, no meaning, no end” (7:703-5) are 
gathered once more at book’s end, this time to be reinserted into a unified, cohesive story. 
But though the picture weary out the eye, 
By nature an unmanageable sight, 
It is wholly so to him who looks 
In steadiness, who hath among least things 
An under-sense of greatest, sees the parts 
As parts, but with a feeling for the whole.   
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
By influence habitual to the mind 
The mountain’s outline and its steady form 
Gives a pure grandeur, and its presence shapes 
The measure and the prospect of the soul 
To majesty: such virtue have the forms 
Perennial of the ancient hills—nor less 
The changeful language of their countenances 
Gives movement to the thoughts, and multitude, 
With order and relation.  (7:708-14; 722-30) 
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Where nearly all of Book Seventh has been devoted to detailing the specific sights, at 
times offering strings of nouns that inundate readers just as Wordsworth had felt 
overwhelmed by the city’s unrelenting spectacles,50 the focus here turns from the 
“unmanageable sight” of fragmented images to a consideration for the larger “picture.”  
Inhospitable streets, buildings, and urban flotsam are dwarfed by the “mountain’s outline” 
that tropes the return of nature to Wordsworth’s mind, the guarantor of “steady form[s]” 
that has been subtly present for the poet all along, as it is to anyone who possesses this 
kind of vision (“to him who looks / In steadiness”).  Wordsworth’s poetic mapping of 
London installs its many images within a readable context that renders even the most 
apparently meaningless sight comprehensible, transforming London from a space of 
busyness, evanescence, and confusion into one of “[c]omposure and ennobling harmony” 
(7:741). 
 I have dwelt on this poem because in it I find Wordsworth to be enacting what 
might be called a Romantic theory of vision in which Wordsworth finds a place within 
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And first, the look and aspect of the place— 
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the sublime natural order for the bewildering collection of urban images that resound 
with English history as well as colonial and commercial expansion (such as the “Land-
warriors, kings, or admirals of the sea” arraying storefronts) because he has discovered a 
way of seeing that places these images in the foreground of a broader, meaning-
bestowing context.  For all that modernism inherits from Romanticism, and for all the 
characteristics Williams rightly identifies as belonging both to the industrial and imperial 
eras, modernists departed decidedly from the Romantics on the question of how to 
represent and interpret the visible world.51 
But this Romantic vision would gradually become more difficult to sustain after 
the introduction of photography in the mid-nineteenth century with the assimilation of 
photography into everyday life.  Photography and similar technologies produced 
greater—far greater—numbers of mediated images estranged from their contexts than 
ever before, making negotiations between the singular and the general, and the personal 
and collective, increasingly uneasy.  The distinctiveness of a person, location, and work 
of art drastically changed as new technologies reversed the requirements of spectatorship, 
bringing images to viewers rather than the other way around.52  Moreover, photography 
opened questions of perception and its interpretation.  At the same time that 
photography’s admirers touted its realism, photographs also drew attention to their 
difference from unmediated human perception.  “Camera vision, in short, was essentially 
modern precisely because it was not perfectly mimetic,” writes Michal North, “because it 
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opened up to human perception possibilities unnoticed by the eye and displayed the 
‘social fantastic’53 that had lived unnoticed inside the restrictions of everyday reality.”54  
The complex questions of representation and reality that began anew with photography 
had the effect of calling attention to the problematic authority often attributed to visual 
perception. 
By making it possible to possess a visual archive of people and places, 
photography was becoming the province of recording, establishing, and reestablishing 
identities.  As changes in technological reproduction in the 1850s and 1860s made 
photographic images easier and cheaper to produce, Londoners went from relatively little 
exposure to photography to a wealth of photographed images available in an array of 
forms.  Travel photography arrived from around the world, cartes-de-visite (calling cards 
with photographs on one side) circulated among the upper and upper-middle classes, and 
urban anthropological photography captured images of the poor.  Each of these forms 
were distinct products, but, in a culture that was for the first time becoming saturated 
with mass-reproduced images, each was also instructing viewers to regard the social 
world as populated not by individuals so much as by “types.”55  This notion was soon 
reflected in literature as authors of Victorian triple-deckers made adroit use of minor 
characters whose motivations and behaviors reflected their place in the social order.  
                                                 
53 See Pierre Mac Orlan in Christopher Phillips, Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents 
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“Part of the genius of Dickens,” as E. M. Forster explains it, “is that he does use types 
and caricatures, people whom we recognize the instant they re-enter, and yet achieves 
effects that are not mechanical and a vision of humanity that is not shallow.”56  Types 
enrich the background and help characters in the foreground ring true.  
But, as Nancy Armstrong observes in Fiction in the Age of Photography, while it 
is certainly true that “types have through time and the sheer repetition and accumulation 
of photographs achieved something like the status of objects,” as something found and 
not made, the effect of this process has not been to imprison subjects in a small gallery 
from which they must choose their identity.57  On the contrary, it underscores modern 
subjectivity as located between seeing and being viewed.  One learns to recognize types 
in order to deviate from them.  I will have more to say about how Armstrong’s study of 
British realism is significant to the issue of types in Chapter 3, but for now I want to point 
out a broad claim she makes about how type emerges for Victorians alongside 
photography.   
As Victorian photography established the categories of identity—race, 
class, gender, nation, and so forth—in terms of which all other peoples of 
the world could be classified, literary realism showed readers how to play 
the game of modern identity from the position of observers.  Maintaining 
their difference from those who did not occupy this position was 
paramount.  Maintaining that difference transformed their images of other 
people into the secret core of Western individuality.58   
 
By arguing that photography robs images of their original contexts and places them 
within a new context, that of the photographic archive itself, Armstrong’s argument 
strikes at the heart of the condition of technological reproducibility.  Because 
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photographs were used as evidence for metanarratives of identity, the tension here is not 
one that is simply between images and texts.  Rather, it is a question of how to recognize 
images that, from one angle, could corroborate the metanarrative and, from another, 
could weaken it.  Reproducing the social world as realistic meant borrowing from the 
genre that purports to reflecting, not creating, that world.  But with this is also a difficulty 
of distinguishing subject and type.  Difference must be maintained, Armstrong intones, 
because in the course of standing in for a group, the typed figure in a photograph is no 
one in particular.  Evacuated of specific identity, that face could belong to many.   
For the denizens of Victorian London, this was not a mere lofty or philosophical 
issue.  In London Labour and the London Poor (1862), Henry Mayhew reports of a pair 
of disingenuous sixpence photographers who regularly convinced sitters that pictures of 
other people’s faces were, in fact, their own portraits.  Whenever this pair’s equipment 
failed, or when sitters were too impatient with the time it took to take and develop a print, 
these photographers handed over a photograph of someone else, insisting that it was “a 
correct likeness.”  Despite what might seem an improbable swindle, Mayhew’s 
photographers recall only a handful of instances when they couldn’t convince sitters of 
their ploy (such as when an elderly woman was given a photograph of a bearded sailor).  
“The fact is,” one of the photographers declared, “people don’t know their own faces.  
Half of ’em have never looked in a glass half a dozen times in their life, and directly they 
see a pair of eyes and a nose, and they fancy they are their own.”59 
 Odd as this story sounds at one level, there is a certain sense in which Mayhew’s 
anecdote delivers a familiar story about modernity.  As industrial society slips into the 
age of technological reproducibility, identity becomes more atomized, subject to the 
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depredations of anomie and fragmentation, to the point that even the features one’s own 
face appear unknown.  The burgeoning urban populations of the nineteenth century 
doubtless contribute a great deal to this sense of personal identity.  Since the technologies 
of mechanical reproducibility both inspired and aided the earliest attempts at the 
quantitative study of metropolitan life, it would be tempting to conclude that Mayhew’s 
photographers were successful at duping their patrons because those patrons were ready 
to accept that their faces were reflective of social types.  And, in fact, this is the reading 
suggested by Mayhew’s multivolume, encyclopedic contribution to the large body of 
Victorian scholarship that attempts to assemble, describe, and classify urban types with 
the aid of photography.  (Even the photographers themselves, like so many of the figures 
who populate Mayhew’s London, are known to us by profession only, their names and 
biographies having been long erased.)  But given that many of these photographers’ 
subjects needed convincing that the picture they were handed was their own, it is perhaps 
more accurate to say that these Londoners found themselves challenged to compete with 
what they were told was the veracity of the photographic eye.  They were caught in the 
difficult position North describes of having to recognize photography’s fidelity to the real 
and its “hyperreal,” mechanical presentation.  As its name suggests and as North also 
reminds, photography was initially imagined as the technology that would allow nature 
(or, better still, capital-N “Nature”) to write itself in images.  It ought to have been a 
Romantic technology par excellence.  Yet the history of photography’s reception from 
modern writers to mass culture spectators that North sedulously and sinuously traces in 
Camera Works points to the friction between the image as photography records it and the 
image as the eye perceives it.60   
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The moment at which Mayhew’s photographers hope to persuade their patrons 
into literally buying into another’s image points to the shift from a Romantic vision to a 
modern vision that unfolds at a mass cultural level.  Regardless of whether these 
photographers succeed, this moment points to the context’s failure to describe the subject 
in the picture, or, in other terms, the failure of metanarrative to define identity.  There are 
(at least) two things this moment has to teach us about how recognition has changed since 
Wordsworth.  The first is the degree to which science and technology were replacing 
nature as the great explanatory framework for urban identity.  If it seems a stretch for 
Wordsworth to relocate London under the outline of a mountain in order to extend 
nature’s jurisdiction, Mayhew’s photographers rest assured in the knowledge that telling 
their patrons that the camera never lies will be a much easier case to make.  But we also 
learn from Mayhew’s report about what happens when technology replaces nature in this 
way.  Nature lends order precisely because it exists before humanity: it requires no 
explanation because everything else should conform to its organic order.  Technology, on 
the other hand, is an artifice and system for constructing further artifices.  Like all 
artifices, including art, technology is understood as useful or accurate to the degree that it 
informs perception.  
These are important lessons for understanding how Mayhew’s story of a pair of 
opportunist sixpence photographers captures the conditions of metropolitan identity as 
the age of mechanical reproduction gets underway.  Mayhew provides a moment that 
challenges recognition by highlighting the close affinities of the unknown and the known, 
reminding that one lies just over the other’s horizon.  But what makes this moment 
particularly complex is that it poses its challenge to recognition in an unexpected way.  
                                                                                                                                                 
study is devoted to understanding how photography was regarded by moderns as a kind of writing. 
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The photographers promise their sitters that the image allegedly belonging to them is an 
unfamiliar one, and, stranger still, the sitters accept the unfamiliar likeness more often 
than not (or, at least, they are content enough to walk away from the photographers).  
There is a powerful ambivalence underwriting this story, one that suggests that the 
visitors to the sixpence photographer’s camera acknowledge a certain uneasiness with 
accepting a photograph of a strange face, but also unsure how to articulate that 
discomfiture, particularly against the temptation to defer to the mechanical eye.  “People 
will think the camera will do anything,” brims one of the photographers.61  As the 
nineteenth century approaches its close, a vast catalogue of urban photography collects 
the familiar and unfamiliar alike and retrospectively creates narratives of recognition to 
explain them.  Here is an image of the poor London street vendor, there the Indian 
shaman, and there Australian aborigine—each as identity as clear and distinct from the 
other as it is similar to those conscribed to the same category.  What to do when 
individual perception disputes the assurances of technologically reproduced (and, thus, 
putatively verifiable) information becomes no easy matter.  More importantly, it fosters a 
reliance on the ability to recognize visually displayed identity and visually encoded types. 
 
Recognition in the Age of Empire 
In the spring of 1840, a few months after Louis Daguerre had explained his new 
invention to Paris’s Académie des Sciences, Thomas Carlyle was writing his own series 
of lectures to be delivered in London on a topic apparently unrelated to the 
daguerreotype: greatness in its most ahistorical, universal sense.  But, as Carlyle explains 
it, the power one exerts depends upon how one sees, for “the degree of vision that dwells 
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in a man is a correct measure of the man,” and so his lectures on heroes would return 
again and again to the question of vision.62  In fact, the hero for Carlyle not only 
possesses incisive vision, but also illuminates the paths of others as well.  Regardless of 
place or position, Carlyle explained, the hero is “the living light-fountain,” the custodian 
of “the light which enlightens, which has enlightened the darker world and this not as a 
kindled lamp only, but rather as a natural luminary shining by the gift of Heaven; a 
flowing light-fountain, as I say, of native original insight, of manhood and heroic 
nobleness” (H 236). 
“Nobleness,” “shining by the gift of Heaven,” providing “native . . . insight” and 
“enlighten[ing] the darker world”: as his rhetoric suggests, Carlyle’s hero receives his 
mandate by dutifully bearing the responsibility of spreading European rationality to the 
rest of the world.  There is a very long tradition, one which reaches across many cultures 
of borrowing from the rhetoric sight to explain understanding, to which Carlyle’s On 
Heroes and Heroism contributes.63  But rather than simply borrowing this visual rhetoric 
in the service of knowledge once more, Carlyle makes the kind of knowledge he has in 
mind inextricable from a metaphorical clear vision, and to this knowledge he gives the 
name “visuality.”  As Nicholas Mirzoeff points out in a fascinating article, it was in On 
Heroes and Heroism that Carlyle, perhaps taken with the metaphor of light as knowledge, 
coins the term.64  Just as Wordsworth had described being able to see London by the 
conclusion of Book Seventh, Carlyle used “visuality” to mean a clear sense of wholeness 
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that subsumes apparently meaningless fragments.  Carlyle explains in a discussion of 
Dante that what made the medieval Italian poet truly heroic was his ability to see “[n]ot 
the general whole only; [for] every compartment of it is worked-out, with intense 
earnestness, into truth, into clear visuality.  Each answers to the other; each fits in its 
place, like a marble stone accurately hewn and polished” (H 320).  Carlyle prizes such 
seeing because it expresses a complex narrative in a way that is “swift, decisive, almost 
military” (H 321). 
The ease with which he moves in characterizing the personality type of the hero 
from vision to a military campaign is indicative of Carlyle’s interest in portraying heroes 
as effective leaders in expanding empire.  (Carlyle’s interest in Oliver Cromwell, who 
would be the subject of a later book, helped inspire On Heroes.)  Even England’s closest 
approximation to Dante is enlisted in this mission as one of the British Empire’s brightest 
beacons. 
England, before long, this Island of ours, will hold but a small fraction of 
the English: in America, in New Holland, east and west in the very 
Antipodes, there will be Saxondom covering great spaces of the Globe.  
And now, what is that can keep all these together in virtually one Nation, 
so that they do not fall out and fight, but live at peace, in brotherlike 
intercourse, helping one another? . . . what is it that will accomplish this?  
Acts of Parliament, administrative prime-ministers cannot. . . . Here, I say, 
is an English King, whom no time or chance, Parliament or combination 
of Parliaments, can dethrone!  This King Shakespeare, does not he shine, 
in crowned sovereignty, over us all . . . ?  We can fancy him radiant aloft 
over all the Nations of Englishmen, a thousand years hence.  (H 340) 
 
According to this line of thinking, the sovereignty of the British crown over the distant 
territories it claims as its own is less important than symbolic collective identification.  
Italy’s political unification is still two decades away, “yet,” Carlyle insists, “the noble 
Italy is actually one: Italy produced its Dante; Italy can speak” (H 341)!  If Dante can be 
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the “living light fountain” who inspires the disparate principalities of the Italian peninsula 
to unite symbolically, so, too, can Shakespeare become an icon who “shine[s]” “over all 
the Nations of Englishmen.”  For what such imagined collective identifications of 
national communities with poets offers, and which political and legal borders do not, is 
the guarantee that the people of a nation can recognize themselves as part of a single 
culture bound, if not by political sympathies, then by their shared pride and admiration 
for their artists.  If Carlyle sounds like many of his contemporaries in reading literature as 
consolidating national identities, he goes further in casting heroes Dante and Shakespeare 
as “heroes,” figures vested with a powerful, orderly, and ordering vision that sees all and 
knows how everything “fits in its place” (H 320). 
Carlyle’s invention of visuality in this sense is important in part because it 
provides a sweeping influence for transferring this kind of seeing from a medieval 
Christian theology—and, as Wordsworth would have it, from a secular Romantic 
vision—to an act necessary for the advancement of empire.  By writing of visuality as the 
province of the handful who possess a clear picture of their surroundings and a near-
divine awareness of the consequences of their own actions, Carlyle made visuality 
exclusive in both senses of that term: limiting it to an elect group, and making it a mode 
of perception that did not admit alternative epistemologies of the subject, nation, or 
empire.  Carlylean visuality, Mirzoeff writes, “was not visible to the ordinary person 
whose simple observation of events did not constitute visuality,” and thus was all the 
more prized: “[t]he centrality of Carlyle’s discourse of visualized heroism to Anglophone 
imperial culture was such that any claim to such subjectivity had to pass by visuality.”65 
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But if Carlyle would help disseminate links between visuality and imperialism, he 
was not alone in associating the two.  A year after Carlyle delivered these lectures (1841, 
the same year On Heroes was first published), Henry Fox Talbot invented the calotype in 
England, and almost immediately members of the Royal Geographical Society began 
making claims that photography was indispensible for its mission of producing British 
maps of the globe.  The renowned astronomer Sir John Herschel, who coined the term 
photography, was making the claim that geography aspires to the condition of the 
daguerreotype.  The lengthy exposure times of early photographic processes like the 
daguerreotype and calotype made them impractical for portraits, but relatively well suited 
for reproducing views of vast spaces in small, portable pictures.  Thus photographic 
apparatuses became standard equipment for all manner of expeditions from nearly the 
beginning (Herschel even mounted an unsuccessful campaign to include photographic 
equipment in an Antarctic expedition in 1839).66   
Moreover, photography’s close association with information-gathering and 
accuracy of vision made it critically important to the construction of colonial otherness in 
England.67  Like Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor, a number of 
photographers sought to contribute to proto-anthropological accounts in the form of 
photographic collections of distant cultures.  The similarity between photographing types 
in the metropole and types abroad was not lost on Victorian viewers.  About a decade 
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after Mayhew, John Tompson published Street Life in London (1878) to expand a visual 
vocabulary of the types Mayhew and others helped identify.  The techniques Tompson, a 
fellow of the Royal Geographic Society, used to photograph the London poor had been 
honed earlier the same decade when he took his camera to east Asia to photograph The 
Antiquities of Cambodia (1867) and Illustrations of China and Its People (1878).  
Tompson’s career attests to a need sensed both in the late Victorian city and the larger 
world beyond it: a need to see places and people who remain hidden to eyes that do not 
travel east (or even as far as the East End).  To see those places and people is to have 
acquired some information about them, though what that knowledge amounted to was 
difficult to say.  In lieu of descriptions, the aim in these works is simply to picture and 
compare, to classify and differentiate.  Photography’s legendary fidelity masked the 
photographer’s selectivity, and viewers seem not to have noticed that photographers may 
have labored greatly in some cases to keep with their own classificatory systems, 
“seek[ing] out a Chinese who looks more Chinese than the others,” as Jean-Paul Sartre 
later quipped.68  Tompson and Mayhew also reveal the degree to which photography 
brought changes in visual literacy that had ramifications for negotiating national identity 
and defining personal identity.  If the aim in all of this cataloging was to make strange 
and unaccounted figures familiar, it seemed to be having the opposite effect.  The 
unfamiliar now appears in starker relief. 
It is for precisely these reasons—because the recognition of one inevitably points 
to the other—that Carlyle’s ideological construction of visuality couldn’t hold.  By 
pointing to an often unacknowledged or little-discussed mode of perception, visuality 
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inevitably suggested subjective points of view also associated with vision.  As Mirzoeff 
points out, Carlyle’s intent for the term was further destabilized by the dual potential of 
vision that of “the visual subject, a person who is both the agent of sight (regardless of 
biological ability to see) and the object of discourses of visuality.”69  Edward Said tracks 
a similar trend at work more broadly in colonialist discourse in Orientalism, observing 
that the subjectivity inherent in the rhetoric of witness of cultural alterity that is required 
to maintain national identity also contains all the volatile ingredients for deconstructing 
these essentialisms.70  Recognition, and especially recognition by sight, becomes in this 
context a critically important process because it is the mode in which identities are 
defined and negotiated. 
As this reference to Said’s account of imperial European discourse suggests, the 
definition of a collective British identity in the nineteenth century rested upon perceived 
differences from colonial others.  According to other foundational writings on 
colonization by Sartre, Albert Memmi, and, above all, Franz Fanon, this process was 
central to the development of western cultural identities during imperial rule.71  Drawing 
from the intimate bonds that Hegel surmised existed between master and slave, these 
early postcolonial theorists detailed the ways in which Romantic notions of the subject—
self-sustaining, Enlightened, and bourgeois (or better)—buoyed western individuality by 
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submerging that subject’s material and financial dependency on the colonies.  For these 
writers, colonial conditions provide a perverse form of identification by which colonizers 
define themselves by negating the colonized.  In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri summarize this process in this way: “Only through opposition to the colonized 
does the metropolitan subject really become itself.  What first appeared as a simple logic 
of exclusion, then, turns out to be a negative dialectic of recognition.”72  At the same time, 
however, this conception of recognition seems meager to the task of explaining the many 
nuanced ways in which recognizing others works to help create, affirm, or challenge 
notions of identity.  Though the best postcolonial criticisms demonstrate the rich 
interplay between national, cultural, and geographical identities, this notion of 
recognition remains almost entirely uninterrogated despite influential theories of 
hybridity, performativity, and the coexistence of irreconcilable notions of identity.  It 
compels us to ask: How useful is it to continue to speak of recognition in these terms? 
The succeeding chapters will be devoted to the problems opened by this question, 
but for now, and by way of conclusion here, we can trace the ways Thomas Hardy 
brilliantly captures the difficulties of recognition and metropolitan identity as they appear 
near the end of the nineteenth century in A Laodicean (1881).  As the novel opens, the 
aristocratic De Stancy family is coming to the end of its line.  The De Stancy’s ancient 
castle has recently been purchased by an upwardly mobile railroad baron who has hired a 
young architect, George Somerset, to restore and add onto the medieval structure.  
Somerset’s antagonist is William Dare, a photographer who claims no nationality.  
Against Somerset’s geographically specific name, Dare renounces local specificities.  
                                                 
72 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 128. 
  46
When Somerset asks what place Dare calls home, he replies, “I have lived mostly in India, 
Malta, Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, and Canada.  I there invented a new photographic 
process, which I am bent upon making famous.”  Later, when other characters speculate 
about Dare but are unable to draw any conclusions about who he is—“I think he is a 
Canadian,” says one; “he is an East Indian,” declares another; “[t]here is Italian blood in 
him,” insists a third—they come to the punning conclusion that, possessing “no 
nationality,” the photographer is “[a] complete negative.”73  Hardy fuses these two 
elements of Dare’s biography so that Dare’s abilities as a photographer are, in fact, drawn 
from his origins abroad.  Emerging from his dispersed background, Dare’s life story 
reminds that the basic effect of photography entails the removal of images from their 
original contexts, the very settings that had been used to define those images, just as 
Wordsworth had rendered even London’s most vulgar advertisements and seediest street 
performances meaningful by making them part of a grander, natural scheme, and just as 
Carlyle had argued the hero was endowed with a similar vision of completeness. 
The early toll photography was taking on visual experience and visual knowledge 
is apparent in the main plot of A Laodicean, which concerns Somerset’s amorous pursuit 
of Paula Powers, the daughter of the railroad magnate who has acquired De Stancy Castle.  
When Somerset first sees Paula, she is standing before a Baptist congregation in a church 
her father had helped finance and defaulting on her promise to be baptized according to 
her father’s wishes.  Standing in refusal before the dissenting chapel, Paula’s “modern 
type of maidenhood . . . looked ultra-modern by reason of her environment” (L 11).  The 
narrative that follows this initial appearance reveals this first impression an accurate one; 
indeed, Somerset will come to have mixed feelings for this ultra-modern figure, feeling at 
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times attracted to her and at other times “a violent reaction towards modernism, 
eclecticism, new aristocracies, everything in short, that Paula represented” (L 90).  In so 
doing, A Laodicean suggests what many other realist novels do: that people can be 
understood by their appearances.  All that is in the background shapes for viewers, and 
readers, the character in the foreground.   
Yet, at the same time, the discussions about Dare’s lack of background that 
trouble the novel’s other characters means that A Laodicean testifies to the fact that 
interpreting people with reference to their background is becoming increasingly difficult 
at a time when those backgrounds—both their immediate surroundings and their 
geographical origins—are not stable.  It is not automatic that both kinds of background 
should be problematic, but Hardy’s novel often presents them as related.  The 
photographic technique Dare invents abroad is a way to manipulate images, and he 
doctors an image of Somerset at a critical point in the novel to stain the architect’s 
reputation by making him appear drunk.74  Moreover, Dare’s occupation as a 
photographer circulating the globe would almost certainly have been in the service of the 
Royal Geographical Society, for whom he would have been taking photographs to 
supplement and aid cartography, or, like Tompson, photographing nonwestern subjects 
for English viewers, helping strengthen the system of types into which Dare refuses to 
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admit himself.  In this way, A Laodicean testifies to the ways in which, at the level of 
national culture, visual media would seem to provide a clear set of boundaries between 
one nation and another, grounding the legitimacy of domestic Britishness in the rejected, 
unfamiliar alterity of the other.   
What Hardy’s novel reveals about the processes of recognition at the end of the 
nineteenth century lies in its ability to persistently create affiliations between visuality 
and transnationalism while remaining ambivalent to both.  The desire for modernity is 
coupled with the fervor of technological progress found throughout the Victorian period, 
but that yearning is tempered by an awareness that technologies are dispersing 
Britishness across the global and diluting its local particularities.  As the novel ends, 
Paula Powers styles herself “a representative of the new aristocracy of internationality” 
and elects to marry Somerset rather than a De Stancy, “a representative of the old 
aristocracy of exclusiveness” (L 376).  De Stancy Castle burns to the ground, and Paula 
and Somerset will build something new and “eclectic in style” next to the old site that 
will be “a perfect representative of ‘the modern spirit’” (L 378, 379).  But the novel’s 
final lines find the “ultra-modern” Paula unable to part entirely from traditional 
Englishness.  She laments to her new husband “I wish . . . my castle wasn’t burnt; and I 
wish you were a De Stancy” (L 379)! 
In spite of what Carlyle may have intended, making visuality a key component to 
Britishness opened the door to redefining British national identity, and the very notion of 
laying claim to identity in Britain as well by making identity subject to the unstable and 
unpredictable possibilities of recognition.  Visual recognition encompasses affective 
responses, like Paula’s appreciation for the noble De Stancy Castle, as well as the rational 
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procedures of ordering and judgment that Carlyle associates with it.  What is significant 
about the vitality of affectivity and rationality is that both contribute to the construction 
of identities, and at the turn of the twentieth century, the age of empire and mechanical 
reproduction, an unprecedented number of mediated images in paintings, photographs, 
exhibition displays, and films called upon their viewers to recognize what they see and to 
understand their relationship to “the visible universe.”75  The chapters that follow attempt 
to explain modernism’s appropriation of the affective and imaginative dimensions of 
recognition that Carlyle disavows, and how and why modernists used recognition to 
pursue their own theories of visuality.   
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Chapter 3 
Decorative Art, Accumulation, and The Picture of Dorian Gray 
 
Following the serial publication of The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), a number 
of critics disparaged the novel, and its author responded.  The exchanges in the St. James 
Gazette and the Observer in which Oscar Wilde felt called upon to defend the novel’s 
coded sexual politics have become well known as statements of Wilde’s own sexual 
politics.76  But his letters also are meant to defend an aestheticist agenda that sets beauty 
above all else and claims to have no interest in morality in art, claims which led Wilde to 
write a new Preface for his novel a year later—and which came to haunt him at Old 
Bailey in 1895.  Tucked away in these exchanges is, however, a curious comment that 
has received little attention.  After weeks of responding to critics disparaging his novel, 
Wilde made his last statement on the matter. 
Finally, let me say this—the aesthetic movement produced certain colours, 
subtle in their loveliness and fascinating in their almost mystical tone.  
They were, and are, our reaction against the crude primaries of a doubtless 
more respectable but certainly less cultivated age.  My story is an essay on 
decorative art.  It reacts against the crude brutality of plain realism.  It is 
poisonous if you like, but you cannot deny that it is also perfect, and 
perfection is what we artists aim at.77 
 
While it is no surprise to find Wilde claiming The Picture of Dorian Gray for 
aestheticism, and setting it against all that he found intolerable about realism, it is quite 
strange to discover the way in which he makes his claim: “My story is an essay on 
decorative art.”  This unelaborated comment suggests two things I want to consider here.  
The first is that Wilde meant for his novel to be read as bearing similarities to decorative 
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art; the second is that Wilde’s readers might be able to recognize a novel about a picture 
as making a contribution to decorative art. 
 If this was difficult to ascertain, it would have been much easier for Wilde’s 
earliest readers, and audiences since, to read The Picture of Dorian Gray as commenting 
on recognition itself.  Dorian Gray’s furtive but obsessive glances at his portrait come 
from finding the picture to be his own portrait, and yet to be slightly different as well.  
Like the logical reversals of Victorian common knowledge that underpin Lord Henry 
Wotton’s aphorisms, Dorian’s picture is always familiar but never as one remembers it.  
At the novel’s climax, the painter Basil Hallward finds himself in a disquieting scene of 
recognition.  The moment takes place just after Basil finds Dorian outside his home in 
Grosvenor Square late one evening, and just before he will murder Basil.  It is a foggy 
night, and Dorian, who hoped to evade his friend, almost slips by Basil, but does not.  He 
follows Dorian home where he confronts him with vague but scandalous rumors going 
around their London club.  Basil says he is fearful the rumors are slandering Dorian’s 
reputation, but what he clearly wants most is to be assured that they are unsubstantiated, 
that all those who leave the room at the very mention of Dorian’s name are mistaken.  
Basil can’t bring himself to believe rumors about anyone with a face like Dorian’s 
because, he believes, “[s]in writes itself across a man’s face,” and Dorian’s face, now 
nearly thirty-eight, remains as unsullied as ever.  But he remains doubtful.  In order to 
know for certain the rumors are not true, he would “have to see [Dorian’s] soul” (PDG 
126, 128).  Dorian laughs at first, but is soon taken with this request and leads Basil 
upstairs to the attic where he has kept his portrait hidden since it began its offending 
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changes.  And it is here that Basil looks upon his picture of Dorian Gray for the first time 
in nearly two decades. 
An exclamation of horror broke from the painter’s lips as he saw in the 
dim light the hideous face on the canvas grinning at him.  There was 
something in its expression that filled him with disgust and loathing.  
Good heavens! it was Dorian Gray’s own face that he was looking at!  The 
horror, whatever it was, had not yet entirely spoiled that marvellous 
beauty. . .  Yes, it was Dorian himself.  But who had done it?  He seemed 
to recognize his own brush-work, and the frame was his own design.  The 
idea was monstrous, yet he felt afraid.  He seized the lighted candle, and 
held it to the picture.  In the left-hand corner was his own name, traced in 
long letters of bright vermilion. 
It was some foul parody, some infamous, ignoble satire.  He had 
never done that.  Still, it was his own picture.  He knew it, and he felt as if 
his blood had changed in a moment from fire to sluggish ice.  His own 
picture!  What did it mean?  (PDG 130) 
 
What is immediately striking is this moment’s refusal to allow itself to be either a scene 
of the recognition of the familiar (though Basil understands that he has painted this 
image) or an encounter with radical, unknowable alterity (though he is, as he wished, 
looking at what the novel assures us is the image of another’s soul).  Basil understands 
what he sees to be both “his own picture” and “some foul parody” of it, a difficult fact to 
conceive because this doubleness results partly from the fact that what he sees is replete 
with “horror,” “disgust and loathing” yet still resonant with “marvellous beauty.”  The 
coterminous existence of such qualities is precisely what makes this scene so powerful 
and significant.  The strange nature of self-recognition at the heart of this novel appears 
here as it does in Dorian’s obsessive returns to his portrait. 
 A key part of recognizing that the portrait is Dorian Gray’s arrives as Basil sees 
that “the frame was his own design.”  The frame, the picture’s most decorative 
embellishment, works in this scene in a way that is central to Wilde’s conception of 
decorative art.  Decorative art is, for Wilde, a term that describes art that literally appears 
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on the margins and which is also meant to soften the edges between “art” and that which 
we typically oppose to art (“life” was Wilde’s favorite antimony; “reality” another).  As 
we shall have occasion to observe below, decorative art also denotes for Wilde an 
exchange between western and nonwestern cultures, making decorative art the nexus of 
several currents that inform identity in fin-de-siècle England, particularly among 
aristocrats like Dorian Gray, Lord Henry Wotton, and Basil Hallward.  Decorative art 
adorns the homes of these characters, as well as many of the objects found there, just as it 
was found in the homes of Wilde and his contemporaries.  There were several reasons for 
this, including making the home more pleasant, showing affiliations with aestheticism, 
and demonstrating the wealth required to purchase decorated things.  But in uniting The 
Picture of Dorian Gray with such art, Wilde seems to be suggesting that the display of 
the decorative does something more as well.  In this chapter I want to read The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, and Dorian Gray’s picture, as sites where we are invited to recognize 
Dorian Gray’s identity as inflected by the presence of decorative art.  In order to do that, 
let us first look to Wilde’s writings in the years before publishing his novel in which he 
often linked decorative art and pictures. 
 
Pictures, the Decorative, and Enjoyment 
On the evening of 30 June 1883, art students at London’s Royal Academy 
assembled to listen to Wilde deliver a lecture on painting and national traditions.  In the 
course of the evening, Wilde’s survey of visual art and artists from the classical and 
modern world refuses to define beauty, arguing instead for a descriptive theory that 
“seek[s] to materialise it in a form that gives joy to the soul through the senses.  We want 
to create it, not to define it.  The definition should follow the work: the work should not 
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adapt itself to the definition.”78  Wilde’s “Lecture to Art Students” then culminates in an 
important, though somewhat enigmatic, definition of another term.   
What is a picture?  Primarily, a picture is a beautifully coloured surface, 
merely, with no more spiritual message or meaning for you than an 
exquisite fragment of Venetian glass or a blue tile from the wall of 
Damascus.  It is, primarily, a purely decorative thing, a delight to look at.  
(“LAS” 320)  
 
At first, Wilde seems to withhold more than he discloses about the nature of pictures and 
the conditions under which they are viewed.  Yet this statement is alive to the constructed 
nature of beauty, and, upon further inspection, seems to aim at forging a particular notion 
of beauty which no doubt sounded peculiar in the ears of an audience who might well 
have been expecting the former student of John Ruskin and Walter Pater to discuss the 
beauties of La Gioconda, Turner, or the Pre-Raphealites.  Wilde passes on these, and 
indeed on pictures in the strictest sense, to turn instead toward a more flexible definition 
of pictures which underscores a “purely decorative” essence.  More surprising still, this 
aesthete refers not to the decorative arts of England’s Arts and Crafts Movement.  What 
is revealing, in other words, is that this description of pictures as decorative things 
bypasses the artifacts of England’s galleries, churches, and even its indigenous aesthetic 
movement to attach itself instead to objects from the Mediterranean.  Far from arbitrary, 
however, the provenance of Venetian glass and Damascus tile long predate modernity 
and point, in Venice, to the world’s oldest global marketplace and, in Damascus, to a city 
which Wilde had recently associated with the “incommunicable” alterity of Oriental art 
and culture for Western audiences.79  
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This exposition of pictures, which comes at an early and sometimes forgotten 
moment in Wilde’s career (when he was little more than a lecturer on aestheticism), 
restores an important context for considering his conceptions of art and modernity.  In the 
years between his address to the Royal Academy and the publication of his novel (1883-
90), Wilde employed the term decorative in a cryptic and idiosyncratic way to denote a 
form of beauty that is non-mimetic and transnational.  Writing of decorative arts in the 
dialogue essay “The Decay of Lying” (1889), for example, Wilde contends that the 
“whole history of these arts in Europe is the record of the struggle between Orientalism, 
with its frank rejection of imitation, its love of artistic convention, its dislike to the actual 
representation of any object in Nature, and our own imitative spirit.”80  Here, Wilde’s 
somewhat specious account finds its purpose in leveraging one of many salvos against 
realism.  But he could just as easily use it, as he does in an 1888 review, to attack 
Romantic expression as well as realist presentation.  
Wherever we find in European history a revival of decorative art, it has, I 
fancy, nearly always been due to Oriental influence and contact with 
Oriental nations. Our own keenly intellectual art has more than once been 
ready to sacrifice real decorative beauty either to imitative presentation or 
to ideal motive. . . . [which has been] its strength, and yet its weakness is 
there also.  It is never with impunity that an art seeks to mirror life.81 
 
As one of Wilde’s favorite metaphors—life as the mirror of art—suggests, western art 
circles around but never passes through “real decorative beauty.”  Wilde is also clear that 
such beauty is not accessed in nonwestern art either.  Rather, the suggestive metaphors 
that he begins deploying in his Royal Academy lecture, and which recur in later writings 
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such as “The Decay of Lying,” posit decorative art as belonging neither to the east nor 
the west, but arising from the “contact” or “struggle” between the two.  Wilde reiterates 
this point presumably because he feels that, as the origin point for “real decorative 
beauty,” east-west encounters may sometimes go unnoticed, that intercultural influence 
has already become naturalized for English audiences and, hence, invisible. 
One important avenue for this naturalization can be detected in Wilde’s writings 
on pictures, a subject to which he devoted more energy than he did to decorative art.  If 
pictures are “purely decorative thing[s],” as he maintained at the Royal Academy, 
pictures of the late nineteenth century nonetheless do a different kind of cultural work 
than decorative art.  The coupling of painting and decorative art is one of many occasions 
in Wilde’s oeuvre where we find him following the lead of his friend and mentor, Walter 
Pater, and taking Pater a step further.  In The Renaissance, Pater demands that “painting 
must be before all things decorative, a thing for the eye,” by which he meant that 
aesthetically pleasing painting reflects a blending of traditions, not boundaries between 
them.82  Pater has in mind the styles of painters within a Venetian school in this essay (on 
Giorgione), but Wilde clearly finds purchase in imagining the decorative as the site where 
recognition might be challenged literally from the margins, where “new” styles from all 
over the globe meet the “old” traditions of Britain and Europe.  In this way, Wilde 
maintained a distinction between the “decorative” and the “pictorial” to redress western 
visual artists for privileging realism over arepresentational aesthetics.  Illustrations in 
English books, for example, “are too essentially imitative in character,” and English 
illustrators stand to learn from “Japanese art, which is essentially decorative, [and] is 
                                                 
82 Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry, Vol. 1 of The Works of Walter Pater (London: 
Macmillan, 1900), 146.  He continues in the same passage: paintings must be “more dexterously blent than 
the marking of its precious stone or the chance interchange of sun and shade upon it.” 
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pictorial also.”83  As early as his American lecture tour of 1882-83, Wilde dichotomized 
eastern and western art as arepresentational and mimetic, respectively.  In “The English 
Renaissance of Art,” the lecture he most often delivered in America, Wilde declared  
this restless modern intellectual spirit of ours is not receptive enough of 
the sensuous element of art  …  And this indeed is the reason of the 
influence which Eastern art is having on us in Europe, and of the 
fascination of all Japanese work.  While the Western world has been 
laying on art the intolerable burden of its own intellectual doubts and the 
spiritual tragedy of its own sorrows, the East has always kept true to art’s 
primary pictorial conditions.84 
 
Whereas “[d]ecorative art emphasizes its material,” painting “annihilates it.  
Tapestry shows its threads as part of its beauty: a picture annihilates its canvas; it shows 
nothing of it” (“LAS”  321).  This material erasure accompanies the suppression of the 
cultural conditions under which Wilde had been arguing paintings are produced.  If the 
purpose of pictures is to generate aesthetic appreciation for their beauty, Wilde 
discouraged his Royal Academy listeners from inquiring into the cultural construction of 
these effects in order to underscore the effects themselves.  “A picture has no meaning 
but its beauty, no message but its joy.  That is the first truth about art that you must never 
lose sight of.  A picture is a purely decorative thing” (“LAS” 321).  In making this claim, 
Wilde positions himself to make another more significant, albeit more implicit, statement.  
If the term decorative connotes for Wilde transcultural struggle and contact, resistance 
and hybridity, Wilde claimed quite literally to see these tensions captured in 
contemporary painting.  
Dorian Gray’s picture reflects who its subject knows himself to be even as it also 
discloses to him unacknowledged, even unknown, dimensions of himself.  This is 
                                                 
83 Oscar Wilde, “Some Literary Notes,” in Reviews 392.   
84 Oscar Wilde, “The English Renaissance of Art,” in Miscellanies 260-1. 
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especially true after Dorian Gray forsakes the stability of fixed identity for sensual and 
aesthetic experimentation in the dense, lengthy chapter chronicling chains of obsessions 
with things that “possess that element of strangeness that is so essential to romance” 
(PDG 109).  Dorian Gray’s intense devotion turns from Eastern perfumes to French 
jewelry to musical instruments from Tunisia, India, and South America, eventually 
sampling as many globally purloined objects and stories as his wealth will allow.  
Unmistakably, this is the point in the novel, for Wilde as much as for his critics, that 
Dorian Gray crosses over into the sphere of the degenerate.  But this is degeneration not 
by Max Nordau’s definition (“a morbid deviation from an original type”), but closer to 
another rough contemporary, the literary critic Holbrook Jackson, who declared 
degeneration a profound sense of ennui and enervation that grows “not out of senility . . . 
but out of surfeit,” and more specifically out of the excesses that came with practices 
which “removed energy from the common life and set its eyes in the ends of the earth 
whether those ends were pictures, blue and white china, or colonies.”85  Looking back on 
the fin-de-siècle in the 1910s, Jackson captures an early sense in which national identity 
is altered by what happens at its fringes, that cultural production happens, as Homi 
Bhabha argues, at the edges or between boundaries rather than in institutionalized places 
or practices.86  Though they appear arbitrary, Jackson’s examples are incisive.  By linking 
pictures with the colonies, he points to both as sources of power that emerge from the 
margins—whose affecting power accrues precisely because of its marginal status.  
Further, in white and blue china (the example that literally appears in-between pictures 
                                                 
85 Max Nordau, Degeneration, translated from the second German edition (New York: Appleton, 1895), 16; 
italics suppressed; Holbrook Jackson, The Eighteen-Nineties: A Review of Art and Ideas at the Close of the 
Nineteenth Century, 1913 (London: Grant Richards, 1922), 65. 
86 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 2nd ed.  (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). 
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and colonies), Jackson lights upon the capacity of aristocratic home décor to deliver 
exotic art and materials to domestic English interiors, interweaving the homely with what 
Bhabha calls the “unhomely,” and wedding the tools for civilized dining with designs 
beautiful for their blending of eastern and western styles.87 
Though Wilde is a notoriously capricious thinker, reading his comments on 
pictures and decorative art throughout the 1880s and 1890s reveals an 
uncharacteristically consistent set of ideas regarding beauty and pictures.  It would not be 
an exaggeration to say, moreover, that this theory was a significant but subtle part of 
Wilde’s contribution to the aesthetic and cultural criticism of his day.  If the point is 
easily missed, it is because Wilde makes that point with a form of art that has never quite 
found a comfortable place in literary scholarship.  “It is the paradox of aestheticism,” 
goes one such dismissal, “that Ruskin and Morris wanted to revolutionize society and all 
the things in it and that finally they and their followers succeeded only in establishing a 
new decorative style. . . .  Similarly, Wilde most often shuts out the world and plays with 
decorative arabesques.”88  Yet to have muted the significance of decorative art for 
aestheticism, and Wilde in particular, is to have overlooked the force Wilde attributes to 
the presence of styles like arabesques in Europe, a powerful gravitational pull that 
demands reconsidering late Victorian England’s fascination with transnational aesthetics 
in a world still widely imagined as partitioned by distinct national cultures.   
                                                 
87 Bhabha, 14-5. 
88 René Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950, Volume 4: The Later Nineteenth Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 411.  Wellek’s discussion of Wilde here is also paradigmatic in its 
frustration with Wilde’s “divergent views,” and yet the very categories into which Wellek usefully groups 
these views—“panaestheticism, the autonomy of art, and a decorative formalism” (409)—have, I want to 
suggest, more in common than they initially seem. 
  60
In this decade Wilde persistently repeats not an analogy that likens pictures to 
decorative art but a homology that insists they are one in the same.  It is an odd way of 
speaking of both pictures and decorative art, to be sure, but one which becomes more 
clear if we read The Picture of Dorian Gray as that homology’s terminal point.  The 
suggestion I read Wilde to make is that pictures have begun to take on identities of their 
own.  That is, they have come to work in a way that is easier to see in decorative art than 
in pictures themselves.  Wilde’s descriptions of the decorative always put it on the move, 
communicating between the margin and the center on the page and shifting between east 
and west in its origins. 
 
Dorian Gray’s Decorative Effects 
Decorative art also has an important place in the compulsive search for the new, 
Wilde’s contribution to the aesthetic changes that would later be called modernism and 
which bears the distinctive markers of desires exercised in the marketplace.89  A crucial 
part of Wilde’s aim in promoting aestheticism was to define and personify “beauty” 
according to aristocratic standards of exclusivity and expense, and because so many of 
the products that were exclusive and expensive in fin-de-siècle London were imported 
products, particularly from the Arab world and East Asia, this also meant objectifying 
nonwestern cultures and people.  What western eyes see in such locations, explains Jeff 
Nunokawa in Tame Passions of Wilde, is “a longing for an exoticism removed from the 
realm of the real.”90  The styles metonymically associated with countries like China and 
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Japan, chinoiserie and japonisme, were prized for packing images with seemingly endless 
ornate details.  The many works flowing out into Europe from Japan in particular from 
the mid-nineteenth century onward could supply the yearning to which Nunokawa refers, 
but it could never slake it.  On the contrary, the extravagant style of that country came to 
mirror the excess of commodities Japanese art brought to Europe, and “to the West in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, Japan had become a storehouse for English, American, 
and French artists and collectors.”91  
By the 1890s, enough of that storehouse had been relocated to European cities for 
Vivian, Wilde’s mouthpiece in “The Decay of Lying,” to claim “the Japanese people, as 
they are presented to us in art . . . are the deliberate self-conscious creation of certain 
individual artists” (“DL” 315).  Once that style has been transported to other spaces, he 
continues, it imbues its new surroundings and those who inhabit them with its former 
location. 
And so, if you desire to see a Japanese effect, you will not behave like a 
tourist and go to Tokio.  On the contrary, you will stay at home, and steep 
yourself in the work of certain Japanese artists, and then, when you have 
absorbed the spirit of their style, and caught their imaginative manner of 
vision, you will go some afternoon and sit in the Park or stroll down 
Piccadilly, and if you cannot see an absolutely Japanese effect there, you 
will not see it anywhere.  (“DL” 315-6)  
 
What becomes clear in this moment is that the most cherished experience art can offer the 
aesthete, an exchange of the tedium of the everyday with an indulgence in the beautiful, 
can also be the displacement of national and cultural identity.  Moreover, that 
displacement occurs as those with means assert their ruling-class identities by acquiring 
private collections of Japanese art and décor.  When the aesthete’s home becomes a 
collections house for Asian styles, London eclipses Tokyo as the preeminent site for “an 
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absolutely Japanese effect” precisely because that effect is the product of “picture[s] by 
Hokusai, or Hokkei, or any of the great native painters” on display in Europe’s museums 
(“DL” 315).  For those who can afford it, the vapid mimesis that Wilde (unfairly) 
associates with Victorian realism ought to be replaced by the beauty of a foreign style 
that is best “absorbed” “at home.” 
Wilde provides a thicker description of this theory in the opening lines of The 
Picture of Dorian Gray.  As Lord Henry Wotton idles in Basil’s studio, he sits in a room 
decorated with the accouterments of imperial and global commerce: a Japanese table, 
Persian saddlebags, Egyptian cigarettes.  Birds fly across the English garden just outside, 
casting their shadows on the Indian silk curtains that hang over the studio’s window.  The 
swift movement of their shadows produces “a kind of momentary Japanese effect” for 
Lord Henry.  If these flitting shadows bring to mind the paintings Vivian described, it is 
because, for Lord Henry, they “seek to convey the sense of swiftness and motion” despite 
being images rendered in a “necessarily immobile” medium (PDG 5).  The essence of the 
“Japanese effect” is the pleasure created by the illusion of movement, and enhanced by 
the awareness of modern mobility and transportability: of being able to bring curtains 
from India or cigarettes from Egypt, and of being able to sit comfortably in a London 
abode pretending to be in a Japanese painting.   
The Japanese painting Lord Henry imagines to be at the outer edge of the studio 
does more than prefigure the novel’s eponymous shifting, fantastical picture.  Standing 
on an easel “in the centre of the room” (PDG 6), the prominently displayed portrait of 
Dorian Gray appears as much the product of global commercial networks and imperial 
reach as the furniture that surrounds it and the cigarette smoke that envelope it.  The dear 
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décor immediately indicates that we are not in the home of a starving artist but in the 
privileged room of an artist of the leisure class who, quite literally, can afford to be a 
painter.   
Clearly the foreign furniture and materials assembled in the opening tableau of 
The Picture of Dorian Gray are meant to appear elegant, beautiful, and worthy of the 
worship of pleasure Lord Henry will soon espouse and Dorian Gray will consume.  They 
are meant, that is, as a counter to the long lists of realist and moral attributes for which 
Wilde so often arraigns English art and literature.  One such list, in “The Decay of Lying,” 
is provided as evidence for the existence of “the ‘genre ennuyeux,’ the one form of 
literature that the English people seem to thoroughly enjoy” (“DL” 295-6).  In suggesting 
an alternative catalogue of things worthy of enjoyment that are not indigenous to England 
but indicative of British contact with the larger world, Wilde loosens a lynchpin of 
traditional cultural identification.  This accords with Slavoj Žižek’s explanation of how 
enjoyment is culturally constructed and understood.  Communities beyond one’s own, 
Žižek claims, are typically imagined as having a dysfunctional relationship with 
enjoyment: they are too ascetic, too indulgent, or simply don’t learn to enjoy things the 
way we do.  Thus nationalism and ethnic exceptionalism spark from the resentment that 
emerges when ethnic communities imagine that an “other” community is denying it the 
pleasures of its particular shared way of life.  The concept of an ethnically uniform 
“nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialized in a set 
of social practices and transmitted through national myths that structure these 
practices.”92  Moving the center of that enjoyment away from “curates, lawn-parties, 
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Critique of Ideology (London and Durham: Duke University Press 1993), 202; italics in original. 
  64
domesticity, and other wearisome things” (“DL” 295) and to décor imported from India, 
Persia, Egypt, or Japan to London’s parlors, the first lines of The Picture of Dorian Gray 
set the novel in the center of vast commercial circuits.  It is a difference, in other words, 
of removing the emphasis from what is distinctive about England and Englishness and 
placing it instead on the fact that London’s most wealthy obtain their symbols of status 
from elsewhere.  Rather than being that which local national identity can define itself, 
enjoyment arrives from across the Channel, if not from across the world.  Though a far 
cry from the mythologies of particularly English enjoyment (sojourns to the country 
house, for example), in an important respect, The Picture of Dorian Gray records an 
aspect of everyday aristocratic life that, by 1890, had been with Englanders for 
generations—the supplying of domestic interiors with imported goods—and renders 
those items as distinctly out of place as they are fashionably emplaced in several 
aristocratic London residences. 
As a repository of respectable expensive global commodities, Basil’s studio finds 
its counterpart in the East End opium dens Dorian Gray will later frequent.  In addition to 
being near the docks that the British Merchant Company’s commercial networks find 
their origins and their terminals, these seedy locales where Dorian Gray spends much of 
his time are also frequented by the lower-class, prostitutes, and “half-caste[s]” who smile 
a “crooked smile, like a Malay crease” (PDG 157).  Though it is here that Dorian Gray 
furtively seeks refuge from his sins and the esteemed clubs where Basil feared his 
reputation was in jeopardy, it is also here where Dorian Gray is recognized by a 
Malaysian prostitute who tells James Vane (now a sailor in the British Merchant 
Company) that Dorian Gray is, in fact, the same man responsible for Sybil Vane’s suicide 
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some years ago (PDG 159-60).  It is tempting to read this moment as an uncomfortable 
moment of recognition for Dorian Gray, and perhaps Wilde as well, about the limits of 
performed English aristocratic identity.  For Curtis Marez, it is in the opium dens that 
Dorian Gray comes in contact with “the ‘colonial’ identity Wilde had tried to erase: if the 
toothsome Malay sailors are Wilde’s others, they also constitute so many self-portraits.”93  
Yet I want to argue that at the heart of The Picture of Dorian Gray is not an attempt to 
repress or “erase” colonial identity, nor any other form of identity.  Rather, Wilde’s novel 
repeatedly asserts that the most aesthetically pleasing products of fin-de-siècle England—
beauty itself as Wilde and his contemporaries understood it—bear styles that emerge 
from transcultural contact and appear in products that can only be purchased at high, 
exclusive cost.  Just as surely as the narcotic, self-abnegating pleasure Dorian Gray 
craves in the East End is the logical endpoint of the “New Hedonism” Lord Henry 
propounds, that decadent philosophy is itself the terminus of the long leisured tradition of 
the aristocratic sampling of the wealth of “new” products from around the globe that 
make their way to London. 
If the histories of modern European metropoles are histories of imperial 
accumulation, The Picture of Dorian Gray is among London’s most self-referentially 
“modern” works because it is a novel of accumulation par excellance.  Much of the novel 
concerns itself with the consequences of Dorian Gray’s accumulation of sin, objects, and 
aesthetic and sensual experiences while making parallel glances at Britain’s accumulation 
of colonial history and commercial global transactions.  The novel is also deeply invested 
in questions of how visual culture provides the basis for understanding one’s culture by 
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reinserting images of the past into the present.  Not only can accumulation never be 
reversed or cast aside in the novel; it constantly reappears in a changing picture.  And, 
perhaps most disconcerting for late Victorian visual epistemologies, it suggests that if the 
deleterious effects of such accumulations can be seen but not visually decoded.  Just as 
sin does not write itself across a face, as Basil believes, the objects possessed by 
England’s most elite inhabitants are in plain sight but hide the costs, financial and 
otherwise, of putting them on display.  
It is in this sense that the world Dorian Gray inhabits is most aptly figured as a 
picture and purely decorative thing.  Surrounding himself with aesthetic objets culled 
from every continent, Dorian Gray’s home becomes a collections house that gives form 
and shape to Pater’s eclectic ideal.  These beautiful and absorbing possessions are meant 
to exert powerful influences over him, not because of magical or even moral qualities, but 
because of their very status as beautiful and absorbing.  Dorian Gray’s purpose in 
assembling this grand collection is to create an environment not steeped in aesthetic 
beauty but constructed from it: a gloriously aestheticist space that may exert a benevolent 
influence on Dorian Gray.94  But what Dorian Gray comes to discover is that beauty, too, 
has a history, and that his most treasured things, crafted by European artisans or Afghan 
tribesmen and collected by British tradesmen, possess other stories that neither Dorian 
Gray’s home nor Dorian himself can contain—stories which, moreover, tarnish his 
purchases and lead him to acquire still more things.  It is no accident that the chapter 
detailing the years Dorian Gray spends accumulating his collection falls halfway through 
the novel and midway through Dorian Gray’s life’s journey, a crucial point at which his 
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feelings toward the changes in his portrait turn from the masochism of “monstrous and 
terrible delight” to a mix of anxiety and weariness.95  At last it becomes clear that 
constructing a domestic interior out of pure aesthetic pleasure turns out to be a 
gargantuan effort at substituting his home for the lack of pleasure he comes to associate 
with that irretrievably doomed portrait.  Expending his fortune to create a home that 
resembles a beautiful picture, Dorian Gray hopes to press Basil’s shifting portrait of him 
further into the margins of his life and his home (he has recently relocated it to the attic 
from his bedroom).  Yet the picture’s changes nonetheless continue to close in on Dorian 
Gray. 
The allegory is not difficult to spot.  Dorian Gray comes to realize that he has 
been defined by his possessions at the very moment when his English aristocratic 
contemporaries are also adorning their homes with spoils from all over the British world.  
But if there is a sense in which Dorian Gray is a synecdoche for a larger cultural trend, 
there is also something more that is at work in Wilde’s novel.  The Picture of Dorian 
Gray caps a nearly decade-long argument Wilde had been mounting that contends that 
the things Englanders recognize as beautiful is precisely that because they also contain 
foreign elements.  This beauty is not necessarily evidence of “struggle” or even imperial 
domination; transcultural contact alone suffices.  It is an aesthetic rendering of a history 
repressed, of England’s displaced history in the colonies and elsewhere returning once 
more to its shores and altered by its wandering.  This experience of this aesthetic 
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encounter might have been figured in a number of ways, but for Wilde its best emblem is 
in pictures, things that also circulate and in so doing acquire their own meanings that are 
appended to the identities they purport to display. 
To return, then, to Basil’s reunion with the picture of Dorian Gray he had painted 
so long ago, the signs of recognition are as likely to arrive with “horror,” “disgust,” and 
“marvellous beauty” all at once (PDG 130).  Though Basil does not survive to 
disentangle these simultaneous responses, The Picture of Dorian Gray provides several 
moments at which other characters or readers may have similar feelings.  As we have 
seen, the novel’s opening scene, Dorian Gray’s acquisition of imported goods, and his 
own face all provide moments in which the familiar has also pointed beyond itself, as did 
Wilde’s dandyism and his explanation of pictures and the decorative to students at the 
Royal Academy.  But above all is the eponymous figure of Wilde’s only novel, the 
picture of Dorian Gray itself, and it is in the picture where the fixed and familiar should 
be most readily found and accessed, but which Dorian Gray and Basil Hallward find 
changed.  The frustration that leads Dorian to destroy the picture, and himself, is a 
frustration we have also seen in Wilde’s rearguard audiences and caricaturists: the 
frustration of wanting to fix an image but not being able to do so.  And that is perhaps the 
grandest statement Wilde makes about recognition: once something is be established, 
demarcated, and familiarized, it must be reassessed with each encounter because, like 
Dorian Gray’s picture, there is no guarantee that it does not change in the time between. 
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Chapter 4 
Characterizing Photography: Recognition, Type, and Authenticity in Henry James 
 
“[A]rt is nothing if not exemplary.”   
—Henry James, Preface to The Golden Bowl96 
 
Among the eminently quotable statements found in James’s Preface to The 
Golden Bowl (1909), this innocuous comment will not, I trust, be among the better 
known.  It seems a disappointing, forgettable line, perhaps even a clichéd throwaway 
unworthy of the Master, particularly in this revered document—the last preface James 
wrote for Scribner’s 1909 New York Edition and the only preface that houses his direct 
sentiments on both photography and the process of revision.   
Yet it is a revealing statement.  It comes at the end of a preface that has concerned 
itself all along with the status of art and the question of how to “view” its examples.  
Reflecting on revising his fiction for the New York Edition and writing new prefaces for 
it, James writes that he has found himself concerned with the question of negotiating the 
universal and the singular.  “I have in other words constantly inclined to the idea of the 
particular attaching case plus some near individual view of it” (GB v-vi; James’s italics).  
James imagines the view he takes as revisionist as akin to “an imagined observer’s, a 
projected, charmed painter’s or poet’s” (GB vi).  However, as he describes it, this view 
seems to belong to another imagined observer, the photographer.  His prefaces 
“repeatedly” explain “my preference . . . for ‘seeing my story’” through the eyes of  
“some more or less detached . . . though thoroughly interested and intelligent, witness or 
reporter,” a figure James regards as “a convenient substitute or apologist for the creative 
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power otherwise so veiled and disembodied” (GB v).  The implicit similarity between 
revision and photographing betrayed by James’s summary of his prefaces supplies further 
evidence for a claim critics have recently been making about James: that he writes from 
within a more complex relation to photography than he professes.97  But it is also a 
relationship, I would add, that borrows from the language of photography precisely 
because it allows James to discuss his fiction as exploring the relationship between the 
general and the example, “the particular attaching case” and the “near individual view of 
it.” 
As part of the preparations James was making for the New York Edition of his 
work, he sent express instructions to Alvin Langdon Coburn (in 1906) as to how he 
wanted the photographs for the edition to be taken.  James hoped that a Coburn 
frontispiece might be valuable in its own right and in relation to the text, “might, by a 
latent virtue in it, speak of its connection with something in the book, and yet at the same 
time speak enough for its odd or interesting self” (GB xi), and in bringing out an edition 
that could feature Coburn’s photographs alongside James’s tales, James brought his 
readers what he felt was a new means of appreciating how his characters negotiate the 
general and specific.  In his letters to Coburn, James is clear that he wanted the 
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photographs to serves as examples—“types,” James calls them—that could augment his 
stories.  Charging Coburn to search for “objects that won’t be hackneyed and 
commonplace and panoramic,” James instructs Coburn to look instead for “some view, 
rightly arrived at” and “sufficiently bedimmed and refined and glorified,” and “especially 
not choosing the pompous and obvious things that one everywhere sees photos of”: 
nothing “merely . . . familiar,” please.98  Though there are particular places he wishes 
Coburn to see, James is adamant that these locales will be suggestive as a group.  Travel 
through these London streets and those Parisian arrondissements, he declares, and “once 
you get the Type into your head, you will easily recognise the specimens.”99  To 
complete the task, as James would later explain in The Golden Bowl Preface, James 
himself had traveled with Coburn (“my fellow searcher”) to do the work James described 
as “not to ‘create’ but simply to recognise—recognise, that is, with the last fineness” (GB 
xii).  If the author and his photographer did not always find “what we were looking for,” 
James was nonetheless heartened by another discovery: “that the looking itself so often 
flooded with light the question of what a ‘subject,’ what ‘character,’ what a saving sense 
of things, is and isn’t” (GB xi).   
 Subjects, characters, and a sense of things: familiar terms that thrive on the 
interplay between definition and exception.  James himself declines on this occasion to 
define what a subject or character is, withholding those definitions in favor of letting 
examples of them in his fiction stand on their own.  In so doing, he sides with his 
contemporaries here, as when Wilde declares that art aspires not to delimit beauty but to 
present it, or, to take a later example and from the opposite direction, when the judge said 
                                                 
98 Henry James Letters, ed. Leon Edel, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap, 1974-1984), IV: 
417, 428; James’s italics. 
99 Letters, IV: 417. 
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he cannot define pornography but he knows it when he sees it.100  And this is precisely 
the point.  A sense of subjects, characters, and so much else in modernist aesthetics relies 
heavily on familiarity with examples, or, to use James’s term once more, a familiarity 
with types.   
To say it again: art is exemplary—or, to conflate James with another, so much 
depends on the example in art.  In the context I have just limned, James’s phrase might be 
read as asserting that art operates by the logic of the example that the late-nineteenth-
century profusion of photography helped install—a logic which relies on a paradox.  
When taken together, examples express similarities that can seem their reigning quality; 
when taken out of the chain, however, each example seems to radiate differences that 
defy its category.  Viewers negotiate this paradox, as James so precisely puts it, by 
learning “to recognise with the last fineness” (GB xii).  Further, if photography is the 
technology that allows James “not to ‘create’ but simply to recognise,” this raises 
questions for how does such an education comes about?  How does photography teach us 
to recognize character and type?  Correspondingly, how are the ways in which we speak 
of character and type infused with the rhetoric of photographs?  Though we are 
accustomed to thinking of the latter half of the twentieth century and the digital age as the 
society of the spectacle, James’s preface attests that the question was just as relevant after 
the sudden swell of photographic images of the 1850s and 1860s.  To be sure, recognition 
is, for James, a complex process whose first step is to see, and it is in seeing and being 
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shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see 
it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that” (Justice Potter Stewart, Concurring Opinion, 
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seen that James’s characters come to acquire both their subjectivity and their sense of 
things. 
There are many Jamesian places we might go to in order to pursue these 
questions—much too many for the space I have here.  “All of James’s work, it could be 
shown,” writes J. Hillis Miller, “turns on the undecidable question (which nevertheless 
urgently needs deciding) of whether the type or idea preexists its representation in picture 
or word, or is present in something the representation copies, or is generated by the 
representation.”101  Let us turn, then, to a short and familiar work that distills this 
question while also offering a better vocabulary than one grounded in representation.  
“The Real Thing” (1892), James’s widely anthologized short story about an illustrator 
and his down-and-out models who seem to be types precisely because they are “the real 
thing,” will do.  The difficulty of writing about “The Real Thing” as well as the question 
of example in James’s work is not just that the ground is well-worn, but that its many 
travelers have found these matters, to mix my metaphor, rather groundless for precisely 
the reasons Miller mentions.  Which comes first: the type or that which exemplifies it?  
But to approach “The Real Thing” as a tale James embeds in the representational 
economy of photography, as I will be doing here, frees us from the undecidability of this 
question.  Far from separating the image from the real, photography, as Nancy Armstrong 
explains, began cementing the notion that images are reality as early as the 1850s.102  
Keeping that in mind allows this chapter to offer a case for adding the concept of 
recognition to our historicized accounts of the problems photography posed for character, 
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type, and authenticity at the turn of the twentieth century.  Doing so will, I believe, help 
navigate around the undecidability found in the representational vocabulary of 
authenticity that often asks us to side with reality or imitation, original or copy, 
authenticity or inauthenticity.   
In making my case I am drawing from Susan Griffin’s claim that “the interactive, 
creative process of Jamesian perception provides an alternative model for a literary 
historicism, one that recognizes James as both written by, and writing, history.”  If James 
tropes the recognition of historical moment and the process of history as perceptive, it is 
surely visual, for “his descriptions of visual interplay between self and environment, we 
can trace the making of these historical identities.” 103  In another foundational study, 
“The Jamesian Lie,” Leo Bersani remarked that the ability to use sight as a tool of critical 
judgment is what James’s characters cherish most—though often to their detriment—and 
yet sight is what most allows James to usher forth their character, particularly where 
recognition is involved.104  Many critics since have followed Griffin’s and Bersani’s lead 
in tracing how vision operates in James’s texts, most recently by reading James’s 
attention to visuality as a tool for encoding or decoding (depending on how it is used) 
national or ethnic identity.105  But I want to return to the sense of recognizing identity has 
historically constructed that Griffin and Bersani suggest.  In particular, I want to claim 
that photography is, for James, the medium that frames how identities are recognized.  To 
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say this is also to make a claim for the historical construction of recognition itself.  
Pursuing the procedures of recognition will allow this chapter to contribute to my project 
by moving toward a more refined notion of what we mean when we speak of types and 
authenticity in modernity and modern fiction alike. 
 
The Jamesian Eye 
It is difficult to exaggerate James’s attention to vision, or the attention readers 
have lent to James’s descriptions of vision.  Critics since James’s contemporaries have 
understood sight as a burden James and his characters carry.  The contributors to the 
“Henry James Number” of the Little Review (August 1918), which included T. S. Eliot, 
Ezra Pound, and A. R. Orage, repeatedly describe James’s fiction as visual (“definitively 
visual,” Eliot claimed) in a way that created difficulties for James or his characters.  Ethel 
Coburn Mayne describes in that issue a photograph of the young James that appeared on 
the cover of A Small Boy and Others (1913; Fig. 3.1) as a figure for James’s own visual-
psychological investments:  
you catch already the apprehension, humorous and mournful, of all that he 
could ‘see.’  I never beheld, for my part, any creature who struck me as to 
his degree assailed by the perceptions.  The grief, heavy-lidded eyes, upon 
my word were more alarmed than piercing.  They were piercing, but it was 
as if he wished they weren’t, for dear life’s sake.106 
 
If Mayne confirms James’s “piercing” powers of sight as a burden he had to shoulder 
from an early age, she also writes of the photograph of the young James as the medium 
capable of conveying that sense.  Thus when Mayne writes of “beh[o]ld[ing]” the boy  
                                                 
106 “Henry James Number,” special edition of the Little Review (August 1918), 3.  The quotation from Eliot 
appears on p. 50. 
  76
  
 
Figure 3.1.  Frontispiece to Henry James’s A Small Boy and Others (1913), 
daguerreotype of James with his father, Henry James, Sr., by Matthew Brady, 1854.
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 “assailed by the perceptions” who would become the author, she both accedes to and 
defies James’s conception of photography.  She defies it by acknowledging photography 
to be a medium that can convey depth with surface, but she accedes to James’s sense that 
photographs can offer new forms of recognition. 
As James suggests in the Preface to The Golden Bowl, recognition is a critical 
process for negotiating singularities from general contexts, including character from type.  
While James and his characters often affirm the necessity of type, what will make “The 
Real Thing” invaluable to our discussion is that its narrator acknowledges the relationship 
between type and character to be a mutually constitutive one.  This is unusual in James.  
Though the term “type” appears throughout his fiction and nonfiction alike, it is 
sometimes discussed but more often taken for granted.  Absent throughout “The Special 
Type” (1900), for instance, is any discussion of what type is.107  James yields more 
ground when writing of visual artists.108  Painters in James’s fiction are often “much 
interested in types,”109 and the term is a regular feature of James’s own art criticism of 
the 1880s and 1890s, where James praises artists who, like John Singer Sargent, could 
find “the types which strike us as made for portraiture (which is by no means the way of 
all).”110  More disturbing is when James has national or ethnic stereotypes in mind, as 
when he concludes from Sargent’s treatment of French models that the painter “has 
studied the physiognomy of this nation so attentively” that the features of French faces 
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cling to portraits “represent[ing] other types.”111  James’s complex relationship with 
stereotypes, which others have thoughtfully explored and demonstrated that James’s 
compositions, particularly where issues of visual recognition are involved, appropriate 
the logic of racial, ethnic, and national stereotyping.112  If such scholarship means we 
take for granted that James borrowed from the logic of stereotype, the question remains 
how he understood the depth and richness associated with character to emerge from 
flatness and inauthenticity of type, and—perhaps more pertinently—what kind of 
response such writing demands from readers today. 
In an 1882 gallery review James exalted Sir Hubert von Herkomer’s portrait of 
Archibald Forbes, subtitled War Correspondent (Fig. 3.2), as “one of those fine pictures 
which, besides representing an individual, represent a type—raise the individual to the 
significance of type.  This is the roving Englishman, the man of energy and adventure, 
who has left his solid footprint in every corner of the globe, and has brought back from 
his furthest peregrinations a fund of good spirits and good stories.”113  The individual and 
the exemplar are not opposed to one another here.  Rather, James upholds a relationship 
by which character and type bolster one another, and by extension he presents the process 
of figuring character as a dialectic with the type.  If type is of higher “significance” over 
and above “the individual,” it is because the category allows a picture of a singular 
individual to be immediately recognizable as a type (“the roving Englishman,” in this 
case) and as somehow departing from the generic template.  
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Figure 3.2.  Portrait of Archibald Forbes, War Correspondent by Sir Hubert von 
Herkomer, 1881. 
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Though he speaks of a painting here, the image to which James refers has no 
indicate of which “corner of the globe” its subject stands, leaving only the khakis and 
posture to suggest “war correspondent.”  The other signs to which James refers must be 
inferred from elsewhere.  By the 1880s, in fact, it was not painters but photographers who 
were following “roving Englishm[e]n” on their “furthest peregrinations” to capture their 
images.  A large segment of the popular photography of the period circulating in 
London—where, in 1882, James resides and writes this gallery review—dedicated itself 
either to pursuing English explorers in Africa, China, and the Indian subcontinent, or to 
following in their “footprint[s].”114   
Further, just as James praises Herkomer’s painting of the roving Englishman for 
its display in a London gallery, so, too, did many of the photographers who chronicled 
explorers and cultures abroad find work in helping chronicle London’s more remote 
corners.  As we saw in Chapter 1, a number of English photographers chronicled London, 
some of whom, like John Tompson, did so after making photographic expeditions all 
over the world.  Tompson’s Illustrations of China and Its People appeared in 1874, four 
years before his images of Street Life in London, pictures that individuals while also 
portraying a general sense of London’s impoverished denizens.  It seems quite likely that 
James had a similar photographic logic of type in mind when he affirms, in the Preface to 
The Golden Bowl, photography’s “best consort” to be the “hunt for a series of 
                                                 
114 On Victorian photography that traveled to the colonies and beyond, see Peter Osborne, Traveling Light: 
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reproducible subjects,” such as the hunt on which he and Coburn went as they scoured 
“certain inanimate characteristics of London streets” for frontispieces (xi). 
But what does it mean to be able to capture characteristics in a photograph?  Does 
this procedure change when “the hunt” goes from being for “inanimate characteristics” to 
searching for people?  These questions point us to the authenticity, that concept that “The 
Real Thing” manages at once to address and elude. 
 
Picturing the Monarchs 
As both a way of being and a way of explaining connections between people and 
the material culture that surrounds them, questions about the authenticity of the subject 
have been raised since the deep holds of capitalist economies placed on Anglo-European 
social life in the nineteenth century.  Though authenticity does not always mean the same 
thing for everyone, a few broad contours hold for many.  Classically, authenticity is 
opposed to imitation; it is a way of being that asserts the singularity of the individual, of 
expressing something unique and intrinsic to her alone.  Authenticity in this sense is 
haunted by a Romantic notion of the self challenged by the market and machine forces of 
the modernist era.115  It was during the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth 
century, Orvell claims, that being authentic began to take on the valence of recovering 
something that had been lost in the connections between people and the things they 
bought or could buy.  The impulse toward the authentic was a move away from “a culture 
of types, stylizations, of round generalities” and toward “the creation of more ‘authentic’ 
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works that were themselves real things.”116  There is an ethical dimension to authenticity 
as well, which Charles Taylor summarizes like this: “There is a certain way of being 
human that is my way.  I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation 
of anyone else’s.  But this gives a new importance to being true to myself.  If I am not, I 
miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me.”117  If the primary task of 
western subjects since antiquity has been to articulate itself for itself and everyone else, 
Lionel Trilling, Orvell and Taylor suggest that task takes on greater sharpness in the 
modern era as the vocabulary of authenticity emerges to distinguish someone who acts 
according to a will or desire that emerges from deep within from someone who flatly, 
uninterestingly, and perhaps disingenuously imitates others.   
What makes “The Real Thing” particularly relevant to the topic of modernist 
authenticity is that James destabilizes this very premise.  The trouble readers of “The 
Real Thing” face immediately is that the dichotomy between authenticity and imitation is 
not taken for granted: “real” refers in the story both to things that seem to be true 
expressions of the self and to imitations of others.  To complicate matters further, the 
language of character and type in “The Real Thing” holds to the dichotomy while the 
story’s logic does not.  The narrator of “The Real Thing” seems at first to express a 
concern for type in a well-known passage. 
I wanted to characterize closely, and the thing in the world I most hated 
was the danger of being ridden by a type.  I had quarreled with some of 
my friends about it—I had parted company with them for maintaining that 
one had to be, and that if the type was beautiful (witness Raphael and 
Leonardo), the servitude was only a gain.  I was neither Leonardo or 
Raphael; I might only be a presumptuous searcher, but I held that 
everything was to be sacrificed sooner than character.  When they averred 
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that the haunting type in question could easily be character, I retorted, 
perhaps superficially: “Whose?  It couldn’t be everybody’s—it might end 
in being nobody’s.”118 
 
Here, this narrator seems to insist that type does harm, that it inflicts the violence of 
flattening or distorting character.  Yet there is clearly something more at work as James’s 
narrator utters these words amid a complaint about the futility of using the Monarchs as 
models for his illustrations.  Mrs. Monarch, who seemed from the beginning to look 
“singularly like a bad illustration (“RT” 312), now appears “insurmountably stiff” with 
“no variety of expression,” of no use to this artist who “adored variety and range” (“RT” 
326, 327).  “The case was worse with the Major—nothing I could do would keep him 
down” (“RT” 327).  As Stuart Burrows points out, the artist reads the Monarchs’ stiffness 
as embodying a stereotypical aristocratic Englishness, a mode of self-presentation that 
seems too flat and uninteresting to bother representing.119  The long passage above that 
seems to suggest an antimony between character and type actually points to a dynamic 
relationship between them.  Eager to present themselves as the aristocrats they can no 
longer claim to be, the Monarchs show no sign of possessing a character noticeably 
different from the type with which they want to associate themselves.  The narrator’s task 
is to illustrate a limited, deluxe edition of a revered English novel; to do this, he must 
“secur[e] the best types,” not the types the Monarchs present themselves as (“RT” 319). 
The narrator also associates the Monarchs’ inflexible appearance with something 
else.  “I could see she had been photographed often, but somehow the very habit that 
made her good for that purpose unfitted her for mine. . . .  [D]o what I would with it my 
drawing looked like a photograph or a copy of a photograph” (“RT” 326).  Most readings 
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of “The Real Thing” frame the narrator’s conflict in terms of representation.  Revising a 
reading popularized by F. O. Matthiessen, Susan Bazargan argues that James’s tale is not 
about an opposition between professional and amateur but about how “ideology [is] 
realized in the practice of representation itself.”120  The presence of photography in “The 
Real Thing” supplies further evidence for the Monarchs status as subjects caught in a 
system of identity formation over which they have no control because their status as 
photographed subjects renders them as “inauthentic” as photography itself.121  In 
approaching this story from another angle, I want to begin by retracing a potential 
problem for authenticity that photography poses in “The Real Thing,” but this will turn 
out not to be a problem of representation but one of recognition.  If it is the case, as 
Thomas Otten argues, “that painting makes its viewers, that viewing painting is a 
physically intimate, almost immediate process that shapes and forms and frames the body 
of the viewing subject,”122 I want to suggest that other mediated images, including 
photographs, are no less capable of participating in the process of creating subjectivity.   
If the problem of authenticity is present in scores of James’s tales, not least of 
which in “The Real Thing,” as many have suggested or implied, authenticity in these 
tales is often pursued by a nuanced notion of recognition.  In “The Real Thing” is a story 
told by a narrator whose professional aspirations turn on his ability to recognize others.  
James’s narrator is an illustrator whose “‘illustrations’ were my pot-boilers,” a means of 
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income until he can earn enough as a portrait artist to pursue that career full-time (“RT” 
310).  Indeed, the narrator fancies himself quite adept at recognizing even the most subtle 
gestures.  When the Italian model-to-be Oronte arrives at his studio, the narrator hears “a 
knock which I immediately recognised as the subdued appeal of a model out of work” 
(“RT” 331).  Yet what propels the narrative of the “The Real Thing” is the artist’s 
inability to recognize the other principal characters of the story.  The Monarchs are an 
aristocratic couple whose fortune has dwindled in recent months, so much so that they, 
too, have turned up at the artist’s door hoping to be hired as models.  The famous opening 
lines of “The Real Thing” constitute a scene that prefigures the story’s recurrent themes 
of misrecognition.123 
When the porter’s wife, who used to answer the house-bell, announced ‘A 
gentleman and a lady, sir,’ I had, as I often had in those days—the wish 
being father to the thought—an immediate vision of sitters.  And sitters 
my visitors in this case proved to be; but not in the sense I should have 
preferred.  There was nothing at first however to indicate that they 
mightn’t have come for a portrait. (“RT” 307)  
 
When the embarrassed couple reveal their intention to be hired as models for illustration, 
the narrator registers his disappointment of not being able to portray them, “for in the 
pictorial sense I had immediately seen them.  I had seized their type—I had already 
settled what I would do with it.  Something that wouldn’t absolutely have please them, I 
afterwards reflected” (“RT” 310).  The narrator’s friend, a fellow artist, also fails to size 
up the Monarchs when he sees them as bourgeois, or perhaps nouveau riche: “they were a 
compendium of everything he most objected to in the social system of his country.  Such 
people as that, all convention and patent leather, with ejaculations that stopped 
conversation, had no business in the studio” (“RT” 340).  “I don’t know,” the friend 
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bristles; “I don’t like your types” (“RT” 338).  The failure of recognizing the Monarchs 
owes to the narrator’s friend seeking to recognize the Monarchs by the social type they 
present rather than the rather atypical one they occupy: “atypical” not because theirs was 
an uncommon situation, but because it was a type that had no name (who speaks of the 
nouveau pauvre?).  That he wants to, or at any rate believes he can, identify them with 
their social standing suggests a way of seeing well outmoded by the end of the nineteenth 
century.   
 Yet the consumerism that lies beneath the narrator’s friend’s judgment is on point.  
As the narrator continues his tale, it becomes clear that an uncanny desire animates this 
pair, and much of James’s short story is spent describing how familiar and yet unfamiliar 
this desire is.  At first, he tries to put his finger on it by imagining how the Monarchs 
must have lived before they had lost their capital.  “I could see the sunny drawing-rooms, 
sprinkled with periodicals she didn’t read . . . I could see the wet shrubberies in which she 
had walked . . . I could see the rich covers the Major had helped shoot and the wonderful 
garments in which, late at night, he repaired to the smoking-room to talk about them,” 
and so forth (“RT” 316).  The narrator envisions the smallest but most telling details 
about them: how they tipped, how fastidiously they dressed, “how even in a dull house 
they could have been counted on for the joy of life” (“RT” 317).  “It was odd how 
quickly I was sure of everything that concerned them,” the narrator reports before 
plunging into the two lengthy paragraphs of these perfectly plausible-sounding 
speculations about the Monarchs’ private lives in better times (“RT” 316).  “But 
somehow,” he continues, “with all their perfections I didn’t easily believe in them.” (“RT” 
317).   
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The myriad details about the Monarchs that the narrator is able to spin seem to 
source from their from their appearances, conversations, and small gestures.  “It was in 
their faces, the blankness, the deep intellectual repose of the twenty years of country-
house visiting that had given them pleasant intonations” (“RT” 316).  But these things 
cannot be read in their faces, of course, and in the end the narrator knows he is only 
connecting plausible details of an aristocratic life with these former aristocrats, using 
their preferences and tastes to “divine” what their favorite possessions were, how and 
where they were kept in the Monarchs’ estate. The story he imagines seems “sure,” but 
this is a story created by an artist.  The Monarchs themselves have not told it and do not 
know how to, at least not in the way a professional would.  The tragedy of the story is in 
their clumsy grasping at explaining themselves.  Each time they speak they can’t help but 
evoke the desperation of their new and unfitting financial straits rather than the depth of 
their humanity, which the narrator does with the quick and apparently effortless ease of 
the studied artist.  
I want to suggest that the narrator invents this background as part of his much 
professed “preference for the represented subject over the real one,” a preference that can 
be traced the fact that he wants to uphold the crafts of representation (storytelling, 
painting) over the instrumental, unapprenticed acts of representation (stereotype, 
photography) (“RT” 317).  This is the straightforward view of representation and 
authenticity so often repeated in James studies.  It is the preference for “things that 
appeared; then one was sure.  Whether they were or not was a subordinate and almost 
always profitless question” (“RT” 317-8).   
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This interpretation follows the narrator in not paying nearly enough attention to 
the Monarchs, for whom profit is hard to come by and whose knock upon the artist’s door 
has much greater purpose than he realizes.  Caught up in the mix-up of thinking that they 
are portrait sitters when in fact they are not, the artist never puts together the story with 
which he provides his readers piecemeal.  The Monarchs came to this illustrator at this 
time because they were recommended by his friend, a landscape painter who “had told 
them of the projected édition de luxe . . . planned by a publisher of taste” that the narrator 
has recently been commissioned to complete.  “Major and Mrs. Monarch confessed to me 
they had hoped I might be able to work them into my branch of the enterprise” (“RT” 
318).  As we have seen, using the Monarchs as models proves a spectacular failure, but 
the equally significant point is that while the narrator complains of that they seem too 
much like photographs to be illustrated, the Monarchs spend the rest of the story trying 
not just to be working models but to be illustrated in this deluxe edition.  Major 
Monarch’s final complaint, the one that sets the narrator over the edge (“I can’t be ruined 
for you!”) is using the Italian Oronte to illustrate “an English gentleman” (“RT” 342) for 
an edition whose illustrations were intended to be an “homage of English art to one of the 
most independent representatives of English letters” (“RT” 318). 
An important clue to this reading emerges as the Monarchs explain an important 
part of their past, and as the narrator explains the demands illustration exacts on its 
models. 
“Of course I should want a certain amount of expression,” I 
rejoined. 
  “Of course!”—and I had never heard such unanimity. 
  “And then I suppose you know that you’ll get awfully tired.” 
“Oh we never get tired!” they eagerly cried. 
“Have you had any kind of practice?” 
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They hesitated—they looked at each other.  “We’ve been 
photographed—immensely,” said Mrs. Monarch. 
“She means the fellows have asked us themselves,” added the 
Major. 
“I see—because you’re so good-looking.” 
“I don’t know what they thought, but they were always after us.” 
“We always got our photographs for nothing,” smiled Mrs. 
Monarch. 
“We might have brought some, my dear,” her husband remarked. 
“I’m not sure we have any left.  We’ve given quantities away,” she 
explained to me.   
“With our autographs and that sort of thing,” said the Major.  
“Are they to be got in the shops?” I enquired as harmless as 
peasantry. 
“Oh yes, hers—they used to be.” 
“Not now,” said Mrs. Monarch with her eyes on the floor.  (“RT” 
314-5; James’s italics)   
 
This passage is significant in part because, just as James spoke of his creative process as 
beginning with a donnée, this narrator’s story-within-James’s-story owes its germ to this 
moment.  Thus begins the narrator’s speculation about the pair: “I could fancy the ‘sort of 
thing’ they put on the presentation copies of their photographs, and I was sure they wrote 
a beautiful hand” (“RT” 316).  But there is something of still greater importance.  What 
should not go overlooked here is the fact that the Monarchs have been associated not just 
with photography in general but with photographs of themselves that bear their signatures, 
images that now summon the loss of capital and social standing.  But a deeper dimension 
to this loss that appears when we read the Monarchs’ history with photography as a 
narrative of entropy.  The energy that begins this passage (“Oh we never get tired!”) and 
which at first is channeled through the demand of their images in the new medium (“they 
were always after us”) quickly abates, concluding with the melancholy of rejection (“they 
used to be;” “Not now”).  To the Monarchs these pictures, at once photographs and 
autographs, can still seem tidy, autonomous and autoreflexive emblems of themselves.  
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The collapse of self-image with photographic image is enlivening because the 
photographs seem to give form to the intrinsic value of their identity—that is, until they 
must at last recall that their photographs carry market, not intrinsic, value.   
The narrator misreads the lesson the Monarchs take from this, and, although it is a 
lesson drawn directly from modernism’s aestheticist roots, it is a lesson many readers of 
“The Real Thing” also misrecognize.  Because the Monarchs associate themselves with 
mass culture’s favorite reproducible technology, the narrator confidently sees them as 
right for advertisements.  But if the Monarchs have little desire to be in advertisements, it 
is only partly to do with their embarrassing social standing.  What the Monarchs want is 
to ratify their personal identities by duplicate the image of their bodies in expensive 
objects.  Further, they desire to be rendered not just any object but new, unsullied 
commodities—something like their own things, for one of the hallmarks of the Monarchs 
(this statement literally refers to their calling cards) is, even in poverty, “their 
appurtenances were all of the freshest” (“RT” 311).  This is a desire that the Monarchs 
have great trouble articulating, and which even now we would not begin to capture with 
understandings of authenticity as opposed to imitation.  From one side, it is easy to 
imagine someone identifying with an object, and our current critical vocabulary has ways 
of working through relationships between people and the things they cherish whether that 
relationship emerges from repression, powerful memories, or a sense of playfulness.  Yet 
the Monarchs do not identify with things they themselves enjoy, or with things that evoke 
personal memories, or with talismans that carry special power, or fetishes that give shape 
to their desires.  Nor could their desire be called commodity fetishism, for they do not 
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pine for new things.  What the Monarchs want more than anything is to be new, 
expensive images that help compose a cherished cultural narrative that is not their own.    
The Monarchs’ desire to become mediated images is the desire to reverse the 
exhausting metonymical game of keeping up the freshest things for the best appearances 
that makes them easily mistakable for the bourgeoisie, the wealthy, or as celebrities.  No 
longer able to seize the means for keeping up with expensive, limited things which will, 
in the end, be parted from them anyway, the Monarchs now want to become cherished 
commodities of the market—things that can circulate from one place to another, granting 
the appearance of wealth and dignity the all those hands that will come to possess and 
exchange them.   
Caught at that liminal moment of the fin-de-siècle, the Monarchs seem to embody 
the desires of both Victorian and modernist fiction.  Their desire to be the illustrations of 
the deluxe, limited edition of a highbrow novel seems to wed the dual desire to take 
possession of and be possessed by commodities that Jeff Nunokawa diagnoses in high 
Victorian fiction, and perhaps prefigures the modernist yield one’s subjectivity by 
becoming an object or a machine.124  But what separates the Monarchs—and perhaps a 
handful of other of James’s characters—from this pack is that they do not seek to become 
the artifice for artifice’s sake.  At bottom, they want the validation conferred by a cultural 
narrative bigger than themselves.  In other terms, they want to be recognized in several 
senses of that word—acknowledged, validated—as legitimate subjects.  David Shumway 
comes closest to articulating this sense of authenticity when he writes of certain kinds of 
celebrity as giving birth to a “conception of authenticity [which] entails not the embrace 
                                                 
124 Jeff Nunokawa finds this notion of possession at work in Dickens’s Dombey and Son in The Afterlife of 
Property: Domestic Security and the Victorian Novel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 2. 
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of surfaces but the location of depth in culture rather than in personality.”125  But then 
this, too, may erroneously direct us to another of the narrator’s misnomers for the 
Monarchs, who seem to have an air of “celebrity” about them, but too much of that air, 
“look[ing] too distinguished to be a ‘personality’” (“RT” 307).   
Lacking an adequate critical vocabulary for authenticity that captures the 
complexities of “The Real Thing,” we return once again to James’s own comments on 
photography and the Preface to The Golden Bowl.  The Monarchs’ desire, we might say, 
seems akin to James’s descriptions of the photographs meant to accompany his works—
something that does not traffic in imitation but which is more aptly described as 
“discreetly disavowing emulation,” just as Coburn’s photographs were “optical symbols 
or echoes” of James’s work, “expressions of no particular thing in the text, but only of the 
type or idea of this or that thing” (GB xi), and yet the thing itself.  To recognize such a 
type is, at last, not a fixture but a point of departure, a beginning to invention, 
imagination, and meaning-making.   
 
Typicality after Photography 
“The Real Thing” thus draws a distinction between illustration and photography 
that has less to do with their representational differences than with what kinds of 
consumers to which cheap photographs and expensive illustrated novels were marketed.  
It is a distinction that brings to mind how moderns thought of property as a signifier of 
class.  While it would not be fair to speak of modernism and marxism as possessing the 
same motives or aims, there is no doubt that marxism is a species of modernist discourse 
                                                 
125 David R. Shumway, “Authenticity: Modernity, Stardom, and Rock & Roll.”  Modernism/Modernity 14:3 
(2007): 528. 
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and that some strains of modernism are devoted to sounding the depths of the ethic of 
consumption and consumerism that had already been firmly in place in Europe and 
America for generations by the late nineteenth century.  For Jonathan Freedman, the 
defining feature of Jamesian modernism is James’s appropriation of aestheticism without 
ever claiming to participate in that movement. Freedman finds James just as devoted as 
his aestheticist contemporaries to  
at once registering, shaping, and critiquing a society whose cultural 
institutions are increasingly devoted to inciting, celebrating, and inducing 
the act of consumption—first finding that its critical impulses are wholly 
subsumed within its celebratory function, then discovering a way to 
reassert them from within the confines of the historical moment.126  
 
“The Real Thing” contributes to James’s anatomizing of a consumer ethos by exploring 
how mediated images offer themselves as possessions.  As the Monarchs know, 
illustrations and photographs alike can be possessed by any who purchases them, but they 
also lay implicit claim to being able to possess the identities they represent.127  If one can 
possess and yet be possessed by a picture, as the Monarchs claim to be, this dual notion 
of possession complicates questions about the authenticity of images—how faithful they 
are to the people and things they purport to represent—as well as about the authenticity 
of identity—whether or not one is true to oneself.   
 This rhetoric of possession and property would suggest that a marxist line of 
inquiry seems warranted here, but Nancy Armstrong offers another way of thinking 
through these matters in Fiction in the Age of Photography.  For Armstrong, it is deeply 
                                                 
126 Jonathan Freedman, Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and Commodity Culture 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 58.  Many studies implicitly place marxism within 
modernism’s umbrella, but Freedman makes a sinuous argument that reads theorists such as Max Weber 
and Theodor Adorno as responding to contradictions that aestheticism and modernism were the first to take 
up.  For another comparison in this vein, see Michael North, “Eliot, Lukács, and the Politics of Modernism,” 
in T. S. Eliot: The Modernist in History, ed. Ronald Bush (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 169-90. 
127 Nunokawa, Afterlife. 
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important to avoid recourse in a marxist interpretation of images when we talk about how 
realist representational economies after photography work.  She lends focus to the 
general critique others have leveled at marxism’s precapitalist nostalgia (its yearning for 
relationships between the social and material worlds that are not mediated by capital) by 
showing that nostalgia to have given rise to an “iconophobia” after capitalism (FAP 28).  
In Marx, Lukács, and Baudrillard, she uncovers “indications that real things and authentic 
feelings have, for some time now, been receding behind a successive veil of images” 
(FAP 29).  This iconophobia can be traced to Marx himself but gained its greatest 
currency in literary studies with Georg Lukács, who dated the year of realism’s decline 
1848.  The year Louis Napoleon came to power and almost immediately betrayed the 
working classes that had helped install him also witnessed what Lukács felt was a second 
betrayal on the part of the novel.  A rash of unwelcome visual rhetoric in realism made 
the novel irresponsible to what Lukács felt was its mission of exploring communal bonds 
and social practices in which money and commodities played limited roles.  As 
Armstrong explains, “Lukács blames this failure on a sudden infusion of ‘ornamental 
detail,’ ‘immobile background,’ ‘pictorialism,’ ‘picturesque atmosphere,’ and 
‘photographic authenticity’ which fiction slipped in between readers and the social world 
around them” (FAP 5).128   
The chief aim of Fiction in the Age of Photography—the notion of which 
Armstrong so fervently and, I would say, rightfully seeks to disabuse us—is not just a 
                                                 
128 Armstrong quotes from “The Crisis of Bourgeois Realism,” in The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and 
Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 171-250. 
With that latter phrase of Lukács’s, “photographic authenticity,” Armstrong comes to place marxism too 
close to modernism.  Though Lukács was one of modernism’s most acerbic opponents, his outright 
rejection of realist imagery comes to seem a great deal like the impulse “to embrace a post-photographic 
notion of authenticity that modernism conjured up retrospectively,” and the marxist iconophobia Armstrong 
diagnoses at the beginning of her study finds its corollary in what she calls “the logic of modernism”: “that 
images per se are bad” (FAP 276, 275). 
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specifically marxist iconophobia, but a notion that underpins spectacle since Marx: that 
spectacles must, almost by nature, be presentations of capital.  A good many spectacles 
do, of course, display glitzy commodities or demonstrate wealth or testify to the grand 
possibilities of money and all that it can buy.  But even so, that will not be all that such 
spectacles display.  They will also continue to instruct us in the ways in which we might 
understand our visible—which is to say, corporeal—selves, “[t]he body on which we 
stake our sense of futurity, individuation, rights, and community” (FAP 276).  It is the 
essence of photography, whether in popular photography or the notoriously essentialist 
composite photographs of degeneration theorists, to suggest that its viewers conflate the 
image of the body with identity.  In so doing, photography would also assert itself as a 
system for interpreting and classifying bodies into types.129  It was this very system of 
reducing images of people to types that helped photography lay claim to unrivaled 
accuracy and, for Armstrong, not to purport to lead us away from the real but to “[tell] us 
what is real” (FAP 3; Armstrong’s italics).130 
With this conclusion in mind, I want to return to a claim Armstrong makes on her 
way to arriving at these statements.  Though she clearly has the above critique in mind 
when she writes that marxism might at least offer “valuable insight into the whole notion 
of ‘authenticity’ that came to stand for the world as it was before these images usurped 
the place of objects in mediating human relationships,” I want to pursue another insight 
that her critique allows (FAP 29).  If marxism is the discourse that arose to analyze the 
social construction of authenticity under capitalism, and if marxism renders that 
                                                 
129 Armstrong delineates the different ways in which popular photography and the photography of social 
scientists achieved these aims in her introduction. 
130 “Our remarkable ability as modern individuals to move in the world and carry the categories we inhabit 
with us hinges, I believe, on our ability to understand almost anyone and anything in terms of just those 
categories” (FAP 3-4). 
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authenticity a surrogate for more properly authentic but now irretrievable relationships, 
then it is worth asking whether marxism is always iconophobic and, if not, what else it 
can tell us about how images possess identity. 
 While a full investigation of this question would stray too far from the aim of this 
chapter, a good starting place is Fredric Jameson’s classic gloss of Lukács’s account of 
literary realism’s typed characters.131  Jameson notes that Lukács takes up the issue of the 
type (in Theory of the Novel, 66-9) as an enabling figure in realist literature precisely in 
order to explain how representational forms work.  Though we have seen Armstrong 
observe Lukács speaking of realism as exchanging thick descriptions of non-capitalist 
relationships with “photographic authenticity,” Jameson wants to be clear that “for 
Lukács the typical is never a matter of photographic accuracy.”132  If types in literature as 
Lukács describes them cannot be likened to photographs, Jameson declares, then we 
come to understand types not as ossified, abiding stickmen but as representatives of 
social positions that change over time.  Thus, types, and “the notion of the typical” itself, 
are the places in which literary realism most readily historicizes itself by drawing 
attention to that change: “realism itself comes to be distinguished by its movement, its 
storytelling and dramatization of its content; comes, following the title of one of Lukács’s 
finest essays, to be characterized by narration rather than description” (MF 196).  Even if 
realist authors of the nineteenth century learned a great deal from photography about 
types, as Armstrong insists, Jameson contends that analogizing types in literature to 
                                                 
131 Another starting place, better known but which I cannot take up here because it would lead us too far 
afield, can be found in W. J. T. Mitchell’s analysis of the visual rhetoric Marx uses to distinguish 
commodity fetishism from other human-object relationships.  See in the final chapter of Mitchell’s 
Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
132 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 194 (hereafter cited in text as MF). 
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photography is inaccurate because it implies stasis, immobility—frames of arrested time.  
By contrast, types in literature offer “rather an analogy between the entire plot, as a 
conflict of forces, and the total moment of history itself considered as a process” (MF 
195).  Martha Banta makes a similar claim when she writes, “the attention paid to ‘type’ 
by artists, literary and art critics, psychologists, and philosophers of the late nineteenth 
century is one of the more helpful ways we today have of threading the path between the 
isms of art’s genres and life’s modes of conduct.”133 
 The problem of locating authenticity in the age of photography that I read 
Armstrong and Jameson to be working through in their discussions of Lukács is the same 
problem with which we have seen the narrator wrestle in “The Real Thing,” and much the 
same problem we have seen J. Hillis Miller attribute to James’s oeuvre.  Does the 
authentic emerge from remaining true to realist representation, or is its proper source 
outside of representation altogether?  James’s late views on photography direct us to a 
more useful vocabulary that suspends that question, allowing us to embrace both 
possibilities and, as Freedman would argue, allowing James the aestheticist pose of 
embracing the possibility that authenticity is born not of one or the other but the 
irreconcilability of the contradiction.  In part, James’s suggestion that we attend to the 
general and particular might seem to follow the maturation of aestheticist criticism into 
deconstruction that Freedman traces.  Indeed, deconstructive procedures that critics of 
virtually every stripe continue to find valuable are its means for ferreting out singularity, 
of identifying the particulars of difference, of taking note of how the individual departs 
from the category or categories ascribed to it.  If there is such thing as a deconstructive 
                                                 
133 Martha Banta, “Artists, Models, Real Things, and Recognizable Types,” Studies in the Literary 
Imagination 16.2 (1983), 33. 
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ethic, it would be what Jeffrey Nealon calls the imperative that compels us to reread even 
the most mundane example for differences unacknowledged so far.  “Such an iterative 
siting (or, perhaps, a citing) calls for a radical rereading of the example, an attempt to 
open up a reinscribed future of response rather than merely settling for or on a 
representative past.”134 
Not to layer too many puns, but, for James, the issue of rereading is inseparable 
from sighting, too.  James’s discussion of photography in the Preface to The Golden Bowl 
is interwoven with his remarks on revision and rereading, twin acts that James regards as 
“a living affair” (GB xix; James’s italics).  The entire purpose of rereading, James 
continues, lies in “seeing the buried, latent life of a past composition vibrate, at renewal 
of touch . . . and break through its settled and ‘sunk’ surface” (GB xx).135  The suggestion 
is that those things which keep to the surface only, like a photograph, are not worthy of 
the deep attention art receives.  There is, he asserts, no life in surfaces alone, nor in 
surfaces which, like painting, do not call upon viewers to imagine a depth of story or 
character.   
 The unfavorable comparison here serves to suggest something implicit in the 
discussions of type I have outlined in this section.  The quality we most readily attribute 
to types seems to be their banality, and yet the Monarchs’ defining quality for much of 
                                                 
134 Jeffrey T. Nealon, Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 117. 
135 As he continues in this vein, James goes on to “the vast example of Balzac,” whose fiction “intensif[ies] 
for me the interest of this general question of the reviving and reacting vision,” and thereby discusses 
rereading and revision in terms of negotiating the general and the particular, an act that requires 
acknowledging what one has already seen and known as well as what one learns from the latest encounter 
with the text (GB xx-xxi).  Here, too, James borrows from the rhetoric of photography: just as “any 
representational work” should “bristle with images” (GB ix), James finds the unrevised text “bristling with 
a sense of over-prolonged exposure” (GB xxi). 
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“The Real Thing” is their persistent boringness.136  Indeed, that is the quality that this 
narrator most easily attributes to the Monarchs: their sameness, their ungeneralizability, 
makes them seem walled off from the rest of humanity, pocketed in an enclosure all their 
own that makes him represent them as simply themselves, unlike anyone else he knows.  
Trying to create illustrations with these models proves tedious work.  “When I drew the 
Monarchs, I couldn’t anyhow get away from them—get into the character I wanted to 
represent;” “There were people presumably” like the Monarchs, but “I found myself 
trying to invent types that approached [their] own;” (“RT” 334, 335, 327).  After trying in 
vain to work with them, the narrator at last admits, “They bored me a good deal” (“RT” 
339).  
But out of this emerges something of a revelation: “the very fact that they bored 
me admonished me not to sacrifice them—if there was anything to be done with them—
simply to irritation” (“RT” 339).  In other words, “The Real Thing” suggests that the 
narrator’s not seeing the Monarchs’ humanity becomes a reminder to him that they are, in 
fact, human.  This seems deeply inauthentic.  The authentic might be a lot of things, but it 
is not hackneyed—for how could authenticity refer to anything unoriginal?  (Recall 
Taylor: “Being true to myself means being true to my own originality, and that is 
something only I can articulate and discover”).  Yet, the status of the authentic in “The 
Real Thing” demands at every turn a vocabulary for addressing the very possibility that 
authenticity may be rooted not just the everyday or quotidian, but in the banal.  The 
narrator gropes for it, cannot find it, but insists that such things do exist.  If James hoped 
to write a story that authentically represented the situation Du Maurier relayed to him, 
                                                 
136 The exception would be at the end of the story, when the Monarchs have let down their guard in 
desperation.  Having ceased to pretend to appear like aristocrats (offering to wash the narrator’s dishes in 
lieu of sitting as models), they finally inspire his full pity.   
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then he was hoping to be authentic to one of “oddity and typicalness,” which might be 
better understood as the authenticity of the oddity of typicality.137 
 
  
                                                 
137 The Complete Notebooks of Henry James, ed. Leon Edel and Lyall H. Powers (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 55. 
  101
Chapter 5 
Structures of Irony: Curiosity and Fetishism in Conrad, Forster, and London’s 
Colonial Exhibitions  
 
“London, that wonder city, the growth of which bears no sign of intelligent design, but 
many traces of freakishly sombre phantasy[.]”  
—Joseph Conrad 
“You can make India in England apparently, just as you can make England in India.”   
—Cyril Fielding in A Passage to India138 
 
“The general tone of novels is so literal,” declared E. M. Forster in the Clark 
Lectures later collected in Aspects of the Novel, “that when the fantastic is introduced it 
produces a special effect; some readers are thrilled, others choked off; . . . [it is] like a 
sideshow in an exhibition where you have to pay sixpence as well as the original fee.  
Some readers pay with delight, [for] it is only for the sideshows that they entered.”139 
(160).  In this lecture, called “Fantasy,” Forster explains that readers come to know 
experimental fiction like Ulysses (1922) and Mrs. Dalloway (1925) by extending their 
“[c]uriosity for the story” to its narrative frameworks (AN 158). Forster’s lightly-treated 
analogy (where experimental fiction is the sideshow within the grand exhibition that is 
the history of the novel) makes these lines difficult to read without imagining the arched 
eyebrow that Forster must have shown to lecture attendees at Cambridge in this moment.   
If regard for curiosity is critical for the appreciating new and inventive literature, 
as Forster suggests in this lecture, he raises questions about how curiosity operates when 
it is housed within the kind of self-conscious, ironic frame in which Forster presents it 
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here—a question that has perhaps become only more acute over time as irony has become 
enshrined as one modernism’s favorite modes.  That question becomes even more 
complex in the context of exhibition.  By 1927, when Forster delivers this lecture, 
exhibition would almost certainly have meant a particular kind of exhibition.  Grand 
public fairs and shows that unmistakably highlight empire had become a staple in 
London’s Olympia, Earls Court, and Shepherds Bush in recent decades.140  As Harold 
Hartley, one of the directors and designers of exhibitions in London during this period, 
described it, the goal of these exhibitions was to present visitors with imperial ideology 
that appealed to fantasies of looking upon colonial domination. 
Our aim was always to provide for our visitors a great variety of attractive 
amusements, in addition to those termed side-shows, for which extra 
payment had to be made.  The Indian city [created for the Empire and 
India Exhibition (1895)] contained all the ingredients that go to make up a 
realistic picture of Asiatic life; its many shops with Indian and Cingalese 
craftsmen actively at work at their various callings; the elephants and 
camels carrying people about, and the tiny zebu drawing his load of happy 
children—all made it an instructive object-lesson.141 
 
If curiosity for innovative writing could be analogized to paying extra beyond the charge 
of story and plot, it is important to note that Forster, no stranger to the issue of 
colonialism, raises the very specter of what makes curiosity potentially harmful.  As 
Hartley explains it, entrance into a colonial exhibition’s sideshows preyed on the 
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curiosity of visitors who want to see their own sense of cultural superiority rendered back 
to them in “an instructive object-lesson.”  Taken together, Forster’s and Hartley’s 
comments reveal a great deal of traffic shuttling between points that we typically imagine 
as having distinct boundaries—including narrative and exhibition, London and the 
colonies, and, above all, irony and curiosity—for it is only by gazing upon “the Indian 
city” temporarily erected within London that one could understand that city to be “a 
realistic picture of Asiatic life.”  Following the rhythms and patterns that briefly join such 
entities in the early twentieth century clearly means being attentive to how the aesthetics 
of modernity could inspire both curiosity and irony at the same time while also, it 
sometimes seems, preventing either from overcoming the tightly-closed grasp of imperial 
ideology.  
In this chapter I want to respond to Forster’s injunction to take curiosity seriously 
by pursuing narratives that thematize curiosity itself, and which, moreover, do so with 
regard to the “fantastic” space of colonial exhibitions.  This pursuit helps provide deeper 
insight into how modernist fiction responds to Britain’s metropolis as contact zone.  I ask 
what can be learned from the detachment two of modernism’s best-known ironists, 
Joseph Conrad and E. M. Forster, cultivate in their responses to early-twentieth-century 
London.  Specifically, I wish to ask: What happens when we read Joseph Conrad’s novel 
The Secret Agent (1907), Forster’s exhibition review, “The Birth of an Empire,” and his 
novel, A Passage to India (both 1924), as ironic responses to London as they knew it?  
And what further responses might those texts call for now?   
Setting, then, will figure prominently here, but equally significant will be visual 
metaphors of space and structure that abet irony’s role in these texts.  I will argue that 
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Conrad’s attention to what he calls London’s endless vistas—the windows, doors, and 
apertures that could mark points of passage but in Conrad tend instead to be sealed 
thresholds between spaces—enables a presentation of London as an imperial capital so 
needful of its colonial entanglements for its own identity as to warrant the powerful ironic 
distancing found in The Secret Agent.  Often recognized as a high achievement of 
modernist irony, The Secret Agent in fact goes a step further, inviting its readers to trace 
the limits of irony as a responsive (and responsible) style.  Tracing those limits as closely 
tied to Conrad’s confrontation with London’s endless vistas will put us in a better 
position to understand how Forster deploys irony while asserting that metaphors of 
circulation within and between intimate spaces, resulting in a strategy of ironic 
detachment from metropolitan imperial culture that seeks productive forms of 
reattachment.  Conrad’s impenetrable vistas and Forster’s hospitable locations—the 
“structures of irony” of this chapter’s title—prove to be spaces designed for ironic 
presentation that also disclose the role of curiosity as irony’s dialectic shadow.  In The 
Secret Agent, curiosity is the element whose conspicuous absence burdens irony with the 
obligation to respond alone to the late imperial culture Conrad characterizes as governed 
by fetishism.  By contrast, curiosity appears in Forster’s review not as irony’s naïve 
opposite but as that which learns from the distance irony produces, and as the occasion 
for testing tentative styles of reattachment to the metropole.142 
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Modernist Irony and Colonial Exhibitions 
Of the many expressions of London’s global reach in the early twentieth century, 
Forster responds expressly to the “high imperial vision” of colonial exhibitions.143  The 
Secret Agent, too, demands to be approached in this vein, setting itself against the 
fascination with pseudo-scientific narratives that colonial exhibitions helped 
popularize.144  Recent work in modernist studies also invites us to be attentive to colonial 
exhibitions in order to understand London’s modernism as emerging from a city that was 
the British Empire’s cultural and economic center and one of its contested locations.145  
One could productively read literary modernism, as Scott Cohen does, as responding to 
the spatial and geographical conditions of colonial exhibitions.  But this approach may 
overlook the significance of visuality in the development of metropolitan modernism.146  
Taking a different tack, Andrew Thacker describes the displays, exhibits, and the gazes 
they inspire as rendering colonial exhibitions “visual contact zone[s].”147  The close 
attention Forster and Conrad turn toward the processes of sight and the conditions of 
space calls for just such a model that regards visual experiences at exhibitions as 
                                                                                                                                                 
one that finds it “necessary to experience surprise.”  See Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Pedagogy, Affect, 
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mediating “the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by 
geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect” that defines 
a contact zone.148 
In the decades surrounding 1900, tens of thousands of Londoners annually invited 
such intersections by devoting immense segments of their capital to the colonial 
imaginary.  Exhibition guidebooks make it clear that exhibitors sought to satisfy a 
widespread desire for publicly displaying systems for classifying and representing the 
vastly diverse peoples, territories, and commodities which appeared under the sign of 
empire.  At a time “when the gospel of Imperialism is being so widely preached and 
when men’s minds are naturally interested in records of national achievement and the 
statistics of national progress,” reasons the author of an 1899 exhibition guide, the era 
enjoins “a colossal and comprehensive display of the growth and development of the 
British Empire.”149  Here the guide discloses a common feature of colonial exhibitions: 
their attempts to cater to, and drum up, curiosity for empire’s stories, and to manage that 
curiosity with displays and guidebook narratives.  Though Walter Benjamin famously 
declared that exhibitions succeeded in funneling visitors’ curiosity to “places of 
pilgrimage to the commodity fetish,” they did more than dupe the feeble-minded: 
colonial exhibitions also introduced their spectators to a quasi-scientific method for 
interpreting alterity that coincided with the pleasures of purchasing souvenirs (like 
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official handbooks) at the event.150  If we imagine exhibition visitors as subjects 
enmeshed in prefabricated conditions but also involved in the construction and 
reconstruction of those conditions, 151 we might say these visitors arrived to Earls Court 
and Olympia precisely in order to enter spaces where the colonial world could be visually 
consumed in tidy, orderly displays.  These displays invited a detached scientific gaze that 
does not empathize with who or what one looks upon, but instead encourages exhibition 
visitors to imagine themselves as something like amateur social scientists touring in the 
colonies.  This is the gaze of distance. 
As a result, although commodity display and consumer culture figure prominently 
in London exhibition culture, it might be misleading to follow Benjamin in speaking of 
the gaze colonial exhibitions solicit in terms of commodity fetishism.  That term proves 
too coarse a sieve for sorting out the complexities of exhibition culture.  We may be 
better off with the more general understanding of fetishism that had wider currency 
among Victorians and Edwardians than either commodity fetishism or nascent theories of 
sexual fetishism.152  As Peter Logan explains, throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century and for at least the first decade of the twentieth, fetishism was as 
significant for its connotation as its denotation.  It denoted the act of projecting agency 
onto an inanimate object while connoting savagery, primitivism, and all that was alleged 
to be part of cultures that practiced religious fetishism—that is, all that was counter to the 
idea of civilized, enlightened society.  “During these years,” writes Logan, “fetishism 
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defined ideas about culture through difference, not by describing what culture was but by 
defining what it was not.”153  These associations began attaching to fetishism in the mid-
nineteenth century owing in no small part to the Great Exhibition held in London’s 
Crystal Palace in 1851.  Though exhibitions were not new to Victorians, the Great 
Exhibition offered an unprecedented display of cultural artifacts and peoples that 
intended to represent the entire world for the purpose of cultural comparison.  Not 
incidentally, the terms of that comparison—demonstrations of scientific and 
technological achievement—were arranged so the British clearly surpassed all the rest.  
Visitors walked through passageways and corridors that followed a teleological narrative 
of cultural progress which “emphasized the place of Britain’s culture in the overall range 
of advancement.”154  This model of visual comparison was not only a supremely 
successful formula but powerfully influential for British exhibitions in the decades that 
followed.  Nearly sixty years later, the Imperial International Exhibition held in London 
in 1909 measured itself against “the great exhibition of 1851, which was virtually the 
parent of these undertakings” by seeking cultural comparisons again in terms of scientific 
advancement.  “In those mid-Victorian days, science, as it is understood to-day, was in its 
application of electricity to illumination was unknown,” the official guidebook explains.  
This guidebook reproduces a familiar narrative found in Edwardian colonial exhibition 
culture.  The brisk pace of “the milestones of progress” in Britain since 1851 explains the 
accumulation, arrangement, and array of that country’s machinery, textiles, and domestic 
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products, all of which are placed among “the choicest products of the earth . . . for our 
inspection.”155   
This exhibition aesthetic, which lays claim to direct presentation as a means of 
cultivating knowledge about the observable world, finds its opposite in modernism’s self-
reflexivity, fragmentation, and ironic detachment.  In tracking the changes in European 
social life and literary history over the course of empire’s expansion and contraction, 
Edward Said has noted that disenchantment with empire reached critical mass just as 
irony was being granted unprecedented authority as a style of response toward European 
metropolitan culture.  This is the irony endemic to modernism, “the irony of a form that 
draws attention to itself as substituting art and its creations for the once-possible 
synthesis of the world empires.”156  The purpose of submitting an aesthetic solution for 
political problems is, of course, to produce new knowledge about the nature of those 
problems, distancing and depersonalizing them so that they may be contemplated anew.  
In order to respond to London as a visual contact zone that colonial exhibitions helped 
produce, it made sense for modernism to build on the irony that had become central to 
nineteenth-century realism.  If modernism’s ironists were to reorder the world in new 
views from imagined spaces, they would need to seize upon a device “within which 
everything is seen as many-sided,” as Georg Lukács found to be the recompense of irony: 
“within which things appear as isolated and yet connected, as full of value and yet totally 
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devoid of it, as abstract fragments and as concrete autonomous life, as flowering and 
decaying, as the infliction of suffering and suffering itself.”157 
The shift from realist to modernist irony resulted partly from a change in how 
each generation approached perception, particularly sight.  Fredric Jameson offers a 
helpful articulation of this transition in judging the turn of the twentieth century as a 
moment in which authors were revaluating how literary aesthetics is “dependent on the 
very ideology of the image and sense perception and the whole positivist pseudo-
scientific myth of the functioning mind of the senses.”158  Modernist texts present 
immediate sense information, particularly visual information, without paying tribute to 
explanatory theoretical frameworks, deepening a broader skepticism of metanarratives 
that will be amplified in the latter half of the century.  But what Jameson also explains 
about modernism in The Political Unconscious is that its response to its culture 
sometimes emerges not from a place of irony, but out of wonder and curiosity as well.  
For a writer like Conrad, the reluctance to accept grand “positivist pseudo-scientific” 
theories of perception meant “a rejection of the conceptual in favor of the two great 
naturalistic psychic and narrative texts of daydreaming and hallucination.  Where Conrad 
marks an ‘advance,’ if that is the right term to use about this historical process, is in his 
own mesmerization by such images and such daydreaming.”159 
Pursuing a finer history of this moment requires us to alter Jameson’s terms 
slightly to understand what might be meant here by “mesmerization.”  To be mesmerized 
may mean to be deeply enthralled by a work of art, subject, or event: to give oneself over 
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to fascination for something absorbing or difficult.  But it may also mean (as it did during 
the period in question) to be hypnotized, to be locked under conditions of perception 
dictated by another.  Jameson’s phrasing preserves both readings, allowing modernism to 
issue from deep, self-aware interest about the visual grammar of compelling spectacles as 
well as from writing from within their grip.  But let us divide these experiences into two 
different terms: “curiosity”—meaning an approach that self-consciously seeks attachment 
with something or someone else—and “fetishism”—meaning an approach that seeks such 
attachments unselfconsciously, indeed unknowingly. 
Exploring modernism as emerging from the fetishism and curiosity I take as 
residing within a mesmerization of images allows for a fuller understanding of how 
Conrad’s treatment of reveries in London and Forster’s daydream at a colonial exhibition 
each sound the limits of irony as a counterstrategy against a culture saturated with 
spectacles of progress in the form of imperial dominance and scientific advancement.  
Irony begins a responsible stance toward the late imperial metropole by seeking to draw 
knowledge out of metropolitan spectacles through procedures of distance and 
disidentification.  Yet irony must also sometimes remain a partial alternative that cannot 
reengage with the flawed object of its critique.  For Forster and Conrad alike, the wound 
inflicted by a knowing irony on London’s spectacles is partial without the 
accompaniment of a device that allows for the unexpected reattachments that tend to 
develop in irony’s wake.  Curiosity may serve as irony’s accessory in this very way, 
making possible a much broader and richer response to a culture of fetishized spectacles 
than either irony or curiosity could alone.  Taking irony and curiosity into consideration 
in this way will help guide a response mindful of the perils of recognition.  Rather than 
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being beholden to simply rebuking the exhibitions for “exoticizing difference,” we can be 
attentive to what is at work “when histories and cultures overlap” in a single, contested 
space.160 
 
The View from Conrad’s Windows 
On the first page of The Secret Agent Adolf Verloc leaves his home, which is also 
the Soho pornography shop he runs with his wife, Winnie, and brother-in-law, Stevie: 
“Mr. Verloc, going out in the morning, left his shop nominally in charge of his brother-
in-law.”161  But this turns out to be something of a false start.  Not until the beginning of 
the second chapter, when we begin to follow Verloc on his journey away from home and 
to an unspecified eastern European embassy—“Such was the house, the household, and 
the business Mr. Verloc left behind him on his way westward at the hour of half past ten 
in the morning” (SA 10)—does the novel begin in earnest.  This double opening allows 
Conrad to provide necessary background for Verloc’s story right away, and perhaps 
serves as an elementary instance of what Ian Watt called Conrad’s delayed decoding,162 
but more importantly this return to the beginning initiates a pattern of repetition and 
obsession that will become familiar over the course of the novel. It will be invoked each 
time Verloc and Stevie leave and return from their walks through Greenwich Park to their 
Brett Street home; in the visits made by Chief Inspector Heat and the assistant 
commissioner of police to the Verlocs’ shop after the bomb attack; and repeated once 
more when Winnie returns with Comrade Ossipon to the Verlocs’ home after she has 
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murdered her husband.  Moreover, as the murder of Adolf Verloc reveals, such obsessive 
returnings focus not only on locations but on visual information as well.  Only when 
Winnie “thought in images” was she also “governed too much by a fixed idea” that led 
her to murder her husband (SA 204, 215). 
Just such patterns of repetition and obsession concern Vladimir, the embassy 
official who has summoned Verloc away from his home and shop on the morning the 
novel begins.  Vladimir has called upon the failed agent provocateur so that he may 
provide Verloc with a scheme that could believably be pinned on zealous anti-
government insurgents.  “You anarchists,” Vladimir bristles, “should make it clear that 
you are perfectly determined to make a clean sweep of the whole social creation.  But 
how to get that appallingly absurd notion into the heads of the middle classes so that there 
should be no mistake?  That is the question” (SA 27).  To that question, Vladimir offers a 
reasoned reply: the target must be unthinkable, not heads of state, houses of worship, 
theaters, public squares—for all of these have been rendered cliché by “ready-made 
phrases [used] to explain such manifestations away”—but instead “something outside the 
ordinary passions of humanity” (SA 27).  This reasoned argument, it turns out, targets 
reason itself.  “What is the fetish of the hour that all the bourgeoisie recognize—eh Mr. 
Verloc?  . . .  The sacrosanct fetish of today is science.  Why don’t you get some of your 
friends to go for that wooden-faced panjandrum—eh” (SA 25, 26)?   
That Conrad’s anarchists and counterrevolutionary plotters should respond to 
London in the language of fetishism is not particularly surprising, nor it is surprising that 
The Secret Agent should itself conduct its response under the maneuvers of irony that 
reveal anarchist plots against London’s fetishes to be “hopelessly futile,” as Conrad was 
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fond of calling them (SA 43; cf. xxxv).  More noteworthy is that Conrad’s ironic narrative 
procedures should so closely approximate the obsession, repetition, and visual fascination 
Vladimir attributes to London’s bourgeoisie.  If readers of The Secret Agent have not 
taken note of this before, perhaps this is because the novel’s “thick fog of irony,” as 
Irving Howe had it,163 is so thick that it impedes readings of the culture to which the 
novel addresses itself, leaving irony to be treated as a theme in its own right rather than as 
a mode of response—despite the fact that even the novel’s author insisted that The Secret 
Agent can be “traced to a period of mental and emotional reaction” to “feel[ing] . . . lost 
in a world of other, of inferior, values” (SA xxxiii, xxxv).  As “a perfect illustration of the 
ironic theme,”164 The Secret Agent throws one of irony’s tendencies into high relief: 
namely, that when its distancing operations work most efficiently, irony can seem an 
aesthetic of self-enclosure.  But we do well to press on this aesthetic.  As Amanda 
Anderson reminds, “detachment, whatever form it takes or predominantly allies itself 
with, is always situated—it is always detached from a particular mode of experience, a 
social situation, or a form of identity.”165  The trouble The Secret Agent gives readers 
who wish to regard it as a response to its particular situation is twofold.  First, how does 
this novel suggest the concept of fetishism is circulating in turn-of-the-century London?  
Second, what can the novel’s detachment and relentless repositioning from the Londoners 
who populate Conrad’s narrative tell us about irony as a mode of response? 
Directed not only at the broad category of “science” but specifically at the 
Greenwich Observatory, the language of fetishism in The Secret Agent posits fetishism as 
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the fixations with and attachments to technologies of colonial domination (the 
observational knowledge that in different ways undergirds cartography, topography, and 
institutionalized racism) as well as the disavowed knowledge of how investments in the 
colonies produce domestic wealth.  (“Any imbecile that has got an income believes in 
[science].  He does not know why, but he believes it matters somehow,” Vladimir 
declares [SA 27].)  In Conrad’s African fiction, fetishism proves to be European 
modernity’s colonial unconscious.  Reading Heart of Darkness (1899), Simon Gikandi 
argues that fetishism goes unnamed throughout that text precisely because of its powerful 
hold over Marlow.  Unable to decouple his European subjectivity from his African 
locality, Marlow fails in the fundamental narrative act of arranging events sequentially—
“the enabling condition of epistemology and consciousness in the Western tradition”—
and ultimately “temporality in Heart of Darkness is haunted by fetishism, which the 
narrative compels to function as the radical opposite of knowledge and consciousness.”166  
Written within a decade of Heart of Darkness, The Secret Agent is heir to the same 
conflicts of colonial contact but is also far more aware of its fetishistic design, making its 
center not an ungovernable, unknowable alterity but the West’s fetishization of science 
itself.  “Science” here denotes little more than the thinnest veil of scientific evidence 
conveniently laid over a predetermined politics, much like the Lombrosoism embraced by 
Comrade Ossipon, or science as it was displayed at the colonial exhibitions.  If the 
Greenwich Observatory emerges in this text as London’s fetish for “learning” and 
“science,” as Vladimir says (SA 28), its fetishists would doubtless have patronized the 
annual extravaganzas that offered “a spectacle constituted as simultaneously scientific 
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exegesis and as mass entertainment” held in west London between 1886-1925,167 a time 
encompassing the novel’s 1894 setting and the 1906-7 period during which Conrad 
composed and published The Secret Agent.  It is precisely London’s exhibition culture, 
and the fetishistic modes of seeing it encourages, that provide the most productive basis 
for understanding The Secret Agent’s ironic posturing. 
Against these annual events, which Paul Greenhalgh calls ephemeral vistas, are 
the vistas Conrad embeds in The Secret Agent.168  During the scene in which Vladimir 
unfurls his plot to destroy the Greenwich Observatory, Verloc elects to demonstrate his 
authority by opening a window and calling out to a distant policeman on the street.  But 
what is meant to be a show of Verloc’s “usefulness” (SA 20) Vladimir dismisses by 
explaining that his embassy requires Verloc’s action, not his voice.  In the context of the 
novel, the significance of this dismissal lies less in this distinction between action and 
words than in the kind of action Verloc’s words have failed to perform.  Verloc succeeds 
in startling the constable down the street, but his own situation does not change; he 
remains inside the embassy awaiting Vladimir’s instructions.  Such moments recur 
throughout The Secret Agent—so often, in fact, that it would not be difficult to find 
among the novel’s obsessive patterns similar scenes in which characters approach 
openings that promise emancipation only to discover themselves circumscribed once 
more.  This reading would begin with the novel’s first vista, the Verlocs’ shop window, 
which does not entice with glitzy identity-enhancing products but offers only dimly lit, 
“nondescript packages,” “closed yellow paper envelopes” (SA 3), and other “nondescript 
things” (SA 124), a window that lights onto “the comfort of obscurity, not the seduction 
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of display,” as Rishona Zimring reads it.169  The pattern proceeds to Verloc’s interview at 
the embassy and his return home to Soho, where other “windows shone with a dark 
opaque luster” (SA 12).  That night Verloc will watch the reflection in his bedroom 
window transform into a terrifying vision of Vladimir’s face, “a pink seal impressed on 
the fatal darkness” outside (SA 47).  Standing before the same window after she learns of 
Stevie’s death, Winnie will discover her “freedom” exists in name only (SA 208).  At last 
we would arrive at the final vista to appear in the novel: the open space atop the cross-
channel steamer from which Winnie, full of “furious anguish,” throws herself (SA 251). 
Repeated encounters with portals that promise access only to present obstruction 
instead seem as much a part of Conrad’s sense of the city in which he wrote as they are 
features of his novel.  When Conrad returned to The Secret Agent to write his author’s 
note in 1920, he explained the process of writing the novel as at once ignited by his 
fascination with London and inhibited by the responsibility of writing such a vast space.  
“Irresistibly, the town became the background for the ensuing period of deep and 
tentative meditations.  Endless vistas opened before me in various directions.  It would 
take years to find the right way!  It seemed to take years! . . .” (SA xxxvii; Conrad’s 
ellipsis).  To be sure, generations of scholarship have found Conrad’s retrospective 
reconstruction of writing The Secret Agent to be imperfect, but, as Geoffrey Galt 
Harpham argues, the author’s note reveals Conrad’s sense of the act of composition, an 
act he situates throughout this text as closely associated with the dynamism of London 
itself.170  If we can read “endless vistas” as Conrad’s metaphor for “infinite possibilities,” 
then the problem of writing the swelling and heterogeneous metropole seems quite 
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similar to the problem exhibition visitors reported whenever they sought to record all that 
they saw there.  “Who can describe that astounding spectacle?” asked one visitor to the 
Crystal Palace in 1851.  “Lost in a sense of what it is, who can think what it is like?”171  
In the context of Conrad’s author’s note, these questions raise others.  What are the 
consequences of setting a novel amid London’s appetite for overwhelming spectacles that 
the Great Exhibition inaugurates?  How do we read Conrad’s report that the very feature 
that inspires his curiosity about London—the city’s seemingly ceaseless variety of 
singularities—is also what makes it a daunting setting for works of fiction?  And, finally, 
what are the consequences of figuring London’s heterogeneity as “endless vistas” in a 
novel whose vistas unflaggingly curb, confine, and close down? 
These questions presume that exhibitions disclose a great deal about the cities 
they host, a premise that can be traced at least as far back as Conrad’s German 
contemporary, Georg Simmel.  Simmel understood exhibitions as the constructions of a 
collective sense of how a metropole wished to imagine its place within a global scheme.  
As he put it in 1896, one of an exhibition’s purposes lie in demonstrating that “a city can 
represent itself as a copy and a sample of the manufacturing forces of world culture.”  
“Nowhere else,” Simmel continues, “is such a richness of different impressions brought 
together so that overall there seems to be an outward unity, whereas underneath a 
vigorous interaction produces mutual contrasts, intensification, and lack of 
relatedness.”172  More recently, Timothy Mitchell’s penetrating analysis of exhibition 
culture has explained that exhibitions impose a sense of unity over culturally disparate 
materials in much the same way that cities fashion their sense of identity.  “Exhibitions 
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were coming to resemble the commercial machinery of the rest of the city.  This 
machinery, in turn, was rapidly changing in places such as London and Paris, to imitate 
the architecture and technique of exhibition.”173  If, as Mitchell suggests, exhibition-
going was becoming more like city-strolling as the nineteenth century drew to its close, it 
isn’t surprising that both activities were represented according to the same logic.  The 
exhibitions’ maps, placards, guidebooks, and the narratives cued by scientific displays 
suggest that the city outside may be organized along the same lines, creating what 
Mitchell calls “the world organized and grasped as though it were an exhibition” (“OEO” 
296).  According to this argument, the infrastructure of exhibitions forms a system of 
accessibility that can be more widely applied: the diverse spaces of London can 
themselves be imagined, mapped, and experienced as if they were part of a carefully 
planned and ordered exhibition.  But what seems at first to offer a universally applicable 
system of signs for comprehending globalizing modernity soon seems far more stifling 
because the system of signs must be maintained even where maps, placards, guidebooks, 
and scientific narratives are unavailable.  Just as the sprawling exhibitions themselves 
made it difficult for exhibition-goers to find their way out, the reality effect produced by 
the exhibition genre also encloses.  The city and exhibition alike appear “organized as a 
system of commodities, values, meanings, and representations, forming signs that reflect 
one another in a labyrinth without exits” (“OEO” 300).  The taxonomized presentation of 
heterogeneous global contents that had made the exhibitions commercially successful in 
the first place also exposed them to the same girded, autoreferential limits of any 
representational system of signs.  
                                                 
173 Timothy Mitchell, “Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order,” in Colonialism and Culture, ed. Nicholas 
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The Secret Agent conducts its critique of London along these lines, detaching 
itself from an urban reality effect to reveal that that aesthetic is dominated by popular 
constructions of science and spectacles of imperial metropolitan culture.  Put another way, 
what secures characters’ access to the real are also, by necessity, the agents of fetishism.  
In winding the circle of metropolitan imperial culture as tightly as it can, The Secret 
Agent discloses an essential fact about discourses of fetishism.  When modern western 
thinkers interpellate fetishism as such, they do so partly in order to distance themselves 
from fetishistic thinking, seeing, and material relations—and yet acts of fetishism remain 
acts that modern rationality represses but can never entirely banish.  When Vladimir 
locates London’s sacrosanct fetish in the Greenwich Observatory, he reveals not just that 
this building and the scientific practices for which the institution stands have been 
fetishized—the same scientific practices exhibitors deploy to assert western cultural 
dominance over animist cultures—but that the tendency to fetishize representational 
systems may govern more forms of modern seeing and thinking than we sometimes 
realize.  Indeed, as The Secret Agent confirms many times over, Edwardian London 
became a city of vistas that promised scientific and cultural advancement but which more 
readily revealed a deep obsession with displays and narratives that promised scientific 
and cultural advancement.   
In such a frame where representation itself cannot be trusted but must be relied 
upon nonetheless, Conrad’s novel pursues a self-conscious technique of distancing from 
cultural values that means to call into question the self-aggrandizing distancing from 
“primitive” cultures that characterizes the fetishism of science found in the exhibitions.  
To engage any further with this culture, Conrad suggests, would be irresponsible.  Rather 
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than affirming any value or value system found in this London, what The Secret Agent 
instead most cherishes are the countervaluations—distance, detachment, and the 
disengagement that calls all else into question—of irony itself. 
But, one wants to ask, aren’t there always possibilities for renewed engagement, 
even in a narrative space as constricted as The Secret Agent?  There are, in fact, a handful 
of moments in which Conrad’s characters find themselves under the spell not of fetishism 
but of curiosity.  The best case to take up would to be the unnamed “lady patroness of 
Michaelis” (SA 86), the one character in The Secret Agent expressly described as “curious 
at heart” (SA 87).  The assistant commissioner recalls this patron fondly, having been a 
frequent guest of the drawing room she has lately been providing for Michaelis (a benign 
and recently paroled anarchist, also called “the ticket-of-leave apostle”) to write his 
autobiography.  As a “temple of an old woman’s not ignoble curiosity,” the patron’s 
drawing room has been fashioned into something resembling an exhibition space where, 
at a given gathering, one could observe and mingle with the “notabilities or even the 
simple notorieties of the day” (SA 87).  And an exhibition space it has become, for on the 
day the assistant commissioner recalls, he stood in her drawing room among “groups of 
people” and “beheld the ticket-of-leave apostle filling a privileged armchair,” at work on 
his autobiography “in semi-privacy within the faded blue silk and gilt frame screen . . . in 
the light of six tall windows” (SA 87, 89, 87). 
Why an aristocratic socialite should turn her curiosity, and her patronage, toward 
an anarchist who prophesies the end of wealth, the narrator reports, owes to the “lofty 
simplicity” of her class, the very quality which makes her curiosity possible (SA 87).  The 
patron’s, then, is an empty curiosity, a means of preserving her reputation as a worldly 
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personality whose other use for her drawing room is to pontificate on the scandal du jour 
(such as the circumstances of Michaelis’s imprisonment) before “banal society smiles” 
(SA 91).  While one is tempted to assign more significance to the curiosity of the novel’s 
detectives, the patron’s disingenuous curiosity actually reappears in the register of police 
detection.174  Like Chief Inspector Heat, whose interest in surveying London’s 
underworld is largely only a safeguard for his proud professional reputation, and like the 
assistant commissioner, for whom metropolitan detective work is most interesting when it 
reminds him of “tracking and breaking up certain nefarious secret societies” in the 
unnamed colony where his career began (SA 82), Michaelis’s patron cares less about his 
politics than the controversy his presence in her drawing room is sure to stir.  In short, 
curiosity surfaces in The Secret Agent only to be co-opted by the rewards of a fetishizing 
gaze prompted by exhibition display.  Rather than providing a point of departure for 
inquiries that may fracture disciplining social practices, curiosity merges with fetishism 
under the genre of exhibition display that has been carefully arranged in the patron’s 
drawing room.  
Vladimir’s instruction to marshal an attack “against learning—science” (SA 28) 
turns out to express a close association between the apparent acquisition of knowledge 
and the actual reaffirmation of staid positions and perceptions.  The absence of genuine 
curiosity in this narrative reflects the sense that London has been closed off, a massive 
labyrinth without exits that completes the reciprocal relation we have seen Timothy 
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Mitchell identify between cities and exhibitions.  Where Karl Marx was able to formulate 
a theory of commodity fetishism by examining London’s capitalist production from 
numerous perspectives—moving quickly “from one ‘window’ to another in the first 
chapter of Capital,” as David Harvey so aptly describes it—Conrad encountered just such 
a continuous chain of vistas in London only to feel the delirious sense that none open 
after all, and that the only way to access London was through ironic, multiperspectival 
presentation.175  Though he avers he was finally able to write the novel after he could 
imagine the city “reduced to manageable proportions” (SA xxxvii), it seems more 
apposite to say that Conrad simply displaced the problem of London’s endless vistas into 
the narrative itself, and with it the problem of the indeterminacies of curiosity for which 
those endless vistas stood.  Generations of critique bear this out.  Irving Howe, the first to 
offer a powerful and nuanced reading of the irony in The Secret Agent, felt that the novel 
“forces one to conclude” that “irony has turned in upon itself” (SA 96), and for all the 
revaluations Howe’s reading has received, professional readers in the half century since 
have only sharpened the sense of claustrophobia he attributes to Conrad’s irony.  For 
Mark Conroy, The Secret Agent shades forth a London social order designed according to 
a panoptic scheme.  For Joseph McLaughlin, Conrad’s characters find their way into 
seductive metropolitan spaces only to discover that they cannot escape, for “Conrad 
offers no sense of an outside to this commodity culture.”  And to read Conrad’s “harsh 
ironies at the characters’ expense” is, for Mark Wollaeger, to encounter characters 
“imprisoned” within a monologic dark comedy.176   
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Yet the yearning for an outside that so often comes with reading The Secret Agent 
is not the novel’s limit point, and what sounds at first like a bleak Frankfurt-School-style 
assessment avant la lettre turns out to be something more.  As we have already begun to 
see, this narrative incites readers to feel curiosity’s absence acutely, for it is by reading a 
London where curiosity seems entirely evacuated that we may come to appreciate its 
value.  That value lies nested within the novel’s irony and can only be extracted by 
readings like those I’ve just mentioned which point bidirectionally: toward the limits of 
irony as a responsible way of seeing the fetishes that adorn Conrad’s London, and toward 
the productive powers of curiosity.  Rebecca Walkowitz articulates perhaps the most 
enduring lesson that The Secret Agent’s immuring irony can yield: “that interpretation is 
limited by the meanings that characters and readers are able to recognize.”177  If what one 
recognizes is detachment itself, it becomes deeply important to read this detachment as a 
limited response.  Not doing so is tantamount to Chief Inspector Heat’s mistaking 
Winnie’s ignorance of the observatory bombing for her “detachment” from his questions, 
a detachment which “whetted his curiosity” for what he erroneously imagines she is 
withholding (SA 167).  That these characters fail to rise to the possibilities inherent within 
curiosity only serves to place the burden more heavily on readers, as the novel’s most 
careful readers are likely to discover.   
That burden can be characterized in this way.  Conrad not only affirms in the 
author’s note that “perverse unreason has its own logical processes” (SA xxxv); the 
narrative of widespread fetishism that follows also reveals that unreason exercises its 
secret agency over a world from which one cannot retreat.  Instead, one must find tactics 
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for working from within that world—“tactics” precisely in Michel de Certeau’s sense as a 
provisional method for resisting dominant ideologies by making do with whatever is at 
hand.178  Irony is one such tactic, but curiosity emerges here as another, a shadow partner 
to irony itself.  As Conrad’s narrator declares, “[c]uriosity” is “one of the forms of self-
revelation” (SA 194), a responsive mode whose revelations about oneself and one’s 
culture can supplement irony’s lessons.  If irony calls for one to remove oneself from a 
situation or circumstance, curiosity can offer a return to that situation with the insights 
acquired from ironic distance.   
Conrad’s response to London in the heyday of colonial exhibition culture would 
certainly have qualified as the modernist response Said explained as structured “not 
oppositionally but ironically, and with a desperate attempt at a new inclusiveness.”179  
That is, Conrad’s is a resisting response, but not a chiding one.  Enunciations that wish 
simply to close down the reprehensible not only repeat the violence of the past by 
revisiting and reiterating it; in passing once more by the ghastly only to condemn it, they 
offer little to illuminate why these corridors were ever traveled in the first place, let alone 
how one might find different ways of passing through them now.  As the visual culture 
theorist Annie Coombes urges, “it is only by coming to terms with the heterogeneity of 
responses” to representations of colonial subjects and cultures proffered by exhibitions 
“that we can fully comprehend the insidious appeal of colonial ideology, even amongst 
those philanthropic and humanitarian liberals who were its most ardent critics.”180  The 
Secret Agent, I have been suggesting, calls for just such a reading, which turns away from 
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London’s exhibition culture but not without leaving enough of its faint contours for 
others to trace within the novel’s ironic frames.  If this is the bid for the rearticulated 
inclusiveness that Said says marks modernist irony, one of its inclusive gestures is to 
stage an absent curiosity that implies that there may yet be windows in London that do 
more than look inward.  To be sure, curiosity’s ambivalence is not necessarily immune to 
imperial ideology’s advances; a response born out of curiosity might easily become a 
fetishistic gaze at exhibition spectacles, and Conrad leaves open the question of how 
curiosity might be enlisted as a tactic for transforming late imperial metropolitan culture.  
It is in search of a more fully articulated explanation that we now turn to Forster. 
 
The Magic of the Real 
During the summers of 1924-5, exhibitors held at Wembley what turned out to be 
London’s last grand spectacle of imperial dominance, an exhibition which, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, has gone down in history as inadvertently emblematizing conflicted 
domestic public opinion on empire at its height.181  On the one hand, the British Empire 
Exhibition was a desperate bid to revitalize an imagined community of Britain and its 
colonies, a fact not lost on journalists and satirists of the day.  On the other, it was 
enormously popular, and its success largely rested on perfecting the art of staking a 
colonial exhibition’s identity on its spectacles of cultural and technological superiority.  
The Wembley exhibition was particularly adept at fusing commodity display and 
technological prowess, a fusion best illustrated when thousands gathered to see George V 
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open the exhibition by pressing a golden globe that acted as the simultaneous symbol of 
the global flow of British capital and the mechanism for telegraphing British colonies 
around the world the king’s official announcement that the exhibition had begun.  But the 
event’s greatest technological feat was to construct in a short period a number of 
buildings and pavilions modeled after those found in the colonies.  Wembley’s twenty-
seven million visitors—four times as many as the Great Exhibition of 1851—could walk 
through a fantasyland made to suggest the sweep of British colonial acquisitions, from 
South African coalmines to East Asian pagodas.  For one of these visitors, the Prince of 
Wales (who also helped design the event), such structures rendered the British Empire 
Exhibition London’s greatest vista in Conrad’s sense of the term: it was, as Prince 
Edward succinctly put it, “the Empire’s shop window.”182 
A visitor with a different view was E. M. Forster.  As the correspondent for The 
Nation and Anthenaeum, Forster arrived on 15 April 1924.  As befits the author of novels 
of great muddles, he proceeded through “the wrong entrance, or at all events not the right 
one, which I could not find, and I feared to be turned back by the authorities, but they 
seemed a bit lost too” (“B” 43).  The confusion may be excused, however, for the king’s 
grand opening to the public would not take place for another week, and much of what 
Forster relays in “The Birth of an Empire” are the final preparations in advance of that 
opening.  Even still, it is tempting to read Forster’s review today—“full of fine irritation,” 
as Lionel Trilling noted—as auguring Wembley’s dubious successes.183  Playing down 
the engrossing features of the exhibition, Forster instead affirms experiences of standing 
in a barrage of hollow spectacles and empty entertainments: “beauty always does have a 
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rough time at these shows—even rougher than in the actual world” (“B” 47).  Where 
official guidebooks promise interesting spectacles and grand amusements, Forster’s eye 
falls on the artificial, undemanding, and underwhelming.  After passing through one of 
the exhibition’s large collections buildings (and finding it unimpressive), he at last 
reaches his destination at the section devoted to British India where he cannot resist a 
backhanded compliment of the section’s realism.  “Indians smiled charmingly, and gave 
incorrect information.  It was all delightful; indeed, nothing was wanting except a few 
more exhibits” (“B” 46). 
Yet amid this very scene something unlikely happens.  Strolling past a series of 
Indian exhibits, Forster finds himself caught off-guard by a miniature of a famous site in 
Lahore, the Wazir Khan Mosque, a structure Forster likely saw for himself in 1912.184  
As he writes in his review, the small object “was so lovely and stood so incidentally and 
accidentally upon a table, that it had all the magic of a real building, met by chance 
among squalid or pretentious streets” (“B” 46).  Though he might have commented on 
the craftsmanship or verisimilitude of the miniature, he writes instead that the artifact 
seized his attention because of its accidental, careless placement—a quality Forster knew 
would not survive the exhibition’s opening, and perhaps not the hour.  “When I see it 
next,” he laments, “it will probably be glassed, docketed, and have lost its preternatural 
charm” (“B” 46).  But it is clear that what excites Forster has as much to do with the 
object’s “lovel[iness]”—its unaffected, arresting beauty—as with its “magic”—its 
uncanny ability to mimic the excitement of a discovery outside an exhibition because of 
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its artless display.  For the moment the solicitous staging that characterizes the genre of 
exhibition display is yet to come.  The miniature mosque has been set aside where it 
awaits its careful placement within the armature of display whose very absence permits 
Forster his imaginative encounter with the model’s referent.  The impact of this absence 
for Forster becomes more clear when compared to the collections building he has just 
mentioned passing through on his way to the British Indian exhibits.  Though the 
immense concrete structure has been designed to impress visitors with its magnitude and 
swelling collection of artifacts, for Forster it was “so large that it failed in the normal 
immunities of an interior” (“B” 44).  It is as though the vastness of the space and the 
depth of the collections that had been calculated to make the structure appear imposing 
have instead rendered the space contrived and unreal. 
On the one hand, we can read Forster as turning the affective force of his 
imaginative sojourn against the exhibition that sponsors it.  This misplaced miniature 
stands out because the rest of the exhibition’s artifice draws unwelcome attention to itself.  
The immense exercise of pulling the Wembley exhibition together, Forster suggests, is 
but little compared to the extraordinary cultural labor demanded of turning 
representations of empire’s grisly entanglements into amusements and rationalizations.  
All this work cannot help but make the very opposite point that the exhibition’s planners 
sought to advance: rather than being dazzled by the representational power of the 
exhibition, Forster responds to the magic of a small, cast-aside object.  But on the other 
hand, the exhibition proves more effective, and affecting, than Forster gives it credit.  
Though he crosses the thresholds of the collections building as a journalist, he becomes a 
visitor to an imaginary Lahore during his encounter with the small mosque.  For all the 
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underplayed liberalism of Forster’s article, the exhibition has had its intended effect, 
albeit in a limited sense, when he imagines himself a tourist in a colonial city.  This raises 
questions about what kind of curiosity Forster’s narrative confesses.  If this magic arises 
from the unexpected sense of the real, as Forster suggests, one wonders if this “real” is 
meaningfully different from the claim made in the exhibition’s official guidebook that the 
miniatures of northwest India intend to demonstrate that “the interest in realms lying over 
the borders of civilization is very real.”185 
In writing of the small mosque, Forster perhaps unwittingly echoes one of the 
principle characters in the novel he had completed earlier the same year.  We need only 
turn briefly to A Passage to India (1924) to recall why Adela Quested repeatedly pleas at 
the beginning of the novel, “I want to see the real India” (PI 22, 25), and to note the 
implications of such a plea for Forster’s Wembley exhibition review.  As a number of the 
novel’s readers have noticed, casting Adela as an English tourist in India restages 
Forster’s own travels there in 1912-3 and 1921-2, a repetition that invites us to note the 
resemblances and disparities between the author and his character.186  Like Forster, Adela 
arrives in India with more than idle interest, for as the fiancée of a colonial official she is 
aware that she is likely to remain there for some time; she is, in her own words, not “just 
a globe-trotter” (PI 27).  But Adela’s earnest interest manifests itself as the naïve will to 
understand a culture by gazing upon an archive of alterity that includes Indian people, 
artifacts, and locations, a naivety that will eventually, and tragically, lead her to the local 
tourist destination of the Marabar Caves.  Leading up to that visit, Forster captures 
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Adela’s credulity in her willingness to mistake Dr. Aziz, literally the first Indian she 
meets, as the embodiment of the colony itself.  “In her ignorance, she regarded him as 
‘India,’ and never surmised that his outlook was limited and his method inaccurate, and 
that no one is India” (PI 76).  Such ignorance is hardly idiosyncratic, and Forster’s novel 
carefully traces just how difficult it can be even for the well-intended to break from the 
long history of institutionalized of racism, purported cultural superiority, and imperial 
ideology that supplies colonial rule its authority.  It is in her eagerness “to see the real 
India”—that is, in her belief that its essence could be visually consumed if only she could 
shove aside the obscuring infrastructure of British colonial rule—that Adela elides Aziz 
with what Forster’s narrator dubs the reduced, homogenized “India” that lives only 
between quotation marks.  Put another way, we might say Adela mistakes India for 
Aziz’s exhibition of Indianness.   
In performing a kind of Indian subjecthood, Aziz is also, for the moment, willing 
to oblige his English visitors with what they want, and in seeking to supply the view 
Adela hopes to find, he invites her to visit his home.  This invitation, which Aziz extends 
at a significant early scene in A Passage to India, is more polite than earnest, and one he 
immediately regrets.  No sooner is his invitation spoken than Aziz and Adela are led into 
Fielding’s eighteenth-century garden house, a home that makes Aziz recall his own as “a 
detestable shanty near a low bazaar” (PI 73).  In lieu of rescinding the invitation to his 
bungalow, Aziz begins to praise Fielding’s garden house as one Chandrapore’s most 
impressive private interiors.  But a tourist as inquisitive and persistent as Adela will not 
settle for an Anglo-Indian abode, whether or not Aziz assures her that when one is in 
Fielding’s home “you are in India; I am not joking” (PI 74).  When she promises once 
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more to visit his home, Aziz makes his final bid.  “He thought again of his bungalow with 
horror. . . .  What was he to do?  ‘Yes, all that is settled,’ he cried.  ‘I invite you all to see 
me in the Marabar Caves’” (PI 79).   
In the space of a few pages, Forster’s novel announces a strategy it will adopt 
throughout for negotiating its sense of the real by shuttling between three sites offered to 
fulfill Adela’s quest.  By moving from Aziz’s “shanty” to Fielding’s splendid garden 
home and arriving, finally, at the caves that must substitute for both homes as a location 
for a tourist’s inspection of “the real India,” Forster plots a course through Chandrapore 
that moves from the common to the stately and ultimately to what is outside the city and 
only partly comprehensible.  Adela’s curiosity might have been disappointed by Aziz’s 
home (had she visited it) just as it was piqued by Fielding’s, but it certainly finds its 
limits in her horrifying encounter in the caves.  Rather than marking any single location 
as a synecdoche for the real, the text assigns significance to mobility between and 
through these locations, a point Forster underscores both by making these the locations to 
which his narrative will frequently return and by dividing the novel into three distinct 
parts: “Mosque,” “Caves,” and “Temple.”  In this way, A Passage to India does more 
than suggest that meaningful experience sometimes stands in excess to an accessible, 
readable, and viewable reality; the novel also traces a cautionary tale for liberal humanist 
curiosity.187  Forster acknowledges Adela’s curiosity as rooted in genuine interest in, and 
concern for, India’s colonial subjects and yet simultaneously reveals her curiosity to be 
doomed by the form it takes: the detached tourist’s gaze that cannot begin to capture the 
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complexities of a contested and plural India that the novel presents as a journey through 
distinct Indian locations. 
As we have begun to notice, Forster rehearses a similar three-part tour in his 
review of the Wembley exhibition, reporting by turns in “The Birth of an Empire” from 
the exhibition’s London address, the ersatz India temporarily installed there, and the India 
of Forster’s memory.  In this text, however, Forster cannot duplicate in London the 
passage between discreet boundaries that the novel plots through India.  On the contrary, 
his walk through the exhibition becomes most interesting for him precisely when all three 
locations are intertwined, when he stands in a fabricated colony in the middle of London 
pretending to be in India as he recalls it.  However, Forster follows his comments on the 
miniature mosque with a conclusion that seeks to disentangle these spaces once more by 
redrawing the boundaries between exhibition and reality.  “Well, it is a show to suit all 
tastes.  Millions will spend money there, hundreds will make money, and a few 
highbrows will make fun.  I belong to the latter class.  Rule me out; go, think your own 
thoughts, don’t forget your spats, and don’t expect an Empire to be born too punctually” 
(“B” 47).  Despite his lighthearted tone, Forster’s language discloses an eagerness to 
stride out of the exhibition’s gates and secure his return to a London largely untouched by 
exhibitors.  Inhering in these statements is the muted awareness of the networks 
connecting the exhibition and London that are more penetrating than Forster willfully 
acknowledges here, for his ironic posture intensely seeks to dismantle the fact that there 
exists little difference between the kind of seeing demanded within the exhibition and the 
gaze called upon by spectacles elsewhere in London.  Not only is the Wembley 
exhibition simply the latest in several decades of exhibitions to exalt colonial power and 
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technology; not only does it take place in London in order to intensify that city’s status as 
empire’s center; and not only are London’s hugely successful colonial exhibitions buoyed 
by widespread interest to inspect the evidence of British imperialism.  In addition to all of 
this, the attraction to spectacles of scientific authority and cultural alterity that London 
already fosters forms the basis for the genre of display at colonial exhibitions.  The 
exhibitions simply refine that form of seeing, elevating what is ordinary and normalized 
elsewhere.  Harold Hartley and other exhibitors may strain to present unified and 
diverting visions of empire, but Forster’s own straining to represent “these shows” as 
apart from “the actual world” (“B” 47) cannot help but uncloak London’s presence within 
the exhibition itself.  But even without Forster’s acknowledgement, A Passage to India 
has offered a template for reading the exchange of such spaces and the views Forster 
records there as beginning in detachment only to conclude in a gesture of curiosity.  
What we learn from Forster’s trip to Wembley, and his imaginative sojourn to 
Lahore, is that although the self-conscious aims of curiosity may not easily be divested 
from the unconscious gestures of fetishism, their codependence proves instructive.  
Forster’s curiosity emerges from the knowledge acquired by his ironic stance against the 
exhibition.  By treating the miniature mosque not as if it were magical but simply as 
magical, he writes of the small model as doing the work of a fetish, containing the 
affective power of that for which it stands as substitute and which is glaringly absent 
from the exhibition itself—the vibrant and irreducible spaces, buildings, and cultures of 
colonial India.  It is only in ironizing the exhibition that Forster permits himself to 
experience (and later, to disclose) curiosity for one its artifacts.   
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If irony in Forster’s hands is the device of distance and return, detachment and 
reattachment, abandonment and resituation, it is because his texts reserve space for 
curiosity in irony’s company.  Or, to be more precise, more than one space: for it is in the 
plural locations of A Passage to India and “The Birth of an Empire” that Forster’s irony 
permits and, indeed, encourages the tentative gestures of curiosity, gestures inspired by 
the urgency of adapting to all that is uncertain and unanticipated in acts of arrival, 
passage, and departure.  That is, it is not simply an act of recognizing the familiar 
standards of British high culture imposed on exhibition culture (an affirmation of 
personal taste), nor a moment of recognizing what is laudably different between London 
and Lahore (a celebration of multiculturalism).188  Though both of these acts of 
recognition are at work here, Forster’s description of the miniature mosque more 
forcefully suggests that he is not content with either, and that he seeks something more.  
This bid for curiosity reaches less for what is to be seen at the exhibition than for what is 
not on display there.   Simply put, it is a request to know more: more about the Wazir 
Khan, Islam, Lahore—more about the versions of British India which lie beyond relations 
with London or empire.  And it is also a request to know more about London at the zenith 
of empire, this rich and strange place where Lahore can appear in England just as 
England has fashioned itself in Lahore.  Irony is Forster’s means for demarcating the 
exhibition from the surrounding city, and curiosity the name for the endeavor to see 
beyond both locations and their boundaries toward the space where each may yet have 
something more to show, to narrate, and to offer.  
  
                                                 
188 For a discussion of recognition in this sense, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Oxford and Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-73.    
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Chapter 6 
“Savages Watching the Pictures”: Impersonal Intimacy and the Cinema in Virginia 
Woolf and T. S. Eliot 
 
“All you read a novel for is to see what sort of person the writer is,” complains the 
aspiring novelist Terence Hewet to Rachel Vinrace at the edge of a scenic South 
American view in Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out (1915).   
As for the novel itself, the whole conception, the way one’s seen the thing, 
felt about it, made it stand in relation to other things, not one in a million 
cares for that. . . . But there’s an extraordinary satisfaction in writing, even 
in the attempt to write.  What you said just now is true: one doesn’t want 
to be things; one wants merely to be allowed to see them.189 
 
Terence seeks to bridge with these statements an impasse between his view of art, which 
privileges literature, with Rachel’s, which prefers music’s ability to go “straight for 
things.  It says all there is to say at once” (VO 195).  At issue is which art form possesses 
clear and direct access to experience.  Terence implies in this exchange, as Woolf herself 
would also imply in other writings, that such seemingly unmediated access to experience 
can only be imagined in the terms of visibility.  As she would explain later, near the 
conclusion of A Room of One’s Own (1929), the experiences of daily life are “very erratic, 
very undependable,” but a reader who encounters masterfully composed texts “sees more 
intensely afterwards; the world seems bared of its covering and given an intenser life.”190  
These lines help Woolf explain in Room that this piercing of the veil follows from the 
freedom to construct textual subjectivities that had not existed before, but the reason why 
such rhetoric should be suggestive of unmediated experience comes not from Woolf’s 
lectures but from Terence’s conversation with Rachel.  If writing and reading are 
imaginative experiments with alternative forms of experience (“one doesn’t want to be 
                                                 
189 Virginia Woolf, The Voyage Out (New York: Penguin, 1992), 204 (hereafter cited in text as VO). 
190 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (New York: Harcourt, 1981), 110. 
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things; one wants merely to be allowed to see them”), it is because the terms of 
knowledge and contact share so much with the terms of sight.  Because seeing something 
implies having been in its presence, when saying we have “seen” something means we 
have known it, Terence confirms, we allow vision to denote a metonymic sense of 
closeness.  For her part, Rachel remains unconvinced—not because she does not believe 
that sight stands as a proxy for experiential knowledge, but because Terence’s attempt at 
bridging the gap between them feels abstract and remote.  “As he talked of writing he had 
suddenly become impersonal.  He might never care for any one; all that desire to know 
her and get at her, which she had felt pressing on her almost painfully, had completely 
vanished” (VO 204).  His accusations place Rachel in a camp of readers with the wrong 
kind of vision—“you read a novel . . . to see what sort of person the writer is” when you 
ought to be trying better to understand “the way [the author’s] seen the thing”—remarks 
which appear to put intimacy and intellectual inquiry at odds.   
Though the tension between Terence and Rachel in this scene might mirror a 
contest between forms of art like literature and music, I have opened with this scene in 
order to focus instead on how it suggests vision mediates between impersonality and 
intimacy.  Both characters seek in this scene a closeness with the other, but as one feels 
s/he approaches it, the other feels more removed.  This is in no small way related to the 
novel’s bildungsroman tendencies that seek to trace Rachel’s subjecthood and the 
strictures enforced by the “men of 1914,” for whom Terence, St. John Hirst, and others 
stand as emblems.191  The objectivity T. E. Hulme, Ezra Pound, and, most notoriously, T. 
S. Eliot prescribed in essays on literature demanded that subjectivity be banished and 
                                                 
191 Ann Ardis makes this case in the opening pages of Modernism and Cultural Conflict (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and traces such tensions throughout her study. 
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emotions depersonalized.  Only in so doing, so the argument went, could readers find a 
stable access point from which to critique literature and assign literary value, 
consolidating and esteeming cultural interests over smaller, idiosyncractic concerns.  
Rachel’s disappointment at such language exposes impersonality’s most noticeable flaw: 
namely, that it must be constructed by individual personalities whose political aims are 
masked by aesthetic decrees for how to read a novel or look at a picture.  For Rachel and 
others like her, intimacy is a far more attractive approach, for only in holding things 
closely, rather than at arm’s length that value can emerge.  Only then, as Woolf suggests, 
may we come in contact with life’s most meaningful intensities. 
Yet while they are opposed as to how to go about it, both Terence and Rachel 
seek the same thing.  Both want to be able to bridge gaps, to come together, to pass 
through seemingly impossible barriers.  They hope to kindle their intimacy by talking 
about the possibilities of literature (for Terence) and music (for Rachel) because both 
believe that if a medium can access direct experience, it will bring together people who 
might otherwise misunderstand one another.  However, when they feel closest to one 
another, at the edge of being able to express direct experience, Terence and Rachel think 
not of language or melody, but sight.  
Thus the tension between the pair in this scene also distills a broader cultural 
desire that appears throughout The Voyage Out and which Woolf’s narrator has limned at 
the beginning of the chapter from which this scene is taken.  When the walking path 
Terence and Rachel follow during their conversation reaches its end at the edge of a cliff, 
they look back on the terrain they have covered, a “vast expanse of land” which seems 
like “no view, however extended, in England,” but remains powerfully resonant of the 
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familiar red territories on maps “where famous cities were founded, and the races of men 
changed from dark savages to white civilized men, and back to dark savages again.”  This 
view feels “uncomfortably impersonal” to the pair and causes them to turn their heads in 
the other direction.  In the Atlantic they find another vast expanse, but this one, they can 
imagine, “eventually narrowed itself, clouded its pure tint with grey, and swirled through 
narrow channels and dashed in a shiver of broken waters against massive granite rocks.  
It was this sea that flowed up to the mouth of the Thames; and the Thames washed the 
roots of the city of London” (VO 194).   
The acts of looking in this complex scene would have been familiar to London 
cinema-goers of the 1910s.  The South American panorama that begins the passage 
dissolves, giving way to a host of other views: shots that cut abruptly from one location 
to the next, close-ups of details, and images presented simultaneously as if side-by-side 
(“here the view was one of infinite sun-dried earth . . . widening and spreading away and 
away like the immense floor of the sea”).  Images of a land that is emphatically not 
England communicate the traces of British imperial expansion nonetheless.  The sea that 
crashes against cliffs in Santa Marina (the novel’s fictional British colony) must also, 
finally, lap against the banks of the Thames.  Above all, this chapter in The Voyage Out 
appropriates the quintessential cinematic technique of montage in creating meaning by 
juxtaposing images, in particular images of the immediate and the distant.  Santa Marina 
and London appear almost alongside one another in ways that seem discomfiting to 
Terence and Rachel.  What makes this scene “uncomfortably impersonal” is not that it 
feels abstract or unrelated to these characters, but that, on the contrary, it feels sharply 
close.  Like Terence’s “impersonal” ideas of novels and their readers that uncannily 
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supplements his longing to be close to her “which she had felt pressing on her almost 
painfully,” the colonial history of Santa Marina is not a history Woolf’s characters have 
had a hand in making, but it is their own history nonetheless, and is a history that renders 
them empire’s beneficiaries as well as its culprits.  Woolf’s appropriation of film 
techniques at this point in the novel is one of her earliest modernist flourishes, but it is 
also more that.  It is an attempt to make readers aware of their “positionality” in a 
globalizing world, a way of asking audiences to come to terms with their relation to the 
things they encounter by imagining what we have already seen Terence call the “relation 
[of the novel] to other things.”  As Rey Chow observes, because so many of film’s 
techniques suggest movement, even film’s earliest audiences felt transported when 
watching film.  As a result, audiences were constantly revaluating their conceptions of 
what they saw and from what vantage they saw it.  “[T]he modes of identity construction 
offered by film were modes of relativity and relations rather than essences or fixities.”  In 
other words, “from the very earliest moments” of film, audiences have faced a medium in 
which everything moves, shifts, and changes, and a basic fact that encourages audiences 
to consider identities as forged by such movement.192 
                                                 
192 Rey Chow, “Film and Cultural Identity,” The Rey Chow Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), 86.  The issue of “positioning”—of what might be understood as a perspective and an awareness of 
where a perspective emerges—is a frequent topic in theories of film and cultural identity.  For the 
Vietnamese filmmaker and theorist Trinh. T. Minh-ha, western films too frequently offer images of 
otherness dependent upon stasis and essentialism (“Outside In Inside Out,” Film Theory: Critical Concepts 
in Media and Cultural Studies, ed. Philip Simpson, Andre Utterson, and K. J. Shepherdson, 4 vols.  
[London and New York: Routledge, 2004], 3:375-85).  In his essay on Caribbean cinema and cultural 
identity, Stuart Hall fears that when film represents cultural identity as an established product, it occludes 
the fact that “cultural identity is not a fixed essence at all . . . but a positioning.  Hence there is always a 
politics of the position, which has no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental ‘law of 
history’” (“Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation,” Film Theory, Simpson et al, 3:389; italics in 
original).  I want to follow Chow in suggesting here that such positioning was not always fixed at certain 
moments in film’s history, and that the teens and twenties were one such moment, and, further, that the 
desire to absorb images projected onscreen into one’s identity inspired the sensibility of impersonal 
intimacy under investigation here.  
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If sensations of movement, transport, and travel are built into film’s techniques, 
so, too, are the activities of reflecting on how one sees from changing and unpredictable 
vantage points.193  The sense of multiple perspectives seems to trump subjective 
viewpoints.  By aggregating limited views into a single aesthetic presentation, a sense of 
reality emerges.  But at the same time that an objective, impersonal knowledge of the 
world was projected onscreen, film also connoted closeness between its images and its 
viewers.  This not only brought the larger world into cinema houses, but brought to light 
the paradox at the center of film techniques: that the impersonal presentation of multiple 
shots and a variety of techniques filmmakers were developing in the teens promised 
audiences a privileged sense of intimacy with what they saw.  In fact, the more 
impersonal the presentation—the more images seemed simply recorded by a machine and 
not guided by a director—the more intimate the glimpse seemed.  
In this final chapter, my chief argument will be that impersonality and intimacy 
are modernism’s twin strategies for coping with modernity’s fragmentation and divisions 
and, as such, have more in common than is often realized.  I will make that case by 
considering how modernist literature bears close relation to film.  Both art forms have 
suggested to some critics a distancing between content and audience, and, for others, 
closeness between content and audience.  The extremes between these views are most 
evident in film studies.  Film has been criticized as suggesting the powerful distance of 
mechanical reproduction that separates the camera from the audience, as when Stanley 
Cavell contended that one of film’s constitutive and most affectively charged features is 
                                                 
193 Cf. Chow, who continues the quotation above to say “[f]ilm techniques such as montage, close-ups, 
panoramic shots, long shots, jump cuts, slow motion, flashback, and so forth . . . result in processes of 
introjection, projection, or rejection that take place between the images and the narratives shown on the 
screen,” and in the process, alter “audiences’ sense of self, place, history, and pleasure” (“Film” 86). 
  142
that “movies allow the audience to be mechanically absent.”194  As we turn from the 
enormity of outdoor exhibition grounds to the relatively small and intimate spaces of the 
cinema, we find a renewed, if unexpected, affinity between metropolitan and colonial 
bonds.  Though imperial propagandists made use of both exhibitions and cinema, I am 
more concerned here with a feature of early film that bears subtler relation to the colonial 
imaginary: the powerful connection audiences felt to mechanically produced images.195  
It is no accident, I will suggest, that the early years of film only slightly predate the 
moment at which the modernist posture of impersonality reaches its apex, nor that 
“impersonality” almost always brings its dialect opposite, intimacy, along with it.  My 
hope is that this chapter opens an investigation into how modernist literature and theories 
of readership were inflected by an understanding of film and film audiences, particularly 
metropolitan audiences.  
 
Early Film and the Colonial Unconscious 
In modernist writings on film by contemporaries as heterogeneous as Vachel 
Lindsay, Dorothy Richardson, H. D., Gertrude Stein, and Siegfried Kracauer, the 
audiences watching cinema received more attention than films themselves.196  As Laura 
                                                 
194 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film  (New York: Viking, 1971), 25.  
This view has fallen out of favor more recently as feminist film scholars began borrowing from 
psychoanalysis the notion of suture to suggest the inextricable bind between audience and the films they 
watch.  But see also Rey Chow’s critique of the metaphor of suture, which argues that suture too readily 
suggests that film audiences falsely recognize themselves in what they see onscreen (“Film” 87). 
195 For this reason, my discussion of Woolf in this chapter considers The Voyage Out and “The Cinema” 
rather than the better known novel, To the Lighthouse (1927).  Whereas To the Lighthouse has been 
considered in light of the cinema and filmic techniques, The Voyage Out has not received such sustained 
treatment; critics of late have instead read The Voyage Out in terms of its colonial contexts.  Part of the aim 
of this chapter is to consider The Voyage Out along these lines while also bringing it into discussions of 
Woolf and film in order to provide a richer sense of Woolf’s literary development leading up to her essay 
on the cinema. 
196 See Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture, 1922 (New York, Modern Library, 2000); Siegfried 
Kracauer, “Cult of Distraction: On Berlin’s Picture Palaces,” The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, ed. and 
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Marcus explains in her study of modernist-era film, when particular films were discussed, 
early film critics almost always charged themselves with the task of explaining not 
simply the film but how to interpret the medium itself, “not so much explaining the visual 
as redefining the images according to an alternate set of rules” legislated by film.197  
Discussions of Robert Weine’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919) and Carl Theordor 
Dreyer’s Joan of Arc (1928) yielded above all opportunities to generalize how film 
techniques taught audiences to interpret them.  Thus, continues Marcus, “the writings of 
many early film critics and commentators revealed an acute awareness not only of the 
relationships between filmic motion and the modernity that they inhabited, but also of the 
need to articulate new understandings of vision and identity in a moving world.”198  
The paradox early film critics encountered was the need for explaining something 
for which no adequate vocabulary had yet been found.  Film seemed to divulge visual 
information about the flows and rhythms of experience, but that information could not be 
fully accessed without a capable framework for discussing film itself.  This may be 
difficult to imagine now because our vocabulary for early film now is practically 
synonymous with modernism itself.  Unlike caricature, photography, and colonial 
exhibitions, film and modernism, we are often reminded, come of age at the same time.  
So many of the terms that have been taken to be modernism’s buzzwords for generations 
now—fragmentation, dislocation, mechanization, speed, restlessness, anomie—are also 
the recurrent themes of early film.  Yet, if we are guided by the way moderns sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                 
trans. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 323-30; and 
contributions by Richardson, H. D., and Stein to the film journal Close Up (in James Donald et al, eds., 
Close Up, 1927-1933: Cinema and Modernism [London: Cassell, 1998]). 
197 Laura Marcus, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 181. 
198 Marcus, Tenth, 5. 
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wrote of film, perhaps film’s modernism has no less to do with the longing to visualize 
the modern world’s wide expanse that film sought to satisfy.   
For many, film’s most fundamental quality is its representation of movement, a 
quality which manifested itself as a twin fascination (shared alike by filmmakers, 
audiences, and early film critics) with time and space.  A number of excellent studies 
explain the cinema’s implications for modernist senses of time;199 far less often treated is 
the question of film’s relation to space and place, and in particular to how it helped 
negotiate a sense of identity in the metropole by appealing to imperial reach.  Yet at the 
turn of the century, Britain’s first filmmakers were already expanding the locations of 
film’s stories to satiate the appetite for films about colonial stories whose afterlives could 
be felt in London.  One early British filmmaker, James Williamson, found he could film 
his melodrama about the Boxer Uprising (1900), Attack on a China Mission (1900), 
without traveling to Asia at all.  In fact, Williamson discovered he could make the film in 
England—quite literally in his own back yard.200  But the dominant trend of the period 
was not melodrama but actualité films like those made by the British Mutoscope and 
Biograph Company’s William Dickson, who was one of several who traveled five 
thousand miles to film British troops involved in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in 
South Africa (in sometimes contrived scenarios).  Film and the spectacle of modern 
warfare, especially imperial warfare, seemed to go hand-in-hand.  As Nicholas Daly 
                                                 
199 For considerations of film and modernist conceptions of time, see Gilles Deleuze’s foundational Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989); and Mary Ann Doane’s more recent and historically grounded The Emergence of Cinematic Time: 
Modernity, Contingency, the Archive  (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
200 James Chapman and Nicholas J. Cull, Projecting Empire: Imperialism and Popular Cinema (New York: 
Tauris, 2009), 1-2. 
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writes, “whatever its importance for British imperial history, the [Anglo-Boer War] acted 
as a stimulus to the still very fragile emergent film industry.”201 
 In the epilogue to “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility” (1935), Walter Benjamin diagnoses the pleasure afforded in filming 
“imperialistic war” as the logical endpoint for a certain kind of modernist aesthetics.202  
For audiences who had been trained since the fin-de-siècle that sublime aesthetic 
experience existed in the cult of beauty and ironic presentation, the aesthetic distance 
provided by technologically reproduced art offers “the consummation of ‘l’art pour 
l’art’ . . . .  [Humanity’s] self-alienation has reached the point where it can experience its 
own annihilation as supreme aesthetic pleasure” (“WOA” 3:122).203  Though Benjamin 
seeks to score a point for liberal politics in his anti-fascist epilogue, earlier in the Work of 
Art essay he, too, finds it difficult to separate the pleasures of film from the pleasures of 
the self-destruction that characterize a strain of colonial politics.  
Our bars and city streets, our offices and our furnished rooms, our railroad 
stations and our factories seemed to close relentlessly around us.  Then 
came film and exploded this prison-world with the dynamite of the split 
second, so that now we can set off calmly on journeys of adventure among 
its far-flung debris.  (“WOA” 3:117)   
 
During the height of European imperial control and the early phases of globalization, 
even those things most associated with movement and the benefits of commercial and 
imperial networks seem inadequate to the task of satisfying curious eyes.  That task 
                                                 
201 Nicholas Daly, Literature, Technology, and Modernity, 1860-2000 (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 62.  Daly also has an excellent reading of Rudyard Kipling’s short 
story “Mrs. Bathurst” (1904), which is set in South Africa, as part of a Boer film aesthetic (56-75). 
202 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Version,” 
trans. Harry Zohn and Edmund Jephcott, in Selected Writings of Walter Benjamin, ed. Marcus Bullock et al 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996-2003), 3:121 (hereafter cited in text as “WOA”). 
203 For Benjamin, these are the circumstances that make watching the depredations of the aura its own 
aesthetic compensation.  “Imperialistic war is an uprising on the part of technology, which demands 
repayment in ‘human material’ for the natural material society has denied it. . . . in gas warfare it has 
found a new means of abolishing the aura” (“WOA” 3:121-2; Benjamin’s italics). 
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would be left for film, which, Benjamin suggests, appears in the midst of Europe’s 
metropolitan ruins (its “far-flung debris”), a wasteland of its own making.  It is as though, 
for Benjamin, the new medium of film was not just part of this era, but could not possibly 
have preceded it.  It is further as if the changes wrought by global commercial and 
imperial traffic have not only found their best representations in film, but that in 
producing these representations the cinema completes the implosion of Europe’s 
decadent decline.  Though one of Benjamin’s famous claims about the cinema is that it 
offered a glimpse into the optical unconscious (“WOA” 3:117; meaning, the many small 
movements that are perceived but not entirely apprehended),204 his essay persistently 
testifies to modernism’s colonial unconscious, its awareness, without full 
acknowledgement, of the centrality of the colonial for Europe’s self-definition.205  Film 
not only changes movement (accessing “a vast and unsuspected field of action” [“WOA” 
3:117]) by destroying prefilmic notions of time; it liberates the “prison-world” of the 
European city by facilitating travel to points beyond railway terminals. 
 A decade earlier, a writer in London had considered film in much the same way as 
Benjamin would, but with a reversal of the metaphor.  Woolf’s essay “The Cinema” 
(1926) opens by considering film’s impact on metropolitan audiences by associating that 
impact, like Benjamin, with what is geographically distant from the metropolis.  But 
where Benjamin’s avowed ambivalence toward film slips into the language of destruction, 
                                                 
204 Benjamin first mentions the optical unconscious in his “Little History of Photography,” 1931, trans. 
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Woolf regards film as one of the generative forces of the machine age—though, again, 
the language is telling.  “People say that the savage no longer exists in us,” she begins:  
But these philosophers have presumably forgotten about the movies.  They 
have never seen the savages of the twentieth century watching the pictures.  
They have never sat themselves in front of the screen and thought how, for 
all the clothes on their backs and the carpets at their feet, no great distance 
separates them from those bright-eyed naked men who knocked two bars 
or iron together and heard in that clangour a foretaste of the music of 
Mozart.206 
 
If the challenge film poses to the cultural critics (“philosophers”) is the problem of covert 
proximity Woolf describes—where clothes and carpet hide the closeness between 
civilized and uncivilized, and between the cultivated sense of self and the unsophisticated 
minds of  “bright-eyed naked men”—it makes sense that Woolf should want to turn from 
interpreting films themselves and focus on its audiences instead.  The subterranean 
connection Woolf lights onto here remains hidden but not inaccessible, she suggests.  The 
film onscreen is significant as a form that in some crucial sense remains obscure to 
viewers and, as a result, unmasks its audiences, even its most blasé viewers, as something 
not unlike colonial subjects. 
As Woolf’s essay continues, its comments about film always work in the same 
direction, explaining the techniques of film as a form that reveals something about its 
audiences.  Film emerges for her as uniquely suited for reflection on modern metropolitan 
life, capturing the ephemera lost in ordinary perception.  “Watching crowds, watching the 
chaos of the streets” in person means being inundated with more information than one 
can process.  With film, “it seems sometimes as if movements and colours, shapes and 
sounds had come together and waited for someone to seize them and convert their energy 
                                                 
206 Virginia Woolf, “The Cinema,” The Essays of Virginia Woolf, 6 vols., ed. Andrew McNeillie (vols. 1-4) 
and Stuart Clark (vols. 5-6) (London: Hogarth, 1986-2010), 4:348 (hereafter cited in text as “C”). 
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into art; then, uncaught, they disperse and fly asunder again” (“C” 4:352).  What film 
grants audiences, that is, is what we sense but do not see without the mediation of the 
camera’s eye: or, in Benjamin’s terms, film reveals the optical unconscious.  But for 
Woolf this does not mean that film’s greatest contribution to knowledge will be in the 
arena of psychological processes; nor does Woolf find film to be aestheticism in full 
bloom, as Benjamin does.  Instead, the world rendered onscreen has for her “become not 
more beautiful, in the sense in which pictures are beautiful, but shall we call it (our 
vocabulary is miserably insufficient) more real, or real with a different reality from that 
which we perceive daily life” (“C” 4:349).207 
Concerned as both Benjamin and Woolf are with film’s aesthetic and social 
dimensions, the difference between their assessments is surely the difference of writing in 
Paris as a German-Jewish émigré fleeing from Nazism in the 1930s, and writing in 
London as the beneficiary of the world’s largest empire in 1920s.208  For Benjamin, film 
is the fruition of a politics of oppression for which decadent aesthetics had laid the 
groundwork; writing about film as a means of traveling abroad that destroys the 
metropole is a byproduct of that understanding.  But for Woolf, film is not the 
culmination of the cult of beauty and irony but the arrival of a form that promotes 
widespread urban anthropology and ethnography.  By making it possible to “see life as it 
is when we have no part in it,” to “behold [images of the city] as they are when we are 
                                                 
207 Where Woolf felt that language would catch up with filmic technology in 1926, unlocking film’s most 
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208 Marcus takes up the issue of differing national traditions of film theory and their points of intersection in 
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not there” (“C” 4:349), the cinema becomes a place where Londoners gain access to their 
city’s rhythms, architecture, and customs, elements that audiences may consider, perhaps 
for the first time, without thinking about their place in that urban milieu.  Techniques like 
close ups, montage, and slowed time provide audiences with a critical, depersonalized 
context that exists nowhere elsewhere (“[a]s we gaze, we seem to be removed from the 
pettiness of actual existence, its cares, its conventions;” “C” 4:349).  In this way, Woolf’s 
image of film audiences as “the savages of the twentieth century watching the pictures” is 
not an image of the anxieties of decadence or “reverse colonization,” but of the beginning 
of an engagement with a new medium of expression that, unlike the scene Woolf 
describes, can be observed, documented, and studied from its beginning—by film 
spectators themselves. 
Both Woolf’s essay and Benjamin’s share a tendency to operate on a hinge that, 
swung one way, makes audiences the spectators of film and, swung the other, makes 
them students of their own cultures.  And this is the final lesson that comes in comparing 
two of modernism’s best-known essays on film, for while Woolf and Benjamin would 
seem to be at odds on number of issues, both find common ground in deploying the 
rhetoric of cultural difference as a means for explaining how film affects its audiences.  
To think about one’s culture as an anthropologist almost always means appropriating the 
techniques and terms of ethnography.209  When Woolf and Benjamin write of film in 
these terms, they remind us that to understand modernist self-consciousness, including 
how one’s art might be received, requires a concomitant understanding of modernist 
                                                 
209 Both Marc Manganaro’s Culture, 1922: The Emergence of a Concept (Oxford and Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002) and Jed Esty’s A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England 
(Oxford and Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) carefully plot modernism’s “anthropological turn” 
and modern writers’ interest in ethnography. 
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conceptions of cultural alterity.  As Simon Gikandi and Marianna Torgovnick have 
shown, definitions of modernity and anti-modernity (including primitivism, fetishism, 
and tribalism) are not binaries but mutually constitutive constructions.210  Indeed, as we 
saw in the previous chapter on colonial exhibitions, such antimodern notions coexist 
within modernity itself as the muted awareness of the colonial and as the defining “other” 
of metropolitan culture. 
Contemporary film critics caution against presupposing modernism’s favorite 
self-fashioned narratives of clean breaks and making it new when considering the 
development of the new medium.211  Because Benjamin and Woolf do point to a 
genuinely new feature to appear in modernist culture, the film audience, we must proceed 
carefully so as not to reinscribe these myths in the course of studying what film audiences 
meant for modernist writers.  Like all audiences, a film audience is a loose, temporary 
collective with differing tastes, backgrounds, and social positions who are at other times 
also members of other audiences (visitors to museum, patrons of music halls, and readers 
of poetry, for instance).  Rightly or wrongly, early film audiences tended to regard film as 
singularly new,212 and early commenters on cinema preserve that regard in choosing to 
write about audiences—sometimes more often than films themselves.  Part of this 
newness results from repeated utopian claims for film as a “visual language” that could 
span diverse locations and cultures to augur a “new humanity” whose “language will be 
                                                 
210 Marianna Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990); and Simon Gikandi, “Picasso, Africa, and the Schemata of Difference,” 
Modernism/Modernity 10.3 (2003): 455-80). 
211 See, for example, Laura Marcus, “Film,” in A Companion to Modernist Literature and Culture, ed. 
David Bradshaw and Kevin J. H. Dettmar (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 250-7. 
212 The most familiar iteration of film’s newness belongs to Rudolf Armheim’s claim (in 1931): “For the 
first time in history a new art form is developing and we can say that we were there” (Film Essays and 
Criticism, trans. Brenda Benthien [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997], 13).  
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cinema,” as the poet Blaise Cendrars declared in 1917.213  Prufrock pines for just such 
communicability in the face of the impossibility “to say just what I mean! / But as if a 
magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen.”214 
As Prufrock’s anxious tones suggest, audiences seldom forgot that such human 
fantasies were the phantasmagoric work of machines, and that fact tended to obscure the 
role of the filmmaker.  Even a film as self-conscious about the human element in 
filmmaking as Dziga Vertov’s Man with the Movie Camera (1929) announced itself in its 
opening credits as an “experimental work [that] aims at creating a truly international[,] 
absolute language of cinema.”215  The terms of that language are unmistakable.  The 
narrative of Man with the Movie Camera, in which a camera follows a cameraman 
shooting a film about a city, is framed by the narrative of an automaton: the relentlessly 
mimetic camera.  For the moment, the yearning to be outside of culture seems not only 
possible but actually unfolding before audiences.  With few exceptions, audiences 
willingly suspended better judgment.  Machines, it seemed, made films.   
One reason moderns longed for the camera to provide a universal visual language 
may have been that such a language could have provided impartial, impersonal access to 
cultural differences.  Spectacles delivered by cameras, so it was hoped, might fuse the 
gap between signifier and signified by bringing together that which verbal metaphors and 
analogies could only intimate by comparison.  At the same time the language that 
modernists grafted onto film was inescapably a language which carried with it the 
                                                 
213 Quoted in Marcus, “Film,” 250.  For a broader discussion of imperial complications with the utopian 
project promises of modernist visual culture, see Michael North’s Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of 
the Modern, chap. 3.  North also takes up the issue I take up below (mechanical reproduction as a utopian 
aim for representation without mediation) in Camera Works: Photography and the Twentieth-Century 
Word. 
214 T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, 1967), 6. 
215 Dziga Vertov, Man with a Movie Camera (VUFKU, 1929), 35 mm film, 68 minutes, streaming video, 
http://www.netflix.com. 
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hegemonic binary of observer/observed upon which anthropology and ethnography relied, 
and often continue to rely.216  That such language should turn out to deconstruct itself is 
no new insight (deconstruction’s foundational text is a reading of Claude Levi-Strauss, 
after all), but this particular displacement of a system of visual signs has something 
important teach us about filmic modernism’s colonial unconscious, its recourse to the 
colonial to define metropolitan modernity.   
During the teens and twenties, British modernism’s close associations with non-
western cultures was part of broader series of projects that yearned to understand Anglo-
European cultures from the outside.  If the language of cinema turned out to be 
circumscribed by the discourses of anthropology and ethnography, the language of 
interpreting culture from an outside, objective position was, at least for some practitioners 
of modernism, inflected by the techniques of film.  The language of anthropology and 
ethnography, which relies on firm boundaries between object/subject and 
observer/observed, was built into film from its inception.  At the same time, the 
procedure by which films communicate to audiences destabilizes the ease with which 
such rhetoric characterizes these relations.  Film, Woolf and Benjamin explain, produces 
narrative continuity out of techniques of discontinuity.  Montage, close-ups, slow motion, 
and other techniques reveal that the perception of continuity arrives as the aggregate of an 
infinitely divisible series of smaller, unconscious perceptions which, when considered 
individually, disrupt continuity with “the dynamite of the split second” (“WOA” 3:117).  
Because it strikes at the center of filmic story and audience response, the fluidity between 
continuity and discontinuity in turn disrupts the binaries of anthropological distance.  
                                                 
216 Rey Chow demonstrates this shared reliance in the final chapter of Primitive Passions (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), which attempts a consideration of film “the visualist epistemological 
bases of disciplines such as anthropology and ethnography” (195). 
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Accounting for modern audience’s positionality demands, then, a taking note of 
impersonal object/subject, observer/observed relations while also problematizing the 
psychoanalytic models which would suggest total identification with the impersonal, 
objective observer.  Such a model emerges, I will now propose, when we consider the 
traffic between another apparent binary, modernist impersonality and intimacy. 
 
Impersonal Intimacy 
 Impersonality is one of modernism’s perennial themes, though just what 
impersonality meant for modernists has been a subject of considerable debate.  That 
debate has found that impersonality appeared in various modernist contexts, revealing a 
broad desire to which different modernists felt attracted for different reasons.  Without 
doubt, the figure most closely associated with modernist impersonality is T. S. Eliot, who, 
in a series of essays published in the teens and early twenties, established what came to 
be known as the doctrine of impersonality.  The best known of these essays, “Tradition 
and the Individual Talent” (1919), argues that artistic expression is a matter of 
apprenticeship.  “The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual 
extinction of personality,” Eliot declares, and without the broader frame of a tradition in 
which to consider a poet, audiences had no standard for evaluating what they read.217  To 
safeguard from purely idiosyncratic criteria that measures only how well this poet speaks 
to that reader’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences, Eliot recommended—by notoriously 
borrowing analogies from chemical processes—reading a poet as a link in a chain of 
succession.  The tradition Eliot has in mind is sometimes pan-European, and sometimes 
                                                 
217 T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New 
York: Harcourt, 1975), 40 (hereafter cited in text as “TT”). 
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national (it slips between the two: “[The poet] must be aware [of] the mind of Europe—
the mind of his own country—a mind which he learns in time to be much more important 
than his own private mind” [“TT” 39]).  In either case, Eliot assembles throughout his 
doctrine of impersonality a chain that unmistakably connects the celebration of a poet to 
his national tradition and, by extension, his nation: “his appreciation is the appreciation of 
his relation to the dead poets and artists” who precede him (“TT” 38).  As Maud Ellmann 
forcefully argued, the rhetoric of scientific objectivity and ahistorical, universal value 
provides cover for an Anglo-European, masculine politics that has made impersonality 
unpalatable for some time.218 
As cogent as some of Ellmann’s connections are between Eliot’s prose and poetry 
of this period may be, for many the experience of reading Eliot’s early poetry has not 
been so clearly ideological.  “For a poet who had such success, in his heyday, in 
importing the yardstick of impersonality into criticism,” declares the South African 
novelist and literary critic J. M. Coetzee, “Eliot’s poetry is astonishingly personal.”219  
Indeed, a half-century before Coetzee made this remark, a number of postcolonial writers 
                                                 
218 Maud Ellmann, The Poetics of Impersonality: T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound (London and Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987. 
219 J. M. Coetzee, “What is a Classic?  A Lecture,” Stranger Shores: Literary Essays 1986-1999 (New 
York: Viking, 2001), 3.  Other readers have expressed similar responses.  Jewel Spears Brooker explains 
that Eliot associated Pound, Joyce, Conrad, and Yeats with attempts to curb personal feelings in order to 
create “art emotions”—latent affect for readers to access—as a way of negating the autonomous, Romantic 
poet that allows poetry to be successful (see “Writing the Self: Dialectic of Impersonality in T. S. Eliot,” in 
T. S. Eliot and the Concept of Tradition, ed. Giovanni Cianci and Jason Harding [Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 41-57).  For Charles Altieri, the speaker of Eliot’s “Preludes” 
(1917) “has no personal characteristics. . . . Yet even this minimal first-person condition stages the 
possibility that all this description can lead to sympathy, and hence the image can evoke personal 
responsiveness” (The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry [Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006], 57-8).  
 As I mean to make clear, it is important to note here the difference between these kinds of 
argument and Maud Ellmann’s.  Though Eliot’s impersonality seems very likely to have latched onto 
scientific objectivity in order to conceal its author’s reactionary politics, as Ellmann claims, it does not 
follow that Eliot’s readers chose to respond to those politics.   
  155
were appreciating Eliot in ways that postwar English poets were not.220  As Edward 
Kamau Brathwaite famously recalls, he and his fellow midcentury Caribbean poets felt a 
strong connection to recordings of Eliot’s voice reading his poems: “the ‘riddims’ of St 
Louis (though we did not know the source then) were stark and clear for those of us who 
at the same time were listening to the dislocations of Bird, Dizzy and Klook.”  More 
specifically, this connection was most powerful when such a dialect voice spoke in 
evocative images: that is, when listening to “natural, ‘riddimic’ and image-laden tropes” 
spoken from the Anglo-American past to Brathwaite’s West Indian present.221  
Brathwaite’s account concerns “mainstream [Caribbean] poets who were moving from 
standard English” to dialects that reflect their own local traditions, like Brathwaite 
himself.  His rhetoric here testifies to a powerful attraction images may have in writing as 
well as the unpredictable connections they sometimes help sponsor between audiences 
and authors with widely divergent personal and political views.222   
In the context of modernist literature, film, and audience, these responses have 
much to offer as a reminder of the complex relationship between impersonality and 
intimacy.  Indeed, the line separating the two was not always distinct for Eliot himself.  
In the same year that Eliot called for reading poets in “relation to the dead poets and 
                                                 
220 For the turn away from Eliot’s poetics in midcentury England, see Clive Wilmer, “The Later Fortunes of 
Impersonality: ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ and Postwar Poetry,” in Cianci and Harding, 58-72. 
221 Edward Kamau Brathwaite, Roots (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 286 n34. 
To be clear, the second quotation speaks of a favorable comparison Brathwaite makes between Eliot and 
the voice of a BBC cricket commentator's “natural, ‘riddimic’ and image-laden tropes in his revolutionary 
Hampshire burr” (286 n34). 
222 See, for example, Brathwaite’s express call for understanding Caribbean literature in terms of tradition 
and individual talent in Roots (37).  Such high-culture affiliations between an established modernist garde 
and writers who immigrated from the Caribbean in postwar London are the subject of Peter J. Kalliney’s 
“Metropolitan Modernism and Its West Indian Interlocutors: 1950s London and the Emergence of 
Postcolonial Literature,” PMLA 122.1 (2007): 89-104.  For readers schooled in feminism, gender studies, 
and queer theory, the masculine dimension of Eliot’s politics appears no less stable upon closer inspection.  
See, for example, the essays collected in Gender, Desire, and Sexuality in T. S. Eliot, ed. Cassandra Laity 
and Nancy K. Gish (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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artists” that precede them in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (“TT” 38), he also 
explained, in “Reflections on Contemporary Poetry” (1919), that the bond between poet 
and tradition is “a feeling of profound kinship, or rather of a peculiar personal intimacy, 
with another, probably a dead author.” 223  As Eliot describes the relationship here, even 
apprenticing poets should not be understood as cathected to their predecessors (“[w]e do 
not imitate, we are changed; and our work is the work of the changed man; we have not 
borrowed, we have been quickened” [“RCP” 400]), but the relation is a profoundly close 
one based on “this secret knowledge, this intimacy, with the dead man. . . . [I]t is 
certainly a crisis” (“RCP” 399). 
Though the influence of earlier writers “is certainly a crisis” for the poet, it is less 
Bloomian agon than a crisis of intimacy—a which term saturates “Reflections on 
Contemporary Poetry” (along with the similar language of “kinship,” “friendship,” 
“passion,” and “love”).  The crisis is not only to do with aesthetic maturity but with 
nothing short of the process of self-actualization: “imperative intimacy” legitimates the 
emergence of a self “from a bundle of second-hand sentiments into a person,” yet the 
relationship on which this self depends for its definition, while “ineffaceable,” “probably 
will pass” (“RCP” 399).  Such is the crisis that comes with the assault on personality, 
which Eliot regarded as the price of admission for entering the social world, only to find 
that the social is, by definition, the composite of innumerable points of view that 
interrogate one another, a process that challenges one’s existence, as he explains in his 
philosophy dissertation.224  This crisis is concerned with the fact that, as the social 
                                                 
223 T. S. Eliot, “Reflections on Contemporary Poetry [IV],” Inventions of the March Hare: Poems 1909-
1917, ed. Christopher Ricks (New York: Harcourt, 1996), 399 (hereafter cited in text as “RCP”). 
224 T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, 1916 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), 148, as elsewhere. 
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theorist Niklas Luhmann would later observe, individuation is dependent upon the 
construction and maintenance practices that play on the perceived differences between a 
self and an other.225  As Luhmann puts it, “no personal identity is distinct from social 
identity.”226  National cultures, particularly when they can be found to be homogenous 
and located in a fixed place, can quieten such crisis by leveling differences.  As Eliot 
explained in a letter to a correspondent (in 1919), “[c]ulture, if it means anything decent, 
means something personal: one book or painter made one’s own rather than a thousand 
read or looked at.”227  The cultivation of the personal happens within a national tradition 
of art. 
 How are we to reconcile these sentiments of impersonality and intimacy?  The 
chief problem with defining those terms in statements like these is their movement.  At 
one moment, Eliot declares that a poet enters into a national tradition by surrendering his 
personality while, at another, culture itself is personal.  At one moment a poet seeks to 
mimic dead poets, but at another the living and dead poets are like “great lovers” (“RCP” 
400).  Yet perhaps Eliot’s writings do not point to the impossibility of stabilizing these 
key terms so much as they suggest that audiences’ responses can fluctuate between them.  
Perhaps the reason that impersonality seems to have a fixed meaning for Eliot within 
singular works, like “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” but seems interchangeable 
with intimacy when placing quotations from other works alongside it is because, taken 
together, these writings reveal Eliot to be a reader whose position changes depending on 
                                                 
225 Niklas Luhmann, “The Individuality of the Individual: Historical Meanings and Contemporary 
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226 Luhmann, 324. 
227 The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Volume I: 1898-1922, ed. Valerie Eliot (New York: Harcourt, 1988), 318 
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how different texts affect his sensibilities.  How, then, might we understand Eliot’s 
elaborations of modernist impersonality and intimacy?  
 Recently, Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips have considered a variety of contexts of 
intimacy from antiquity to the present and have found that it is often rooted in little more 
than each party’s narrative of selfhood.228  Memory, desire, and disposition for example, 
provide the basis for connection so that our closest and most cherished social bonds seek 
almost entirely to strengthen likenesses with others rather than exploring differences, not 
unlike the uniform national culture for which Eliot longs.  This renders intimacy a form 
of narcissism that extends the self by finding reflections of one’s identity in others who 
share the same or similar memories, desires, or dispositions.  Rather than constituting a 
connection that overcomes the challenges of otherness, intimacy in this sense is merely 
the path of least resistance and greatest gratification of egos.  
A productive alternative exists, however, in relationships based on what Bersani 
and Phillips call “impersonal intimacy,” or the acceptance of the self and other as 
provisional, changeable positions.  This is “an exchange in which, through a reciprocal 
attentiveness to the other’s becoming what he potentially is, both partners move beyond 
what turns out to have been a provisional distinction between the lover and the 
beloved.”229  What makes impersonal intimacy “impersonal” is that, rather than 
furthering each party’s preexisting sense of self, it seeks an unforeseen result in the 
encounter with another.  What makes impersonal intimacy “intimate” is that, once 
differences emerge in this encounter, it searches for new knowledge about self, other, and 
                                                 
228 Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2008).  Intimacies is a 
book written in dialogue; the chapters alternate authorship and each author reflects on and responds to the 
ideas of the other.  My summary of the notion of impersonal intimacy that emerges from this text draws 
largely from Bersani’s conclusion, the book’s final chapter.  
229 Bersani and Phillips, 121. 
  159
categories of identity.  If we were adhering strictly to etymology, we might simply call 
this relation “intimacy,” for it is a relation that seeks new knowledge that comes with 
establishing and maintaining profound closeness with another and which can change the 
self rather than reflect it.  This is impersonality that directs a posture of selfhood so that it 
can be responsive to the world in which it finds itself by making and breaking 
attachments depending on the needs of the other and the exigencies of a given situation.  
Thus, impersonal intimacy seeks to avoid the metaphor of suture, of an unremitting   It is 
a way of changing identity by creating attachments, and constructing selfhood in a way 
that is fueled by the unknown rather than defined by a lack.   
If we were reading Eliot as simply an impersonal poet, it may be with some 
surprise that we may recall the deep vulnerability in these lines from near the end of 
“What the Thunder Said,” the final section of The Waste Land (1922): “My friend,” 
consoles a voice, 
blood shaking my heart 
The awful daring of a moment’s surrender 
Which an age of prudence can never retract 
By this, and this only, we have existed 
Which is not to be found in our obituaries 
Or in memories draped by the beneficent spider 
Or under seals broken by the lean solicitor 
In our empty rooms230 
Like so much of what is spoken in Eliot’s long poem, we must read these lines without 
knowing to whom, exactly, we are listening.  Even in the case of the poem’s many 
traceable allusions, its cacophonic voices work both as a patchwork of literary history 
                                                 
230 T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in Complete Poems, 49 (hereafter cited in text as as WL).  It may be with 
greater surprise that we find that Ezra Pound, who excised much in the original drafts of The Waste Land 
because they were too personal, did not recommend that Eliot delete the words “My friend” (The Waste 
Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original Drafts, ed. Valerie Eliot [New York: Harcourt, 1971], 
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that serves as the elegy for so many fitful fragments from that history that want nothing 
more than to be returned to their own times and left untouched by modern dissociated 
personalities.231  Having passed through the halls of literary history, Eliot has allowed 
many disconcerting remarks to be directed at least partially at his readers, from baleful 
warnings (“Fear death by water” and perhaps “HURRY UP PLEASE IT’S TIME”) to 
angry shouts (“You! hypocrite lecture! —mon semblable, —mon frère!”).  By the time 
we reach the end of the poem, it is far from clear who this speaker is and why s/he turns 
and speaks to us—reaching across the divide of time and against the fearful anomic 
images of lean solicitors and the empty rooms we own even after death—to address 
readers in the language of friendship.232  
 The language of intimacy and friendship usually refers to immediate bonds but, as 
we have seen, Eliot invokes it when speaking about a poet’s relationship with the past.  
To be sure, though, this concern with dead poets discloses a concern that sometimes 
expresses itself as full-blown urgency to address a future, and hence an unknown and 
unknowable, readership.  The conclusion of The Waste Land is one such moment.  This 
speaker’s turn toward the reader invokes all three temporal dimensions, but only the 
future left implicit (past and present both get direct verbal treatment: “we have existed” 
and “blood shaking my heart”).  The fact of the future is just as certain as that future’s 
unknowability.  These lines insist that identity is determined not by memories (neither my 
                                                 
231 I am invoking, of course, Eliot’s famous claim that at some point “[i]n the seventeenth century a 
dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered” in “The Metaphysical Poets” 
(Selected Prose 288).  
232 I should acknowledge the skeptical reader’s claim that the friend in this quotation may not be the reader.  
I take it to be an address to the reader for a number of reasons: (1) it comes near the end of “What the 
Thunder Said,” The Waste Land’s most inquisitive section and the one that most often directs itself to the 
reader (soon after these lines the poem will ask “Shall I at least set my lands in order?”); (2) the allusion in 
the line immediately preceding this quotation (“DA / Datta: What have we given?”) is to the Lord Creator 
in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Prajapati, who speaks to humanity his command to give. 
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own nor the memories others will have of me) but by the only thing one can do when 
faced with the uncertainty of the future: to consent to “the awful daring of a moment’s 
surrender / Which an age of prudence can never retract.”  From a poet so concerned and 
so deeply thoughtful about the tradition that precedes him, this is a strange and 
unexpected admission. 
Indeed, as a text asking to be read, The Waste Land extends a strange invitation to 
its readers for at least two reasons.  The first is that it enacts the fragmentary dissociation 
of sensibility Eliot broached in “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921) at the same time that it 
nostalgically pines for the unified English culture that Eliot claimed saturated the 
seventeenth century.  This is nostalgia in its strictest sense: a longing to return home, 
passing the St. Louis where Eliot never felt at home and returning to the ancestral home 
of the Elyots of Somerset in western English countryside and to enshrine his reclaimed 
place among them in Four Quartets (1935-42).  Such a view of culture is also elaborated 
in Eliot’s contributions to social thought, particularly in The Idea of a Christian Society 
(1939) and Notes toward a Definition of Culture (1948), the latter of which claims “it 
would appear to be for the better that the great majority of human beings should go on 
living in the place in which they were born.”233  Indeed, Jed Esty makes a powerfully 
                                                 
233  T. S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture, 1948, in Christianity and Culture (New York: 
Houghton, 1960), 125. 
While Eliot rarely writes of the future, his commitment to tradition can be understood as an implicit 
concern for how future readers will regard him within that tradition.  Eliot speaks only explicitly of the 
future in relatively late essays.  “What is a Classic?” (1944) is haunted by a concern for reverence for the 
past.  “If we cease to believe in the future, the past would cease to be fully our past: it would become the 
past of a dead civilization” (Selected Prose 126).  This line of thinking reaches its culmination in a passage 
in Notes towards the Definition of Culture that uses the family as a trope for understanding how national 
cultures change over time: 
when I speak of the family, I have in mind a bond which embraces a longer period of 
time. . .  [namely,] a piety toward the dead, however obscure, and a solicitude for the 
unborn, however remote.  Unless this reverence for past and future is cultivated in the 
home, it can never be more than a verbal convention in the community.  Such an interest 
in the past is different from the vanities and pretensions of genealogy; such a 
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persuasive claim in A Shrinking Island that this “antidiasporic” thread, the insistence 
upon an Englishness united by racial and local particularities, runs throughout the fabric 
of Eliot’s poetic and critical writings alike and is the defining project of Eliot’s career.234  
The Waste Land attests to the sense that to live in late imperial London was to be buffeted 
by confirmations of discordant metropolitan culture, to be continuously reminded of the 
loss of a unified English culture.  In Esty’s reading of Eliot’s career, The Waste Land, 
“[a] classic example of metropolitan perception,” seeks to reflect and compensate for “a 
fallen aesthetic for the imperial age,” “mix[ing] urban vignettes with source materials 
from alien cultures in the service of its own self-authorizing aesthetic.”  Further, the 
“anthologizing and anthropologizing dimensions of the poem enable a formal synthesis 
based in large part on imperial knowledge—including, for example, the worldwide 
mythic correspondences of Frazer’s Golden Bough”—in order to evince Eliot’s 
“dissatisfaction with the broken culture and broken sensibilities that [The Waste Land] is 
constrained to feature.”235 
 Yet even as Eliot’s poem does all the work Esty ascribes to it—marshaling 
cultural fragments as a way of exploring metropolitan anomie in the last decades of 
empire—there is another dimension of The Waste Land’s strange invitation to its readers 
that can be sensed by exploring how Eliot delivers metropolitan anomie in the language 
                                                                                                                                                 
responsibility for the future is different from that of the builder of social programmes.  
(116-7) 
234 This is not to demonize Eliot but to restore him to his interwar political situation, for an important part 
of Esty’s argument is to shift undue attention away from Eliot’s politics and toward a broader view of the 
English landscape that widely nurtured such views: 
Eliot’s conservatism and especially his anti-Semitism have tended to obscure the fact that 
antidiasporic thinking ran across the political spectrum of the 1930s.  Indeed, I take the 
emergence of a wider discourse of insularity on both the left and the right to indicate not 
just the political stripes of one or another segment of the educated classes but rather a 
broader structural shift associated with the contraction of empire and the collapse of 
interwar cosmopolitanism.  (Esty, Shrinking, 109-10) 
235 Esty, Shrinking, 115-6. 
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of friendship.  The questions I have raised about the speaker(s) of the lines above and 
how we might receive their words ought to be answered, I think, in terms of the ethics 
implied in the lines immediately preceding the above quotation: “DA / Datta: What have 
we given?”  One strong candidate for this “we” are the plural authors and images that 
have been exhumed from the past to appear in the poem.  In that case, their question 
could be one of defeat in an era of cultural decline (and when imperial projects appear 
increasingly fragile), meaning: “what part have we played in helping create this 
disjointed cultural landscape?”  But it could also be an affirmative question that asks 
what they may offer readers of Eliot’s time—readers who, as Eliot makes clear in “The 
Metaphysical Poets,” could not have been anticipated by Dryden or Marvell (to say 
nothing of Petronius or Sappho).    
 What I want to suggest here is that while Esty’s reading of Eliot as modernism’s 
champion of conservative, antidiasporic poetics is accurate, Eliot’s language further 
requires us to examine that reading against the terms and gestures of friendship and 
intimacy that appear in The Waste Land—and indeed throughout Eliot’s so-called 
impersonal poems—which expresses a sense of impersonal intimacy as “‘a process of 
becoming,’ or, in other terms, [as] evolving affinities of being.”236  The gestures of 
friendship and intimacy I have in mind rely almost exclusively on Eliot’s use of images.  
By presenting images as the hallmarks of modernity’s social breakdown, Eliot’s personae 
seek to establish a connection with readers: they seem to say, “I, too, feel the alienation 
                                                 
236 Bersani and Phillips, Intimacies, 124. 
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of empty cups, sawdust restaurants and cheap hotels.”  This gesture is intended as much 
for Eliot’s future readers as his contemporaries.237   
Eliot, Automatism, and Silent Film 
It is significant that one of the forms Eliot’s alleged distaste for film takes is a 
running joke that appears in letters to his cousin, Eleanor Hinkley during the winter 1914-
5—the year war broke out in Europe and the poet’s year at Oxford.  In these letters Eliot 
lampoons American westerns (already establishing itself as a genre) by wryly pretending 
to be planning one of his own, “my great ten-reel drama, EFFIE THE WAIF,” which will 
pit hero Spike Cassidy against the sinister Seedy Sam on the desert plains of Medicine 
Hat, Wyoming (LOTSE 62).  Eliot’s parody underscores that national identity can be so 
attractive for some that it can be built from flimsy film types and cultural illiteracy.  
Every western needs “a red Indian or an East Indian,” Eliot snickers, so his faux film will 
include “Traihi Sheik, the maharaja,” who meets Effie’s mother after she discovers that 
the Indians who kidnapped her infant daughter were not American but Kashmiri (LOTSE 
71-2). 
These are parodies of the kinds of plots and stock characters that could have been 
found in Edwardian stage melodramas, but Eliot’s letters also demonstrate a keen 
awareness of the conventions of silent film by parodying intertitles and film’s 
                                                 
237 In The Politics of Friendship, Jacques Derrida is also concerned with the political dimensions of 
“friends seeking mutual recognition without knowing each other” (42).  Though Derrida has the peculiar 
dimension of intimacy shared between readers and authors that we also find haunting Eliot’s writings on 
tradition and impersonality, Derrida finds that models for friendship writ broad might be traced back to 
Cicero’s word for the friend: the “exemplar, which means portrait but also, as the exemplum, the duplicate, 
the reproduction, the copy as well as the original, the type, the model.  The two meanings (the single 
original and the multipliable copy) cohabit here; they are—or seem to be—the same, and that is the whole 
story, the very condition of survival” (4).  Like Bersani and Phillips, Derrida feels that such friendship is 
little more than a “narcissistic projection of the ideal image [of the self], of its own ideal image (exemplar)” 
onto another and needs reconsideration (3). 
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arrangement of images.  In one of the 1914-5 letters to Eleanor Hinkley, Eliot reports that 
as one character in Effie the Waif travels “westward up the Erie he turns and gazes at the 
Statue of Liberty disappearing on the horizon (not strictly accurate geography, but a fine 
scene)” (LOTSE 63).  For David Trotter, this moment marks Eliot as a more canny 
viewer of film technique than even Eisenstein.  If the Russian director staunchly insisted 
on montage as a technique for disjunction and dislocation, he would miss Eliot’s joke, 
Trotter insists, because such a view is incompatible with the narrative continuity Eliot 
describes here.238  But it seems accurate to say what makes the scene a “fine” one for 
Eliot is that this juxtaposition of images creates a narrative with precisely the kind of 
discontinuity of Eisensteinian montage, an almost-but-not-quite seamless fusion an iconic 
national image from the coast with the equally iconic image of a cowboy journeying into 
the American western interior, making a play for sentiment that one can imagine actually 
appearing in film.  By making the shores of Liberty Island contiguous with the banks of 
the Erie Canal, Eliot’s joke only slightly exaggerates the way in which a cinematic 
narrative of an American imagined community could be reaffirmed.  In fact, film’s chief 
advantage over language, as Woolf saw it, was its ability to harness “some of the residue 
of visual emotion” leftover from verbal narrative (“C” 4:351): “All those terrible 
dislocations which are inevitable” in literature “could be bridged by some device of 
scenery.  We should have the continuity of human life kept before us by the repetition of 
some object” (“C” 4:352).  
Without doubt, Eliot’s parody of the genre of the western targets America as the 
Anglo-European world’s cultural backwater.  In one of the letters that continues the story 
of Effie the Waif, Eliot also tells his cousin he has recently been to a debate on “the 
                                                 
238 David Trotter, “T. S. Eliot and Cinema,” Modernism/Modernity 13.2 (2006), 249. 
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threatened Americanisation of Oxford,” where, he reports, “I pointed out to them frankly 
how much they owed to Amurrican culcher in the drayma (including the movies)” 
(LOTSE 70), drawing attention to the imbrication of film and national culture.  If Effie the 
Waif lets us know that Eliot had a working knowledge of film’s conventions as early as 
1914, it reveals in particular an awareness of the conventions of the western.  From this 
early point, Eliot associated film—especially its editing, angles, and ability to assemble 
scenes with fragments of locations—with a kind of modern mapping that develops the 
tensions of a national unity based on locality and ethnicity.  As Eliot saw it, the humor of 
Effie the Waif is in using a white American indifference to the particularities of otherness 
(“a red Indian or an East Indian”) to manufacture a unified sense of national identity.  
The irony is that the joke became a training ground for learning to deploy filmic 
fragmentation as a means of reporting and expressing the longing for national cultural 
continuity found in Eliot’s poetry.  Accordingly, Susan McCabe reads Effie as a jab at 
Eliot’s home country that “provided an imaginary space where he could articulate 
anxieties over the shifting matrices of class, race, gender, and sexuality” in ways that 
prefigure The Waste Land, “the modern montage poem par excellence,” into which “Eliot 
transcribes . . . his anxieties over racial and gender identity.”239  These anxieties, I would 
suggest, were part of Eliot’s complex relation to gender and racial politics alike in which 
Eliot straightforwardly embraces the masculinity, English, and western European (as 
opposed to Semitic) whiteness in his essays and lectures while coterminously expressing 
oblique but palpable affinities with femininity, ethnicity, and the nonwestern, usually 
                                                 
239 Susan McCabe, Cinematic Modernism: Modernist Poetry and Film (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 40. 
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Asian, world in his poems.240  Those affinities Eliot maps in his poetry’s appropriation of 
cinematic techniques, and with the figure of the automaton.   
Automatism has been part of western visual experience for some time.  In his 
early account of visual perception, René Descartes wrote of automata as instruments 
which may possess, or seem to possess, human qualities but which can be distinguished 
from the human because they do not think or emote; they simply imitate.241  The 
distinction was an important one because of the model of vision Descartes was advancing, 
which preferred to imagine the eye as disembodied and objective.  This Cartesian eye 
became the default for conception for understanding sight during and after the 
Enlightenment.  But imagining vision as though it were perceived by an impersonal eye, 
as though sight was a curiously evacuated of personal content, created a deep 
contradiction in a mode of perception that was increasingly being thought of as individual 
and subjective by the time of modernism.  As Karen Jacobs explains, from Cartesian 
sight to modernist optics, “we can trace a trajectory of crisis in the belief in subjective 
transparency, one increasingly cast in relational terms in which the repressed 
embodiment of the observer becomes the displaced embodiment of the observed, finally 
returning, as it were, to reassert its material presence in uncertainly valued forms.”242  
Film provided a means of negotiating this crisis by bringing together automatic images 
                                                 
240 There is, of course, chauvinism and anti-Semitism in the poems as well.  But rather than drawing a 
bright line between Eliot’s politics that neatly divides his critical and imaginative writings, I read Eliot’s 
poetry as one of the places where we find coded experimentation with affinities for femininity and ethnicity 
that contrast some of his other discursive positions. 
241 This appears in in Part V of Discourse on Method (1637), where Descartes explains that a machine 
resembling a human could be identified by its lack of meaningful speech and imitation.  See Descartes, 
Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 72.  Later, in 
The Passions of the Soul (1649), Descartes identifies an automaton simply as “a machine that moves by 
itself” (in Philosophical Essays, 299). 
242 Karen Jacobs, The Eye’s Mind: Literary Modernism and Visual Culture (London and Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 13; my emphasis. 
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that call to attention their audience’s relational positions.  For early writers on film, the 
new medium seemed something like an automaton: a representation of the human that in 
its most successful form makes us suspend our belief, if not forget, that we are 
encountering is not another subject.  Modernist writers often wrote of film as the 
apotheosis of mechanical reproduction.  This has been one of the legacies of modernist 
film writing, lasting as late as 1945 for André Bazin, who sensed the screen’s presence as 
“the instrumentality of a nonliving agent.”243 
I want to be careful not to make too much of the comparison of film to 
automatism—there are certainly negative consequences to conflating the two—but I want 
to highlight this parallel for two reasons.  The first is that writers of film in the modernist 
period often likened film to an automaton because of its strong mimetic capacity, and 
they responded to it as such.  There the fusion of aesthetics and automatism is closest, 
and yet the result was not that these writers found film to be inhuman or unresponsive.  
On the contrary, they demonstrated that audiences often felt fused to it, a connection born 
not in spite of film’s impersonal presentation but because of it.  The second reason I wish 
to point up this association is because readers since antiquity have been suspicious of 
texts for precisely this reason.244  A text, like a film, indifferently repeats the same 
gestures before each audience and at each viewing.  Though different audiences and 
audience members will yield diverse interpretations, the autonomous work of art seems 
indifferent to them.  But to regard art’s aim, in text as in film, as “impersonal 
                                                 
243 André Bazin, What is Cinema? ed. and trans. Hugh Gray, 2 vols.,  (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967-71), 1:13.  Cf. Cavell above.  Trotter discusses similar comments by Bazin and Cavell on 
film’s automatism (239, 241).  Finally, automata appear throughout Laura Marcus’s study of early film, 
The Tenth Muse, which collects comments by a range of other writers who equate film with automatism, 
including Jean Epstein, Alexander Bakshy, Arnold Hauser, and, more recently, Gilles Deleuze. 
244 I am thinking, of course, of Plato’s famous condemnation in the Phaedrus of all writing as a kind of 
automaton whose record of knowledge is only a shadow of the real knowledge that may only be acquired in 
dialogue. 
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intimacy”—the unforeseeable relation produced by the merging of two entities, such as 
art and audience—is to regard art even in its most automatic, mechanical instantiation as 
sensitive to, even calling out for, audience responses.  In fact, this impersonal intimacy 
only becomes clear in the machine age.  Trotter’s brilliant central claim is that Eliot’s 
poetry does not reject filmic automatism, but, on the contrary, anatomizes the desire to be 
both human and automaton.  Eliot’s poetry leading up to The Waste Land seeks to present 
“what it feels like to (want to) behave automatically.”245 
This is a point worth exploring more fully.  Indeed, automata—lingering, waiting, 
muttering, and sputtering—pervade Eliot’s early poetry, from his early apprenticeship 
poems up to The Waste Land.  Many spring immediately to mind: the “women [who] 
come and go” in “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (1917), the talking streetlamp in 
“Rhapsody on a Windy Night” (1917), the staring daffodil bulbs of “Whispers of 
Immortality” (1917), “the human engine” idling in The Waste Land are just a few.246  
Appearing at key moments in Eliot’s poetry, automata counterbalance figures of 
restlessness, wandering, longing, trauma, and the waning masculinity and cultural 
authority that characterize Eliot’s poetry of the teens and twenties.  Eliot’s abandoned 
early volume Inventions of the March Hare (1909-17) opens with “Convictions (Curtain 
Raiser),” a poem which introduces those that follow it as “marionettes” who think, feel, 
and speak on their own, and concludes with “The Engine,” a “deliberate, and alert” 
machine powering a ship on a long, presumably transatlantic, voyage.247  Automata in 
Eliot not only speak and move; they travel.   
                                                 
245 Trotter, “Eliot and Cinema,” 241. 
246 Eliot, Complete Poems, 4, 14, 32, and 43. 
247 Eliot, Inventions, 11, 90. 
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One of the earliest examples of automata in Eliot’s poetry appears in “On a 
Portrait” (1909), an apprenticeship sonnet Eliot composed and published in The Harvard 
Advocate while still an undergraduate.  The portrait in question is Édouard Manet’s La 
femme au perroquet, which Eliot encountered in a book while at Harvard.248  Eliot writes 
as a viewer who regards the woman with a parrot as in an enviable position of autonomy 
that allows for her contemplation.  What will make “On a Portrait” valuable to this 
discussion of film is its willingness to class both the woman and parrot in the painting as 
automata whose sight Eliot’s speaker wishes he could access—figures not unlike movie 
cameras.   
Because this short poem is not well known (it is not included among the 
Harcourt’s Complete Poems or Faber’s Collected Poems), it is worth reprinting in full: 
“On a Portrait” 
 
Among a crowd of tenuous dreams, unknown 
To us of restless brain and weary feet, 
Forever hurrying, up and down the street, 
She stands at evening in the room alone. 
 
Not like a tranquil goddess carved of stone 
But evanescent, as if one should meet 
A pensive lamia in some wood retreat, 
An immaterial fancy of one’s own. 
 
No meditations glad or ominous 
Disturb her lips, or move the slender hands; 
Her dark eyes keep their secrets hid from us, 
Beyond the circle of our thought she stands. 
 
The parrot on his bar, a silent spy, 
Regards her with a patient curious eye.249 
                                                 
248 Frances Dickey, “Parrot’s Eye: A Portrait by Manet and Two by T. S. Eliot,” Twentieth-Century 
Literature 52.2 (2006), 112. 
249 T. S. Eliot, “On a Portrait,” Poems Written in Early Youth, ed. Valerie Eliot (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 1967), 21. 
  171
Eliot’s poem presents a speaker wrestling with the inaccessibility of the figure in the 
portrait and his desire to close the unbridgeable gap between them.  This speaker seeks 
not to project a supposed subjectivity onto the figure in the portrait, but rather to 
adumbrate the contours of the known so as to express the nearness of knowing her as well 
as the impossibility of doing so.  “On a Portrait” preserves a fascination in the danger of 
regarding the woman in the painting as a lamia, a figure Eliot no doubt borrows from 
precursors such as Keats, Baudelaire, and Swinburne.  If Eliot inherits in these lines a 
Romantic, decadent, or symbolist feminine image of the kind which serves “as a 
powerful symbol of both the dangers and the promises of the modern age,” he also adds 
an unexpected turn.250  Why a “pensive lamia?”  Why a grotesque, threatening half-
female, half-animal body in a nonthreatening posture? 
The inscrutability of Manet’s woman and her parrot that this speaker suffers has 
led Frances Dickey to read Eliot’s poem as struggling to apprehend a figure who appears 
both a subject and an automaton—a struggle, as she points out, between surface and 
depth in which Manet’s contemporaries also found themselves.  But if the woman in the 
painting remains a mystery, as Dickey contends (“The question for viewers of Woman 
with a Parrot, then as now, is whether she has an inaccessible mind and interior, or 
nothing to access at all.  Is she absorbed in her thoughts, or incapable of absorption?”), 
the figure of the parrot most suggests automatism for both Manet and Eliot: 
The automaton may be deceptive, but not because his exterior conceals a 
radically different interior.  Rather, an automaton would have no interior 
at all in the Cartesian sense.  Manet and Eliot represent this alternative by 
the figure of the parrot.  Parrots can ‘speak,’ and sometimes they are 
credited with using language appropriately, yet we do not think they have 
minds like ours, if at all.  Their behavior puts the lie to the idea that 
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language exteriorizes thought, brings the inside into contact with a social 
world.  It is pure imitation without expression.251 
 
The deep attention Eliot records in “On a Portrait” is close to the experience of 
wonder as Stephen Greenblatt describes it in an essay on the display of art and artifacts in 
museums.  This is the experience of arresting viewers before the display in an “act of 
attention [which] draws a circle around itself from which everything but the object is 
excluded, when intensity of regard blocks out all circumambient images, stills all 
murmuring voices.”252  The experience Eliot’s speaker has before this portrait is clearly 
similar to what Greenblatt describes, but unique to the genre of portraiture.  What 
concerns this speaker is that the portrait is compelling because its subject lies “[b]eyond 
the circle of our thought.”  The affective circle surrounding viewer and portrait, in other 
words, becomes more intense when the viewer stands alone within his circle of 
knowledge, left to refigure this woman as a “pensive lamia” of his own “immaterial 
fancy.”   
 Wonder is not part of the catalog of affective modes or intellectual postures we 
associate with early Eliot (modes like restlessness and yearning, as I’ve said, are more 
typical), but wonder in this poem indicates this speaker’s desire to inhabit the world of 
this inscrutable figure, to know what it is like to be a pensive lamia.  This is a peculiar 
form of wonder, one that comes at a moment of respite from modern life but which 
results in an epiphany about the conditions of Eliot’s own speaker as a privileged but not 
puissant interpreter.  Such epiphanies mark so many of Eliot’s speakers as persons who 
stand in the privileged nexus of whiteness, masculinity, and cultural capital while fearing 
                                                 
251 Dickey, “Parrot’s Eye,” 119; the quotation in parentheses appears on p. 117. 
252 Stephen Greenblatt, “Resonance and Wonder,” Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum 
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that they possess no legitimate claims to such positions.  This is wonder stirred by an 
encounter with something greater than the self but also inscrutable—rousing while also 
frustrating closeness and the objective knowledge that the impersonal automaton may 
otherwise deliver.  Yet the compensation is unmistakably impersonal intimacy: while the 
poem seems only to reflect what Eliot’s speaker knew before he saw the poem (namely, 
that the feminine and antimodern are enframed and closed off from masculine modernity), 
the boundary the poem draws between its speaker and its painting, “the circle of our 
thought,” is what the speaker longs to break.  In so doing, “On a Portrait” places its 
weight on what its speaker does not, and cannot, know.  There is something to the genre 
of the portraiture, then, that promises communion by presenting the image of another and 
which becomes more affectively charged by withholding that possibility.   
And here is perhaps where the category of gender becomes most useful in aiding 
our reading of this poem, for part of why this speaker has this reaction before this 
particular portrait is because he envies the figure of “a pensive lamia” and not what I take 
to be its contrast in the poem, “a tranquil goddess.”  The latter connotes quiescence 
(goddesses in classical art are beautiful but benign images elevated for viewing, sapped 
of their own power).  A pensive lamia, however, thinks and exists apart from human life 
without seeking to intervene in it, and retains its own power in its threatening image.  As 
with the parrot, then, Eliot’s speaker is less interested in what this automaton has to say 
than with having direct access to what she sees, for she may possess an accessory visual 
knowledge unimaginable to this speaker and this poet.  It may impart the knowledge of a 
visual language heralded in film later.  It is that otherness that inspires Eliot’s poem, that 
particular identification with the feminine that Eliot uses as a portal of discovery. 
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Taken in light of the automata who will soon be moving and traveling in the 
poetry Eliot will write beginning in 1909, “On a Portrait” will teach us one more thing.  
The reproduction of the painting that Eliot encounters in a book outside of Boston 
becomes the occasion for imagining an encounter with the painting itself in a Parisian 
salon, where, in turn, the presence of the parrot evinces a circuit connecting Europe and 
the tropics.  The real and imagined journeys that were required to capture the image of 
Eliot’s speaker gazing at Manet’s painting are not incidental.  Such commercial and 
imperial traffic leading out of and back to Europe’s cities supplied those metropoles with 
their cultural and financial capital, and, moreover, remained invisible until the age of 
mechanical reproduction could bring global images to local spaces.  Eliot’s speaker 
claims the advantages of a Parisian because of the picture Eliot saw at Harvard, but his 
speaker cannot know what the parrot’s “patient curious eye” has seen in the course of its 
travels.  The desire for that knowledge remains latent in “On a Portrait,” but bears strong 
similarities to the movie camera, another automaton and “silent spy.”  Evidence of 
whether Eliot had seen films prior to 1914 is not extant in his published materials, but 
that is to some extent beside the point.  “On a Portrait” is notable not because it conveys 
the impressions of film but because it reveals a desire in Eliot from an early point to 
possess the kind of visual knowledge films provide: images generated automatically that 
provide object access to different cultures and unimaginable differences. 
The automatic images of film that Eliot’s speaker longs for in 1909 did not 
complete that desire by allowing its audiences suture with it.  Rather, film emphasized its 
audiences’ positionality by encouraging identification with filmed images while 
reasserting the distance between the cinema house and the places and people projected 
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onscreen.  Benjamin characterizes the process in this way in a later version of the Work 
of Art essay: “the audience [takes] the position of a critic, without experiencing any 
personal contact with the actor.  The audience’s empathy with the actor is really an 
empathy with the camera.  Consequently, the audience takes the position of the 
camera.”253  If impersonality and intimacy are modernism’s compensations for 
modernity’s fragmented experiences, as I have been suggesting, and film provides both 
impersonality and intimacy, we might ask the question implied in what we have seen in 
Woolf’s “The Cinema,” Benjamin’s Work of Art essay, and Eliot’s writings of the teens 
and early twenties: how is the compensation of impersonal intimacy complicated by the 
specter of anthropological distance that appears in writings by Woolf, Benjamin, and 
Eliot?  A response that can attend to the deep complexities in this question is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but I want to suggest a path forward by way of conclusion here. 
While few would disagree that early film’s audiences often left cinemas with a 
different sense of themselves and the world around them as shaped by the medium they 
had just seen, we ought to recall that film, too, was altered.  The Poundian mantra “make 
it new” might seem to suggest that film’s newness leaves audiences astonished, 
bewildered, or amused rather than as critical spectators of what they see, and that is 
surely not always the case.  Rather, the myth of film’s inception as a scene of such 
astonishment (where audiences rushed to make way for the arrival of a filmed train) tells 
us more about the tenacity of modernist outlooks even within criticism that believes itself 
                                                 
253 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Third Version,” 
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to have shed its modern shrouds than it tells us about film’s origins themselves.254  The 
arrival of the train suggests another key element of the modernist mythos: speed.  Though 
it makes sense to investigate the immediate impacts of art and media, we ought not forget 
the longer span that includes developments in genres, topoi, and techniques.   
Woolf’s own mythologizing of film’s audiences as savages watching the pictures 
conflates the very different registers of place and time, imposing the temporal scope of 
modernity and premodernity over the geography of London and colony.  That this map 
and this clock were also present in A Voyage Out, a decade and a half before Woolf’s 
essay on the cinema, indicates a deeper commitment on her behalf, and found in other 
modernists as well, for defining modernism by inventing its own primitive origins.  
Nothing intrinsic about film meant that its audiences had to be explained as “savages 
watching the pictures,” but in writing about it that way Woolf deploys the familiar 
modernist trope of rendering urban dwellers inadequate to the task of comprehending all 
that surrounds them.  Distance and defamiliarization become not just aesthetic choices 
but requirements for learning to cope with a social sphere that seems replete with images 
but driven largely by invisible forces. 
The longing for distance that Woolf fills by borrowing the rhetoric of ethnography 
is not unlike the longing we have seen elsewhere in this dissertation.  The most malicious 
have been in caricatures of racial stereotypes and in colonial exhibition displays, but 
others have come in the form of Carlyle’s heroic visuality, Conrad’s irony, and Eliot’s 
impersonality.  Despite their differences, each of these impulses to define oneself or 
one’s culture share a withering effect, allowing first-stage recognition its place but not 
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providing space for further engagement with the unknown and unfamiliar.  Though their 
practitioners do not wish to acknowledge it, these gestures point to something more that 
has been left for others to trace, and what we learn from reading such texts includes not 
just the ways in which London’s inhabitants sought identification, but also guidance for 
our own ways of reading and seeing as well.  As theory refines its approach to images, 
texts, and the relations between the two—developing more precise ways of understanding 
the social ramifications of recognition, the subtle ways images and texts call for 
responses that are not always modeled after one another, the ways that images and texts 
deploy, modify, and alter the flows of power in social life—we need to be particularly 
careful in how we characterize the emergence of modernist literature alongside visual 
media and technologies.  Because critics throughout the twentieth century have supplied 
us with carefully crafted vocabularies for discussing concepts predicated on distance, 
such as irony, defamiliarization, and parallel structures, we need now to relax our grip a 
bit—though not entirely—on those concepts so that we might turn more fully toward 
developing a more precise set of terms for discussing categories such as reattachment, 
codevelopment, mutual influence, and affective reactions.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In a chapter outlining the approach he takes in What Do Pictures Want?, W. J. T. 
Mitchell advocates for a way of viewing that can account for our affective and 
intellectual responses to pictures.  To accomplish this, Mitchell recommends consciously 
regarding pictures partly as objects (inanimate, made things), and partly as subjects 
(enlivened by irrational but persistent projections of subjectivity made by viewers).  As 
he cogently explains, the reason we ought to adopt such a critical program is because we 
already unconsciously look at pictures in this way.255  In order to address pictures on 
these terms—and to “shift the question from what pictures do to what they want, from 
power to desire” (WDPW 34)—Mitchell advances what he calls the “subaltern model of 
the picture” (WDPW 33), a hermeneutic that grasps for a way to recognize in a silent 
surface the possibility of a voice.  In the figure of the subaltern, Mitchell means to remind 
us that we sometimes see pictures “as complex individuals occupying multiple subject 
positions and identities” (WDPW 47).  His point is not to personify pictures, “but to put 
our relation to the work into question, to make the relationality of image and beholder the 
field of investigation” (WDPW 49; Mitchell’s italics).  Ultimately, Mitchell aspires to 
make picture-gazing that which it cannot be, but which he believes ought to be reached 
for nonetheless: “an intersubjective encounter,” a conversation with the subaltern 
(WDPW 39). 
Mitchell’s approach deserves much more sustained treatment than I will be able to 
give it here, but there are a few features that I wish to point out in order to offer some 
closing remarks to my preceding pages.  Let me begin with my last quotation from 
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Mitchell: regarding pictures as subalterns may offer “an intersubjective encounter.”  The 
question surrounding the subaltern is, of course, whether the subaltern can speak.  In 
borrowing the term from Gayatri Spivak, Mitchell notes that when Spivak poses this 
question, her answer “is no, an answer that is echoed when images are treated as the 
silent or mute sign, incapable of speech, sound, and negation (in which case the answer to 
our question might be, pictures want a voice, a poetics of enunciation” (29 n2).  Though 
we might take issue with Mitchell’s answer to the question—that the subaltern might 
speak—the larger point is that he wants to avoid making the same mistake with pictures 
that have been made with subalterns in the past.  Let them speak; see what they say; find 
out what they can teach. 
To be sure, this approach at once sounds strange and yet makes sense.  I raise it 
here because I want to suggest that there is much in common with Mitchell’s subaltern 
model of the picture and the procedures of modern recognition I have been tracing here, 
which also holds out the hope of communication, of a meeting with another who is 
familiar but never quite the same.  Like Mitchell, Wilde, James, Conrad, Forster, Woolf, 
and Eliot attend to rational and affective responses to images.  And, like these modernists, 
Mitchell is interested in exploring identity, though for him it is the identity viewers 
project onto the image.  The reason he selects the model he does owes everything to the 
fact that the figure of “the minority or subaltern that has been so central to the 
development of modern studies in gender, sexuality, and ethnicity” (WDPW 29).  In this 
way, the subaltern is meant to add depth to these identity positions, and to allow them to 
be recognized in all of that term’s complexity—to appreciate what is known and left 
unknown as well.  Or, as Mitchell says elsewhere, to attend to “an inevitable topic of 
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visual culture”: “the recognition of gender, race, sexual orientation, class, tribal or 
subcultural identity, etc.”—identity categories that have some sway over pictures and 
people alike.256 
But argument I have been tracing here also suggests that for over a century 
mediated images have seemed to British subjects to possess uncanny ties to nonwestern 
peoples, occupied territories, and the connections linking these people and places with 
metropolitan westerners.  The figure of the subaltern haunts Dorian Gray’s décor, 
Conrad’s London, and Woolf’s cinema.  And if images taken from within England’s 
boundaries in James and Eliot that connote British identity resonate with global 
connections that are not properly subaltern, they certainly depart from customary senses 
of Britishness.  I have been suggesting throughout this project that to understand the 
kinds of witness Wilde, James, Conrad, Forster, Woolf, and Eliot bear, and the 
connection between modern and (post)colonial vocabularies for seeing on which their 
texts report, it helps to give the name recognition to the conjoined nature of modernist 
visual modes, forms of seeing that include stereotype and invention; “authentic” types 
and character; fetishism and curiosity; impersonality and intimacy.  Indeed, such is the 
nature of recognition: it is a process that happens continuously in daily life and in which 
art forms are particularly adept at coaxing out of us.  Surprise is fundamental to 
recognition, for even when we encounter something familiar for what seems like the 
hundredth time, the singularity of the encounter itself may yet point toward something 
unfamiliar and worthy of our attention.  And because moments of recognition are 
moments of bringing prior knowledge to bear on present circumstances, taking note of 
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recognition itself allows us to revisit those earlier beliefs.  “Prior knowledge” is an 
ambivalent category to a generation that was, on the one hand, highly suspicious of its 
predecessors and, on the other, interested in constructing modern mythologies.   
In the ironic, autoreflexive, and highly self-conscious aesthetics of modernism, 
recognition became a perennial theme as well as a problem to be systematically analyzed, 
particularly as a visual mode operating in the fashioning and refashioning of metropolitan 
identities.  To read Oscar Wilde on the global accumulations of the British aristocracy, 
Henry James on the artist’s dilemma of portraying types in a globalizing world, Joseph 
Conrad on the fetishization of science, E. M. Forster on curiosity at a colonial exhibition, 
Virginia Woolf on cinema as a myth of civilization’s origins, and T. S. Eliot on European 
civilization as fragmented images—to read these is to encounter a series of literary 
aesthetics that urge us to reformulate our conceptions of how identities literally appeared 
to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Britons.  This is not to say that modernism 
reflects a trend that can be spotted elsewhere—in, say, British art history or the records of 
colonial exhibitions.  Rather, as I hope to have demonstrated, literary modernism 
captured the texture of everyday existences shaped by imperial expansion as well as new 
visual media and technologies in order to acquire a deep understanding of this phase of 
British modernity.  One cannot grasp the changes of this period without also reading its 
literature. 
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